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On February 6th, 1981, engineer José Maria Ryan was found in the woods. He had a 
bullet in his neck and a mouth full of cotton. Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) “Basque Homeland 
and Freedom” claimed responsibility. Three days later, 200,000 Spaniards gathered in the 
streets to protest ETA’s violent act. By February 13th, a suspected ETA member named José 
Arregui Izaguirre was tortured to death in a Madrid prison. Outraged at the government’s 
brutality, 110,000 protesters flocked to the streets. Spain, newly democratized in 1975, was 
straining under the weight of a two-decade long terrorist insurrection. While the nation 
endeavored to consolidate a “government by the people,” elements of the hard-fisted fascist 
regime remained. Instead of calming the conflict, the government countered ETA’s violence with 
like-minded brutality. During Spain’s six-year democratic transition, ETA attacks increased, 
followed by government retaliation. Early 1981 signified a breaking point. Spain’s cycle of 
reactionary violence was met with backlash by the population, contributing to Prime Minister 
Adolfo Suárez’s resignation on January 29th. A month later, right-wing Civil Guard members, 
nostalgic for the stability of General Franco’s authoritarian rule (1939-1975), stormed 
parliament in a coup attempt. The plot failed, but it highlighted the fragile state of Spanish 
democracy. Both ETA and the government opposed a restored dictatorship, but years of 
retaliatory torture, assassinations, midnight kidnappings, and secret arrests had unintentionally 
weakened the fledgling democracy. By the end of 1981, ETA violence plummeted. Its violent 
tactics had proven counterproductive in the newly democratized environment. This study 
examines the relationship between political structure and terrorist violence in the context of 
Spain’s democratic transition. Although counterintuitive, democratic governments can 
perpetuate terrorism through hardline counterterrorism crackdowns. As evidenced in Spain, the 
use of authoritarian practices by democratic states delegitimizes the government, alienates the 
people, and renews the terrorists’ resolve. 
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Introduction 
The noise was deafening in February 1981. Banners floated over the streets, suspended 
by shrieking protestors. Cries of “Reject ETA!”1 and “Peace!”2 reverberated off city buildings, 
quickly countered by a few indignant bellows of “ETA on High!”3 Crowds pressed from all sides, 
dispersing and reforming as the Spanish Civil Guard struggled to maintain public order. La plaza 
de Zabálburu was at maximum capacity. Here, in the heart of Bilbao, Spain, one hundred 
thousand people clamored for justice. Only sixty miles away another 60,000 demonstrators 
converged in San Sebastián.  Forty-thousand more gathered in the Basque capital city of Vitoria.
4
 
As tensions heightened, clashes erupted between civilians and the police. By the end of February 
10
th
, 1981 fifty people were reported injured in the demonstrations.
5
  
Spain was reeling. Only four days earlier, on February 6
th
, 1981, a civilian engineer was 
discovered dead in the woods. His body lay face up, less than 150 meters from the road. A 
blindfold covered José Maria Ryan’s unseeing eyes, and crumpled cotton filled the murdered 
engineer’s gaping mouth. He had been killed execution style.6 A kerchief mercifully concealed 
the gruesome remains of Ryan’s neck in the released photos.7 Ryan, a loving husband and 
father,
8
 had no ties to Spanish politics. He was neither a law enforcement officer, nor a 
government official. Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)
9
 or “Basque Homeland and Freedom” 
                                                          
1
 La Gaceta Del Norte [Bilbao, Spain] 11 Feb. 1981: 10. Print. 
 All Spanish text translations are my own, unless otherwise noted  
2 La Gaceta Del Norte [Bilbao, Spain] 10 Feb. 1981: 1. Print. 
3 La Gaceta Del Norte [Bilbao, Spain] 10 Feb. 1981: 11. Print. 
4 La Gaceta Del Norte [Bilbao, Spain] 10 Feb. 1981: 1. Print.  
5
 "Basques Strike to Protest Murder by Rebel Group." The New York Times [New York, United States] 10 Feb. 1981: 
The New York Times. 10 Feb. 1981. Web. 6 Dec. 2014. 
6 La Gaceta Del Norte [Bilbao, Spain] 7 Feb. 1981: 1. Print. 
7 La Gaceta Del Norte [Bilbao, Spain] 3 Feb. 1981: 8. Print. 
8
 La Gaceta Del Norte [Bilbao, Spain] 31 Jan. 1981: 1. Print. 
9
 ETA split into two factions in 1974: ETA-militar (ETA-m) and ETA-político militar (ETA-pm). ETA-m was responsible 
for Ryan’s kidnapping and murder.  
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claimed responsibility for the violence.
10
 Its message was clear. ETA was willing to spill 
innocent blood to achieve its goal of creating an independent Basque State. After kidnapping the 
thirty-nine year-old on January 29
th
, the politically violent Basque separatist organization issued 
an ultimatum to the Spanish government. According to ETA’s statement, Ryan, the chief 
engineer of a controversial nuclear power plant construction project, was abducted for his 
affiliation with government-promoted industrialist capitalism.
11
 But the victim’s civilian status 
made Ryan an especially desirable target. Kidnapping noncombatants incited fear in the Basque 
and Spanish populations, exaggerating public perceptions of ETA’s societal power. Like other 
politically violent groups, ETA hoped to “instill fear and helplessness in a population in order to 
influence decision-making and to change behavior.”12 Their terror tactic was not new. Between 
1968 and 1980 approximately 95.8% of ETA kidnapping victims were civilians.
13
 Most were 
released after paying substantial sums in ransom.
14
 However, while Ryan’s abduction was not 
novel, the contingencies of his kidnapping were unusual. Instead of demanding money, ETA 
required the destruction of the Lemóniz Nuclear Power Plant in exchange for the engineer’s 
life.
15
 Adamant to oppose terrorism, the Spanish government refused to negotiate. Despite public 
appeals for Ryan’s release16 and a heartbreaking plea from the captured man’s wife,17 Ryan was 
shot dead on the night of February 6
th
.
18
 Enraged at ETA’s disrespect for human life, the Basque 
                                                          
10
 La Gaceta Del Norte [Bilbao, Spain] 7 Feb. 1981: 1. Print. 
11 Egin [San Sebastián, Spain] 30 Jan. 1981: 1. Print. 
12 Werner G. K. Stritzke and Stephan Lewandowsky. Terrorism and Torture: An Interdisciplinary Perspective. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2009.  3. Print. 
13
 Robert P. Clark. The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980. Madison, WI: U of Wisconsin, 1984. 135. Print. 
14 Yonah Alexander, Michael S. Swetnam, and Herbert M. Levine. ETA: Profile of a Terrorist Group. Ardsley, NY: 
Transnational, 2001. 21. Print. 
15 La Gaceta Del Norte [Bilbao, Spain] 31 Jan. 1981: 1. Print. 
16
 ABC [Madrid, Spain] 8 Feb. 1981: 19. Print. 
17
 La Gaceta Del Norte [Bilbao, Spain] 31 Jan. 1981: 1. Print. 
18 La Gaceta Del Norte [Bilbao, Spain] 7 Feb. 1981: 1. Print. 
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public erupted in protest. Two days after photos of Ryan’s lifeless form hit the press, 200,000 
anti-ETA protestors converged in the streets of Bilbao, San Sebastián, and Vitoria.
19
  
José Maria Ryan’s tragic death was only the beginning. On February 13 th, exactly one 
week after Ryan’s execution, the Spanish State plunged into a second wave of disorder. José 
Arregui Izaguirre, an imprisoned ETA member and suspected assassin,
20
 lay dead at the hands of 
the Spanish government. Izaguirre had been captured by the Spanish Civil Guard on February 
4
th
,
21
 two days before Ryan’s murder. According to early autopsy reports, the thirty year-old 
etarra [ETA militant in the Basque language] died in the Madrid Carabanchel Penitentiary 
Hospital after suffering bronchial pneumonia, a pulmonary edema, and a pleural effusion.
22
 The 
circumstances of the terrorist’s death were ominous. As an undercurrent of morbid suspicion 
swept through the country, the Ministry of the Interior ordered a formal investigation.
23
 By 
February 15
th
, the sinister reality was clear. Izaguirre had been tortured to death. The five police 
inspectors involved in Izaguirre’s interrogation were turned over to the justice process,24 and the 
newly democratized government scrambled to quell public outrage. Only days after massive 
protests paralyzed the Basque Country in response to Ryan’s death, another 150,000 angry 
people flooded the streets.
25
 This time the anger was directed at the Spanish government. 
Regardless of opinion on ETA, the majority of the Spanish population was horrified at the 
democratically-elected government’s disregard for basic human rights. Tremendous public 
                                                          
19
 La Gaceta Del Norte [Bilbao, Spain] Feb. 10 1981: 1. Print. 
20 ABC [Madrid, Spain] 8 Feb. 1981: 24. Print. 
21 ABC [Madrid, Spain] 8 Feb. 1981: 5. Print.  
22 La Gaceta Del Norte [Bilbao, Spain] 15 Feb. 1981: 1. Print. 
23
 La Gaceta Del Norte [Bilbao, Spain] 14 Feb. 1981: 11. Print. 
24
 La Gaceta Del Norte [Bilbao, Spain] 15 Feb. 1981: 1. Print. 
25 La Gaceta Del Norte [Bilbao, Spain] 17 Feb. 1981: 1. Print. 
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outrage brought Northern Spain to a standstill. Schools closed, public transportation ceased, and 
industry screeched to a halt as anti-government demonstrations overwhelmed northern Spain.
 26 
 
Spain’s troubles only became worse. On February 23rd, 1981, a group of two hundred 
right-wing Civil Guard members stormed parliament in a coup attempt.
27
 Their ring leader, the 
“ultra”28 fascist Lieutenant Coronel Tejero wanted to reinstate Spain’s previous military 
dictatorship, which ended in 1975 after thirty-six years.
29
 Although the plot failed, it sent shock 
waves through Spain. While the murders of early 1981 didn’t explicitly cause the February 23 rd 
crisis, they produced the volatile political climate that made Tejero’s coup attempt possible.  
Known as El Tejerazo, the coup forced both ETA and the democratically-elected government to 
reconsider their strategies. Although neither group supported a return to authoritarian rule, years 
of retaliatory torture, assassinations, midnight kidnappings, and secret arrests had unintentionally 
weakened the fledgling democracy.  
 ETA reduced its popular support base by kidnapping and murdering Ryan. Immediately 
following the engineer’s disappearance, denunciations of the Basque separatist group flooded the 
Northern press. The Catholic Federation of Vizcayan Priests announced it “felt compelled to 
publically express its repulsion at the kidnapping of José Maria Ryan, both for being an attack 
against the human rights of liberty and security, and for shattering a united family.”30 Seventy 
known individuals from Basque politics, culture, art, sports, and social media signed a 
communication published in the Basque newspaper Egin describing Ryan’s treatment as “a 
flagrant violation of the concept of liberty and security for all persons.”31 In response to Ryan’s 
                                                          
26 La Gaceta Del Norte [Bilbao, Spain] 17 Feb. 1981: 21. Print. 
27 La Gaceta Del Norte [Bilbao, Spain] 24 Feb. 1981: 1. Print. 
28 Robert Graham. Spain: A Nation Comes of Age. New York: St. Martin's, 1984. 205. Print. 
29
 La Gaceta Del Norte [Bilbao, Spain] 24 Feb. 1981: 1. Print. 
30
 El Correo Español  [Vitoria, Spain] 5 Feb. 1981: 4. Print. 
31 Egin [San Sebastián, Spain] 6 Feb. 1981: 3. Print. 
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murder, the Basque newspaper La Gaceta del Norte promised its “absolute rejection of ETA and 
condemnation of the group’s unspeakable criminal act.”32 And the February 8th front page of the 
Basque Country’s El Correo Español read “Repulsion and Nausea in the Basque Country Over 
Ryan’s Murder.”33  ETA’s “self-indulgent violence”34 escaped the control of the organization 
and derailed the trajectory of Basque independence. Even the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), a 
political organization which openly supported liberty for Euskal Herria (name of the Basque 
Country in the Basque language), issued a statement criticizing Ryan’s mistreatment. In a 
message to ETA via Egin, the PNV wrote “the kidnapping of a technician in service to Iberdeuro 
[Ryan] was an unthinkable act. It means those [ETA militants] think they can play with the 
liberty and life of a worker.”35 
  Similarly, the Spanish government undermined its own legitimacy by utilizing torture 
against Izaguirre—a tactic which violated the democratic laws of The Spanish Constitution of 
1978. Madrid’s “repressive state response”36 alienated the Spanish and Basque populations and 
strengthened the credibility of ETA’s alleged oppression. Referring to Izaguirre’s death, the 
February 14
th
, 1981 cover of El Correo Español stated “the [Spanish] government must radically 
cease actions that do not respect the fundamental rights of people.”37 Abel Hernandez, an opinion 
writer for La Gaceta del Norte, wrote “the shadow of torture does not promote national 
coexistence.”38 ABC quoted Blas Piñar, president of the far-right Spanish political party New 
Force, arguing “‘this [death of Izaguirre] reveals a lack of coherence in the government, which 
                                                          
32 La Gaceta Del Norte [Bilbao, Spain] 10 Feb. 1981: 13. Print. 
33 El Correo Español  [Vitoria, Spain] 8 Feb. 1981: 1. Print. 
34
 Martha Crenshaw. "The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War." Terrorism in Context. University Park, 
PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 1995. 476. Print. 
35 Egin [San Sebastián, Spain] 6 Feb. 1981: 6. Print. 
36 Tom Parker. “Fighting an Antaean Enemy: How Democratic States Unintentionally Sustain the Terrorist 
Movements They Oppose." Terrorism and Political Violence 19 (2007): 155. Print. 
37
 El Correo Español  [Vitoria, Spain] 14 Feb. 1981: 1. Print. 
38 La Gaceta Del Norte [Bilbao, Spain] 15 Feb. 1981: 13. Print. 
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allegedly safeguards human rights, but is still torturing [Basques].’”39 And Egin opinion 
columnist Rosa Olivares denounced the Spanish government for Izaguirre’s death, declaring “to 
torture, to repress, to interrogate, to crush the subversives, the terrorists, the revolutionaries…is 
socially permitted, accepted, tolerated by the forces of the parliamentary regime.”40 Clearly, the 
Spanish government was not upholding civilian expectations of democratic justice.  
The incidents of early 1981 mark a turning point in the history of ETA as an 
organization, the Spanish government’s relationship with ETA, and Spain’s progress towards 
democratic consolidation. By utilizing violent tactics reminiscent of the Franco-era, both entities 
lost public support and weakened the fledgling democracy. The success of each group was 
inhibited by its failure to innovate new strategies in the democratic environment.  This study 
aims to examine the Ryan and Izaguirre murders in the context of Spain’s transition to 
democracy from 1975-1982. Under the “authoritarian and ultra-Spanish nationalist Francoist 
regime”41 ETA committed “only sporadic acts of violence.”42 But after Franco’s death in 1975, 
the Spanish State witnessed a dramatic increase in terrorist violence.
43
 The implementation of 
democracy brought the Basques territorial autonomy from Madrid and representation in the 
central government, but the new political liberties did not satisfy ETA. The organization vowed 
to continue armed struggle until the Basque Country achieved full independence from Spain.  
Although Spain’s political landscape had shifted drastically, both ETA and the Spanish 
government were “highly resistant”44 to tactical change. Unfortunately, this inability to adapt 
backfired on both groups in early 1981. Analysis of media over the two murders indicates a 
                                                          
39
 ABC [Madrid, Spain] 15 Feb. 1981: 19. Print. 
40 Egin [San Sebastián, Spain] 18 Feb. 1981: 14. Print. 
41 Goldie Shabad, and Francisco José Llera Ramo. "Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in 
Spain." Terrorism in Context. Ed. Martha Crenshaw. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 1995. 411. Print. 
42
 Shabad and Ramo. “Political Violence in a Democratic State.” 411.  
43
 Shabad and Ramo. “Political Violence in a Democratic State.” 411.  
44 Shabad and Ramo. “Political Violence in a Democratic State.” 424.  
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prevailing sentiment of dissatisfaction among the Spanish and Basque populations. Newspaper 
coverage in the Basque Country (La Gaceta del Norte) and Madrid (ABC) highlights widespread 
condemnation of both homicides, signifying the Basque and Spanish populations’ overwhelming 
weariness of violence. While ETA and the democratically-elected government fixated on one 
another, the Basque and Spanish populations sued for peace. The deaths of Ryan and Izaguirre 
triggered a quick succession of events which culminated in the February 23
rd
 coup attempt. 
However, many other historical and cultural factors contributed to the near-breakdown of 
Spanish democracy. Thousands of years of Basque culture and society, the carnage of the 
Spanish Civil War, and the oppression of Franco’s dictatorship bolstered the development of late 
twentieth century Basque Nationalism. This ideology, more than anything else, made the 
violence of January and February 1981 possible. 
Conclusions of this Project 
 According to political scientist Martha Crenshaw, “terrorism can be effective without 
being successful, since it can produce decisive results that are nevertheless counterproductive.
45
 
In Crenshaw’s mind, an “effective” terrorist attack produces some kind of result (i.e. the bomb 
explodes; the gunman assassinates a political figure etc.). However, a “successful” terrorist 
attack generates the political outcomes the group intended. ETA-m effectively kidnapped and 
assassinated Ryan in early 1981, but the engineer’s death did not advance ETA’s political goals. 
The Spanish government refused to destroy the Lemóniz Nuclear Power Plant, and the 
engineer’s death did not augment ETA’s civilian support base in the Basque Country. In fact, 
Spanish and Basque sympathy for ETA dropped off in the aftermath of Ryan’s death (see 
                                                          
45
 Martha Crenshaw. "The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War." Terrorism in Context. University Park, 
PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 1995. N. pag. 475. Print. 
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Chapter Two). The repercussions of ETA’s murder outweighed the political benefits—making it 
largely unsuccessful.  
  The Spanish government also forfeited Spanish and Basque public support when it 
utilized torture, a hardline and illegal counterterrorism tactic (see Chapter Three). By employing 
terrorist-like methods against ETA, the newly-elected government undercut its own integrity. 
Although differences existed between civilian perceptions of Ryan and Izaguirre’s murders in the 
Basque Country and Madrid, both media outlets documented substantial public outrage over the 
deaths. Spanish and Basque civilians were disgusted with the injustices committed by both sides.  
By early 1981, ETA and the Spanish government were operating outside the realm of civilian 
support. Excessive violence from both entities alienated the Spanish population, delegitimized 
each side’s political objectives, and ultimately destabilized democracy. 
Implications  
 At its most basic level, this research explores the functionality of terrorism. When does 
terrorism generate political change? And when does it not? Furthermore, how do governments 
de-radicalize terrorist insurgencies? These theoretical questions are much broader than ETA, but 
the Basque case can serve as a basis for understanding other ethno-nationalist terrorist 
organizations. European terrorism was a central concern during the late twentieth century. In 
addition to ETA, the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland, the Italian Red Brigades, and the West 
German Red Army Faction plagued the international community in the 1970s and 1980s.
46
 Given 
the historical proximity of these groups, it is likely that similar socio-economic and political 
factors affected each organization. However, ETA is a particularly interesting case study because 
                                                          
46
 Dennis A. Pluchinsky. "Academic Research on European Terrorist Developments: Pleas from a Government 
Terrorism Analyst." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 15.1 (1992): n. pag. 15. Print. 
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it experienced a tangible turning point. Between 1979 and 1981, ETA violence plummeted.
47
 
START Global Terrorism Database reports 131 ETA attacks in 1980, but only 69 incidents in 
1981.
48
 In addition, START Global Terrorism Database estimates ETA killed 94 people in 1980, 
but only 23 in 1981.
49
 Furthermore, half of ETA (i.e. ETA-pm) disbanded in 1981, reducing the 
number of active etarras significantly. On December 6th, 1980, Spanish Interior Minister Juan 
José Rosón released a statement to the newspaper Deia claiming 2,000 ETA militants (including 
both ETA-m and ETA-pm) were known to police.
50
 A report published in Deia on June 13th, 
1982 estimated ETA membership much lower. The publication, written by the deputy chief of 
staff of the Civil Guard, placed the number of ETA militants (again both ETA-m and ETA-pm) 
at 500.
51
 If explained, this phenomenon could lend insight to successful deradicalization and 
counterterrorism strategies on the global stage.   
The ETA 
 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) or “Basque Homeland and Freedom” was established in 
1959 by a coalition of radical student youth groups. Angered by the oppression of General 
Francisco Franco’s fascist regime (1936-1975), ETA sought to achieve Basque independence 
and promote the “recuperation of Basque culture and language.”52 Upon its inception, the group 
was peaceful. ETA spread its message through graffiti, the symbolic burning of Spanish flags, 
and an underground journal titled Ekin (meaning “to act” in the Basque language).53  Unsatisfied 
with the results of civil disobedience, the group adopted a strategy of armed struggle in 1962. 
Despite its new commitment to violent resistance, ETA was fairly passive in the 1960s and early 
                                                          
47
 Shabad and Ramo. "Political Violence in a Democratic State.” 414. 
48 Global Terrorism Database. University of Maryland, 2001. Web. Mar. 2015 
49 Global Terrorism Database. University of Maryland, 2001. Web. Mar. 2015 
50 Clark. The Basque Insurgents. 221.  
51
 Clark. The Basque Insurgents. 222.  
52
 Shabad and Ramo. "Political Violence in a Democratic State.” 411.  
53 Wayne Anderson. The ETA: Spain's Basque Terrorists. New York: Rosen Pub. Group, 2003. 18. Print. 
Armstrong 13 
 
1970s. Internal debate over philosophy and strategy consumed the organization’s energy for over 
a decade.
54
  
 Tactical consensus emerged in 1967 when ETA leadership developed an “action-
repression-action spiral theory.”55 The approach was simple. ETA would provoke governmental 
repression by staging targeted terrorist attacks. Once mutual violence escalated to an “unbearable 
level,”56 Spain would overthrow its totalitarian government. The ensuing chaos would permit the 
Basque Country to secede unquestioned. In 1973, ETA coordinated its most “dramatic and 
consequential”57 operation yet. Basque militants assassinated Prime Minister Luis Carrero 
Blanco, Franco’s favored successor. The murder reshaped Spain’s political trajectory by 
prompting the “demise of the authoritarian regime,”58 but it also divided the organization. 
Political schisms within ETA resulted in a permanent split in 1974. ETA-político militar (ETA-
pm) pledged to participate in the political process, while ETA-militar (ETA-m) continued 
employing violence to pursue full independence.  
 After Franco’s death in 1975, Spain experienced the long anticipated “rebirth of 
democracy.”59 King Juan Carlos appointed Adolfo Suárez to the position of Prime Minister, and 
the new parliamentary government ratified a constitution in 1978. In response to the democratic 
transition, ETA agreed to discuss a cease fire if the Spanish government fulfilled a list of 
“requirements”. The document, titled the KAS Alternative, demanded the Spanish government 
amend the 1978 Spanish Constitution to include the right of self-determination for all peripheral 
nations. In addition, ETA wanted the “assertion of the territorial integrity of all Basque provinces 
                                                          
54 Anderson. The ETA: Spain's Basque Terrorists. 19.  
55 Anderson. The ETA: Spain's Basque Terrorists. 19. 
56 Anderson. The ETA: Spain's Basque Terrorists. 19. 
57
 Shabad and Ramo. "Political Violence in a Democratic State.” 411.  
58
 Shabad and Ramo. "Political Violence in a Democratic State.” 411. 
59 Shabad and Ramo. "Political Violence in a Democratic State.” 411. 
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in Spain,”60 the recognition of Euskera as the official Basque language, the amnesty of all 
political prisoners, the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Euskal Herria, and improved labor 
conditions for the working class.
61
 Surprisingly, the Spanish government met the majority of the 
Basque organization’s demands. The Basque Country was granted political autonomy, civil 
liberties, trade unions, and territorial independence.
62
 
 But ETA continued to operate as though “nothing had changed,”63 and the number of 
ETA murders and kidnappings skyrocketed during Spain’s democratic transition.64 According to 
Robert Clark, ETA’s mortal victims increased from nine in 1977 to 88 in 1980.65 Furthermore, 
ETA’s target selections expanded. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the covert group primarily 
attacked law enforcement or military members.
66
 Now its hit list included working-class 
civilians, business executives, police informers, bar owners, a cemetery attendant, construction 
workers, and the girlfriend of a Civil Guard officer.
67
 The reasons were two-fold. ETA-militar’s 
leader José Miguel Beñaran Ordeñana (who went by the nom de guerre Argula) believed Spain’s 
transition to democracy would make the government especially vulnerable to ETA attacks.
68
 
Without stable political institutions and a working constitution, the Spanish government would 
be more inclined to acquiesce to ETA’s demands. If not, the democracy risked a failure to 
consolidate power. In addition, the new political environment allowed ETA to operate more 
                                                          
60 Shabad and Ramo. "Political Violence in a Democratic State.” 411. 
61 Shabad and Ramo. "Political Violence in a Democratic State.” 411. 
62
 Shabad and Ramo. "Political Violence in a Democratic State.” 411. 
63 Shabad and Ramo. "Political Violence in a Democratic State.” 411. 
64 Shabad and Ramo. "Political Violence in a Democratic State.” 441-442.  
65 Clark. The Basque Insurgents. 134. 
66
 Clark. The Basque Insurgents. 106. 
67
 Clark. The Basque Insurgents. 107-111.  
68 Clark. The Basque Insurgents. 106.  
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freely. Liberated from Franco’s secret police (or so they thought), ETA’s militants declared they 
could fight for a free Euskal Herria as “independent, reunified, Basque-speaking”69 patriots.  
 The Spanish government’s response merely fueled the flames. Instead of negotiating with 
the Basque insurgents, the democratic order implemented new antiterrorist laws and police 
policies in 1978. The reforms suspended certain constitutional rights of suspected etarras, and 
facilitated a major terrorist crackdown.
70
 The number of ETA killings peaked in 1980, followed 
by Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez’s untimely resignation on January 29 th, 1981. As the 
government dissolved into a power vacuum, a faction of the Civil Guard staged a military coup 
attempt against Spanish parliament on February 23
rd
, 1981. The coup failed, but it produced 
lasting effects on both the ETA and the Spanish government. ETA underwent structural changes, 
while the Spanish government pursued revised counterterrorism policies in the 1980s.  
 Immediately following the coup attempt of February 23
rd
, ETA-pm disbanded. The 
politically-minded section of ETA feared it would further destabilize democracy with continued 
violence. If democracy fell and Spain regressed into an authoritarian regime, the Basque Country 
would lose its newfound autonomy and ETA-pm would lose its political voice. ETA-m 
publically refused negotiations with the Spanish government, but violence levels dropped in 
1981 and a long series of secret negotiations commenced.
71
 In 1983 the Spanish government 
shifted counterterrorism operations “underground” in the form of GAL (Anti-Terrorist Liberation 
Groups) death squads.
72
 Instead of using police or military forces, Madrid authorities hired 
mercenaries to continue violent counterterrorism tactics against ETA. This secret attempt to root 
out terrorism under democracy strained ETA negotiations in the late 1980s and 1990s. On 
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October 20
th, 2011 ETA called a “definitive cessation” to its armed struggle.73 In its fifty years of 
existence, ETA claimed at least eight hundred lives and wounded thousands of others.
74
 Traces 
of the organization’s bloody history are still visible in Spain today. Further details of ETA’s 
history will be discussed in Chapter One.  
Definitions     
Terrorism:  
 Terrorism is a past and present issue. In the aftermath of 9/11, terrorism became the 
“prime mover in American politics—driving military strategy, national policy and legislation, 
and the domestic agenda.”75 In 2013 alone, the START Global Terrorism Database reported 
11,952 incidents of terrorist violence.
76
 Al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), 
Al Shabaab, the Caucasus Emirate, Hamas, Hezbollah, and many other terrorist organizations 
threaten the safety of the international community, as well as the national security of the U.S. 
But what defines a terrorist organization? Why do certain groups earn this distinction, while 
others evoke terminology such as “freedom fighters” or “criminals”? ETA’s use of murder, 
kidnapping, robbery, and explosives generated “a sense of terror both in the government and 
military circles, and among the general population,” 77 but was it a terrorist organization? Joseba 
Zulaika and William Douglass contend that “many acts that previously would have been labeled 
‘assassination,’ ‘kidnapping,’ ‘threat,’ ‘bombing,’ etc., are nowadays classed and written about 
as ‘terrorism.’”78 Furthermore, some people argue that ETA’s early violence was not terrorism—
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as there were no conceivable political alternatives to armed struggle under the Francoist regime. 
Others disagree, citing ETA’s violent actions as unnecessary and “universally repugnant.”79 
Even the American population has equally divided opinions. When the U.S. granted aid to 
Spain’s anti-ETA efforts in 2002, 51% of Americans were opposed.80 Clearly, the lines are 
blurry.  
 Scholars ardently “disagree on how to define terrorism,”81 and this study is unlikely to 
resolve the hotly contested topic. For the purposes of this paper, “terrorism” will be classified 
according to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) definition. The FBI defines 
“terrorism” as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or 
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political 
or social objectives.”82 Given ETA’s socio-political goals, illegal actions, and consciously 
violent attacks against the federal government and civilians, the organization qualifies as a 
terrorist group.  
 But academic definitions aside, ETA was described as a “terrorist organization”83 by the 
Spanish media during its active years. The prevalence and consistency of the term suggests a 
widespread, de facto classification of ETA among the Spanish populace. Although scholars can 
debate the proper “categorization” of ETA, it was Basque and Spanish public perception of the 
organization that mattered. Perception gave ETA its power—and perception guided 
counterterrorism policy decisions. If the Basque and Spanish people deemed ETA a terrorist 
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group, then the organization was somehow fulfilling this “taboo”84 label. In addition, the larger 
context of European terrorist movements in the 1970s likely encouraged the public to categorize 
ETA as a “terrorist” group. ETA maintained similar goals and tactics as other politically violence 
groups, including the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO), Baader Meinhoff, the Weather Underground, and the Red Brigades. Since the 
international community had already deemed these covert organizations “terrorist” groups, it 
seemed natural to define ETA likewise.  
Political Violence: 
 Scholars dispute the definition of political violence with equal fervor. Some scholars 
argue there is no distinction between terrorism and political violence. Others contend the 
opposite is true. American historian Martin A. Miller defines political violence broadly as “the 
use of violence for political reasons.”85 He asserts terrorism is simply a genre of political 
violence, which also includes the sub-groups of “war, genocide and ethnic cleansing.”86 While 
not all political violence can be considered terrorism, all terrorism fits into the larger category of 
political violence. Unlike other forms of political violence, terrorism employees fear to generate 
insecurity in civilian society. For instance, blowing up a bomb in a shopping mall deliberately 
terrorizes noncombatants. If the perpetrators staged the attack for political reasons, the bombing 
can be considered terrorism. In contrast, a military coup also utilizes violence for political 
reasons, but the government overhaul does not necessarily aim to provoke fear in the civilian 
population. For the purposes of consistency, I will apply Martin’s definition to this research. 
However, given that ETA fulfills both definitions (terrorism and political violence), either term 
may apply to the Basque group in the course of this project.  
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Torture:  
 It is nearly impossible to define torture. As discussed later in this research, a given entity 
may define torture differently depending on the circumstance, the threat, the law, the public, and 
a host of other factors. Many modern-day countries are guilty of modifying the definition of 
“torture,” or referring to torture methods as “advanced interrogation tactics,” to appease civilian 
discontent. Frustratingly, it is also nearly impossible to miss torture. The practice itself is 
blatantly obvious when witnessed. Since this research deals heavily with the concept of torture, I 
will do my best to clarify the term up front. According to Australian psychologists Werner G.K. 
Stritzke and Stephan Lewandowsky, torture aims “to instill in the victim an overwhelming sense 
of debility, dependency, and dread.”87 Although the exact methods vary, the objective of torture 
is to inflict pain on the victim—either physical or mental. Common torture practices include 
“waterboarding, beating, electrocuting, burning, intimidating with dogs, stripping prisoners 
naked, and forcing them to perform or mimic sexual acts.”88 All of these acts, as well as any 
other practice that intends to inflict pain, will be considered torture in this paper.  
“Hardline” Counterterrorism Tactics:  
 For the purposes of this paper, “hardline” counterterrorism tactics will include torture, 
secret arrest, and assassination. All three methods are common to law enforcement policies 
worldwide, and all three played a crucial role in Spain’s counterterrorism efforts against ETA 
from 1959-1987. I am choosing to separate these concepts from other anti-terrorism actions 
because governments often debate the morality and legality of these approaches. The 
controversial nature of these particular counterterrorism policies fundamentally impacted Spain 
in January and February 1981.  
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Methodology                   
The focus of this paper is January and February of 1981. Although important events 
occurred before and after this year, 1981 represents a climactic moment in the relationship 
between terrorism and democracy in post-Franco Spain. This research predominantly draws upon 
the qualitative and quantitative analysis of two original-text Spanish newspapers. The first, La 
Gaceta del Norte, was collected in August 2014 at the Biblioteca Municipal in the Basque city of 
Bilbao. The second, ABC, was acquired in August 2014 at the Biblioteca Nacional de España in 
the Spanish capital city of Madrid. Featured opinion pieces, interviews, photographs, and article 
topics can offer insight into a population’s general viewpoint on various subjects. Furthermore, 
terrorist activities both manipulate and rely upon public opinion, making them a prevalent media 
subject. According to Zulaika and Douglass, “there is obvious power in the printed work or 
projected image.”89 Covert groups derive their influence from the “slippery / phantom quality”90 
that media assign to them. However, terrorists also depend on romanticized media portrayals to 
depict them as heroes, soldiers, or martyrs. Although media is not necessarily representative of 
an entire population’s opinion, it certainly illustrates some of the ways in which society and 
individuals are thinking about and addressing issues of terrorism.  
Consequently, this study qualitatively and quantitatively examined hundreds of articles 
from ABC and La Gaceta del Norte from January 1st to February 23rd, 1981. I selected these 
particular dates for two reasons. First, this two-month span included media coverage of the major 
events of early 1981, including Ryan’s kidnapping and execution, Izaguirre’s capture and 
murder, Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez’s resignation, and the February 23rd coup-attempt. 
Although Ryan was not kidnapped until January 29
th
, newspaper articles from early January 
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provided media perspectives on ETA prior to the pivotal events of this research. The second 
reason is purely logistical. It seemed wise to maintain the uniformity of the newspaper dates 
collected for comparative purposes. In addition, it was unclear which days and articles would be 
particularly useful at that point in the research.  
 To effectively gauge the relevance of the Ryan and Izaguirre murders according to the 
Basque and Madrid media, I constructed a series of quantitative analysis measures. The number 
of newspaper articles pertaining to ETA, Ryan, and Izaguirre were tallied, and a series of 
comparative charts and graphs were produced to visualize the tally results. In addition, the 
positive, neutral, and negative word choices referring to ETA were recorded. Again, graphs were 
generated to aid visualization of the findings. Finally, the qualitative characteristics of the 
newspaper articles were carefully reviewed, and important events, dates, and quotes were 
integrated into this project. The detailed criteria and conclusions of this newspaper analysis will 
be presented in Chapters Two and Three. 
 This study compared and contrasted the results of this research with existing secondary 
and primary source literature on the subject. Books on the origins of Basque Nationalism, the 
Spanish Civil War, Franco’s regime, ETA, the Spanish transition to democracy, and GAL 
formed the historical framework for the project. A collection of scholarly journals on political 
violence contextualized ETA in relation to other terrorist movements, introduced global 
counterterrorism strategies, and presented deradicalization trends. The START Global Terrorism 
Database provided statistics and details of 2,027 ETA attacks from 1970 to 2010.
91
 Primary 
source research included a careful analysis of thirty-five translated testimonies of individuals 
who left ETA, and a qualitative review of newspaper articles from San Sebastian’s Egin and 
Vitoria’s El Correo Español. In addition, several original-text memoirs provided personal insight 
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into etarra motivations. Unfortunately the memoirs focus on the late 1980s, placing them outside 
the immediate scope of this study. However, these individual accounts describe the political 
climate of Spain in the aftermath of 1981. 
Historiography 
 Several texts were instrumental in the development of this project. Goldie Shabad and 
Jose Llera Ramo’s chapter “Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in 
Spain” gave a general overview of ETA’s origins, history, leadership, structure, and methods 
from 1959 to 1989. According to the authors, the persistence of ETA violence post-1975 was a 
product of Spain’s “culture of violence.”92A climate of cultural repression, perceived threat, and 
symbolic violence fueled local support of Basque separatist violence. Shabad and Ramo’s 
findings positively correlate with the results of this study. For decades a “culture of violence” 
pervaded Basque society. Thousands of Basques lost loved ones in the Civil War, watched 
Franco’s regime brutally execute neighbors for speaking Euskera, or witnessed friends die in 
ETA’s ranks. Those who personally experienced Franco’s oppression often excused ETA’s 
armed struggle. However, 1981 marked a turning point in public perception. Once popular 
support of ETA decreased in the wake of Ryan’s murder (detailed in Chapter Two), the 
movement could not sustain its previous levels of violence. In their book, Terror and Taboo, 
Joseba Zulaika and William A. Douglass further stress the necessity of public sympathy in 
sustaining politically violent groups. Ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations (such as ETA and 
the Provisional IRA) tend to exhibit the most staying-power because their self-constructed 
“mysticism” can provide an ideological justification for violence.93 Zulaika and Douglass’s 
findings mirror the results of this research. ETA’s strength sprung from its appearance as the 
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“self-styled guardians and avenging angels”94 of Basque freedom. But Ryan’s assassination 
destroyed ETA’s facade of heroism, forcing ETA to reconsider its strategy.  
 By using hardline counterterrorism policies in a democratic system, the Spanish 
government debilitated its own credibility. Tom Parker’s article "Fighting an Antaean Enemy: 
How Democratic States Unintentionally Sustain the Terrorist Movements They Oppose,” and 
Paddy Woodworth’s book Dirty War, Clean Hands: ETA, the Gal and Spanish Democracy 
augment this claim. According to Parker, democracies facilitate the terrorism they oppose by 
undermining their own principles through quasi-authoritarian crackdowns. He argues that 
politically violent groups draw strength from their environment. When democracies indulge 
violent state backlash, they incite the mass hysteria necessary for terror to flourish.
95
 
Woodworth’s investigation of the covert Spanish organization known as GAL further 
demonstrates the shortcomings of pro-state violence under a democracy. A glorified secret 
police, GAL carried out illegal activities (i.e. torture, assassination, arrest without due process) 
against suspected ETA members from 1983-1987. However, while the group was formalized in 
1983, Woodworth advises these government-sanctioned incidents were occurring well before 
that.
96
 This study’s analysis of Izaguirre’s murder corresponds with Woodworth’s research. 
Desperate to foil ETA violence, Spanish law enforcement authorities resorted to torture. 
Izaguirre became the first visible victim. His death, which blatantly contradicted Spain’s new 
democratic laws, triggered a hostile Basque and Spanish public response.  
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The Basque People  
A Sacred Place  
 The Basques are an ancient people who settled in the territory straddling modern day 
Spain and France.
97
 Four of the seven Basque Provinces are located in Spain, including Navarra 
(Nafaroa), Guipúzcoa (Gipuzkoa), Vizcaya (Bizkaia) and Alava (Araba). The Basque Country is 
roughly the size of New Jersey. It encompasses a compact 8,218 square miles, but hosts three 
million inhabitants.
98
 Although some archeologists estimate the Basques have occupied this 
region for over 40,000 years,
99
 the Basque people did not enter recorded history until 
approximately 218 BC.
100
 Documented interactions with the Celts, Carthaginians, Romans, 
Visigoths, Moors, and Franks
101
 provide historians with a glimpse into ancient Basque society. In 
the third century BC, the Basques “fought to preserve their land, language, and culture against a 
succession of invaders,”102 including the Arab and Germanic peoples. Remarkably, the resilient 
populace managed to withstand the “great invasions”103 and retain their unique territory and 
identity. Not surprisingly, the trend of invasion continued. The Romans,
104
 Charlemagne,
105
 and 
later Napoleon
106
 all posed a threat to Basque existence.  
Dominated by “tough green mountains, rocky crests”107 and “a cobalt sea,”108 Basqueland 
is treacherously beautiful. According to Mark Kurlansky, the Basque Country appears “too green 
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to be Spain and too rugged to be France.”109 The snowcapped Pyrenees Mountains give the 
“illusion of alpine scale”110 and “impenetrable”111 grandness. In reality the highest point is only 
5,200 feet, shorter than the tallest Adirondack Mountain.
112
 However, the steepness and “jagged 
protrusion of rocks”113 have intimidated invaders for centuries. During Napoleon Bonaparte’s 
1808 invasion of Spain, the Pyrenees limited the number of French roads “practicable for large 
armies”114 The unforgiving Northern terrain also denied Napoleon “immediate control of the 
coast”115 and ultimately trapped him on the plains of Castile, thwarting French success. In 
addition to the challenging terrain, Basqueland’s absence of readily-available resources afflicted 
potential conquerors. While Basque foliage is a lush dark green, the land is “not particularly 
fertile.”116 Frequent rainfall makes farming possible, but the hilly topography impedes modern 
farming equipment.
117
 As a result, successful agriculture demands the “hard labour”118 of 
individuals. 
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Due to their close proximity to the coast, the Basques have always enjoyed a rich 
“maritime history.”119 In the seventh and eighth centuries, the Basque Country produced the first 
commercial whale hunters.
120
 By the sixteenth century, Basque “maritime skill and engineering 
innovations”121 manufactured the best “fishing, whaling, merchant, and warships”122 the world 
had ever seen. The Basques even stake a claim in the “discovery” of the Americas. When 
Cristóbal Colón [Christopher Columbus] sailed to the New World in 1492, his fleet was built and 
crewed by Basques.
123
 And when Ferdinand Magellen died on his famous voyage to 
circumnavigate the globe, a Basque sailor named Juan Sebastián de Elcano assumed command in 
his stead.
124
 Later, the Basque Country exported vast quantities of steel and other shipbuilding 
materials to the European Continent.
125
 These industrial imports propelled Great Britain’s rise as 
the premier 19
th
 century sea power. San Sebastián, and many other Basque coastal towns, 
continue to promulgate the Basque maritime tradition today. 
A Forbidden Tongue  
 The Basques speak the oldest known living European language.
126
 A consistent source of 
bewilderment for historians, linguists, and anthropologists, the Basque language appears to pre-
date the Indo-European invasion and perhaps the Bronze Age.
127
 Linguistically distinct from all 
other tongues, Euskera has “often been dismissed as an impossible language.”128 To English and 
Spanish speakers alike, the frequency of “k” and “x” letters appears daunting. Although many 
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non-Basques associate Euskera with harsh and staccato sounds, the language is surprisingly soft 
and smooth. The “x” is pronounced as a “ch”, so “house” or etxea becomes “et-CHAY-a.”129 
During Franco’s regime, Euskera was outlawed in favor of Castellano (or what most English 
speakers acknowledge as “Spanish”). This thirty-six year period of fascist oppression nearly 
eradicated Euskera from modern history. The “secret tongue”130 was spoken quietly behind 
closed doors. Parents taught Basque children the language of their ancestors in secret, fearful of 
imprisonment or death. The language continued to struggle for existence, until a tiny group of 
university students began meeting covertly in 1952 to speak Euskera.
131
 Idealistic youth, fervent 
political discussions, and childhood memories of repression slowly radicalized the group. On 
July 31
st
, 1959 at the University of Deusto in Bilbao, ETA was born.
132
 Today, some Basques 
credit ETA with saving Euskera. Others believe the language would have survived regardless. In 
any event, the Basques identify very strongly with their language. There is no word for “Basque 
Country” in Euskera. To these ancient people, the Basque territory is simply Euskal Herria—or 
“Land of the Euskera Speakers.”133 
A Rare Culture  
 Unlike most civilizations, the ancient Basques had a matriarchal society.  Because 
Basque men were habitually preoccupied with war, “the female line of Basques inherited 
property and titles.”134 Consequently, Basque women possessed a great deal of societal power. 
Women were also responsible for farming the land. In most agrarian societies “the control of 
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draft animals and tillage [was] an important factor in man’s dominance of women,”135 but 
Basque women didn’t face this “labor disadvantage.”136 Their nontraditional role as farmers 
allowed agricultural production to continue, despite a steady stream of debilitating wars.
137
 In 
addition, this arrangement encouraged guerilla warfare—as young men could leave home 
urgently without suffering economic repercussions. 
138
 Although the Basque Country no longer 
adheres to this early structure, Basque women retain a large degree of influence in their homes. 
The wife and mother “administers things, pays the bills, disciplines the children, and conducts 
the general business of the home.”139  
The Basque house, or etxea, is considered the most fundamental building block of 
Basque society. Etxeas are analogous with clans. An etxea begins as a physical place, but it 
eventually pervades time and space. Each etxea has a name, a founder, a family tomb, and an 
etxekandere [spiritual head]. The etxekandere is a respected woman “who looks after blessings 
and prayers for all house members wherever they are, living or dead.”140 Long after the physical 
structure is gone, Basques still introduce themselves by the name of their home—their etxea. For 
all Basques, izena duen guzia omen da [That which has a name exists].141  
 Today, the majority of Basques are devout Catholics. But long before Christianity spread 
through Europe, the Basques worshipped their own gods. The original Basque religion had 
strong ties to nature. Basques prayed to “sun gods, moon gods, rock gods, tree gods, mountain 
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gods”142 and many other earthly spirits. While most Basque gods assumed animalistic forms, 
others resembled humans. And like the ancient Greeks, it was not uncommon for different 
villages to worship different spirits.
 143
 However, Basque culture contains one symbol of 
religious continuity. Most Basque valleys praised the sun as the “eye of God,”144 leading 
anthropologists to associate the Basque people with sun worship. The sun was also a prominent 
feature of Basque grave markers. Gravestones from the first century B.C. depict circular images 
of the rising sun. Over time these sun engravings morphed into the “Basque cross,” 145 which 
illustrates the encircled intersection of four curved spokes. The icon’s cross-like appearance is a 
coincidence. According to Kurlansky, the “Basque cross” predates Christianity.146 But the onset 
of Catholicism did not extinguish the Basque sun’s emblematic significance. Instead, the image 
of a “sun with its rays stretching toward a circular border”147 became the official symbol of the 
Jesuit religious order. The celebrated St. Ignatius of Loyola was born into an aristocratic Basque 
family in 1491. After an early life of political intrigue, court romance, vain amusements, and 
near-death experiences, the young Ignatius committed himself to God. On August 15
th
, 1534 the 
former “handsome young courtier”148 founded the Society of Jesus (Jesuit religious order) with 
seven followers. The Jesuits have 25,000 present day members, making them the largest Catholic 
order.
149
 Forever enshrined in controversy and mysticism, St. Ignatius is considered the most 
famous Basque in history.   
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 In addition to celebrating the Catholic tradition, the Basque people revere seafood, tough 
sports, Rioja wine, singing, Iberian ham, and tight-knit families. Basque sports celebrate the 
physical strength required to thrive in steep foothills of the Pyrenees. Harri-jasotze, or rock-
lifting,
150
 is a prime example. Basque men exhibit their brawniness by hefting gigantic boulders 
to their shoulders. Log-cutting, hay-mowing, wagon-lifting, and sheep-fighting, regattas, and 
tug-of-war also constitute “‘primitive’ Basque folk-sports.”151 As suggested by their names, 
many Basque sports originated in agricultural practices. Each herri kirolak, or rural sport, 
illustrates the prized masculine qualities of strength, resilience, and boldness. Pinned against 
both coast and mountain range, plagued with inadequate resources and fleeting alliances, the 
ancient Basques relied upon sheer tenacity to survive. Particularly indicative of Basque bravado 
is the ancient game of pilota, or pelota in Spanish. Reminiscent of modern day racquetball or 
squash, pilota is usually played on a two-walled court with two teams of two players each. One 
side will serve the ball against the end wall, striking the barrier between a demarcated low and 
high line. The opposing side must return the rebounding ball before it hits the ground more than 
once. Although pilota can be played using bats or rackets, bare-handed pilota appeals to the 
“old-fashioned machismo”152 of Euskal Herria. The audience can hear the smack of the 104-107 
gram ball
153
 against the athletes’ palms, as Basque men showcase their ambidextrous dexterity.  
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Pilota Tournament: Personal Photo, San Sebastián August 2014  
 
 Basque cuisine is equally intertwined with the geography of Euskal Herria. A sea-faring 
people by nature, the Basques enjoy plentiful seafood on their coastal towns. Sea bream (bixigu), 
spider crab (txangurro), baby eel (txitxardin), spring anchovies (antxoa), small squid (txipiron), 
and sardines (sardina) compose especially popular Basque dishes.154 In the seventh and eighth 
centuries, Basque whale became a coveted delicacy.
155
 Forbidden from consuming red meat on 
holy days, but permitted to eat sea creatures, Europeans eagerly flocked to the Basque whale 
market. Commercial whalers sold lean cuts fresh or salted, and cured fattier parts like bacon.
156
 
Tender whale tongue was particularly desired among government officials, the Church, and 
European royalty.
157
 Today, coastal Basque restaurants feature mainstream cod, sea bass, hake, 
salmon, mussels, and scallops. Cooked dishes are doused generously in olive oil, and garnished 
with white asparagus, spicy Espelette peppers, grilled zucchini, and baked bread. Basques are 
also noted for their pintxos, or “finger foods”. Pintxos are tiny sandwiches, consisting of bread, 
egg, cheese, and ham or seafood. Generally prepared in the morning, pintxos are displayed on 
bar counters for the remainder of the day, allowing guests to browse the selection. Unlike 
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Spanish tapas, pintxos are “taken” not “ordered”. Following the customary rules of Basque 
hospitality, customers grab and eat their pintxos before paying. Tabs are on the honors system, 
silverware is nonexistent, and plates are optional. Basque breakfasts are small, typically 
consisting of a pinxto or Spanish tortilla. Beer, cafe con leche, and sangria are standard morning 
beverages. Similar to central and southern Spain, the Basque Country maintains the midday 
break of siesta from 4:00-6:00 pm. During siesta, workers return to their homes to enjoy the 
largest meal of the day. Analogous with American “dinner”, the siesta meal usually features 
bread, meat, vegetables, and red wine from the Rioja region of Basqueland. At 6:00 pm 
businesses, libraries, stores, and bars reopen for the evening. Dinner is uncommon. Most 
Basques snack on pintxos and sangria around 10:00 or 11:00 pm before retiring for the night.    
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Chapter One: The Roots of Basque Nationalism 
 The tree was young. Already tinged with the reddish-gold hue of approaching autumn, 
the oak’s leaves ruffled softly in the rain. Slender branches swayed precariously, barely anchored 
to the tree’s narrow trunk. Ceremoniously planted upon the highest hill in sight, the Oak Tree of 
Guernica (Gernikako Arbola) proudly overlooked the city below. A Romanesque assembly hall 
stood adjacent to the oak, casting a majestic air on the scene. As I gazed out on the tiny 
courtyard, a small group of French tourists congregated around the oak’s ornate iron fence. 
Excited murmurs drifted from their direction, cameras buzzing anachronistically beside the stoic 
and peaceful “Basque Freedom Tree.”158 Vibrant against its stone encirclements, the tree 
continued its protective watch over Euskal Herria. It wasn’t alone. Several hundred feet past the 
courtyard stood another tree. Now robbed of life, the oak was gnarled and discolored. Its pale 
bark gleamed in the falling dusk. I eyed the dead tree uneasily, strangely hesitant to move closer. 
Sheltered by a marble gazebo, the former Oak Tree of Guernica resembled a mausoleum. Planted 
in 1742, the oak had survived 150 years.
159
 After its death in 1892, the “old tree’s” trunk was 
preserved in the gardens of Guernica, a silent observer to the turmoil of the 20
th
 century.  
Hailed as the undying symbol of Euskal Herria, the Oak Tree of Guernica represents 
freedom, honor, democracy and peace to the Basque people. Each of the four oaks in recorded 
history descended from the original specimen, a tree that thrived for 450 years.
160
  Named for 
this cherished oak, the Basque national hymn “Gernikako Arbola” opens with “O tree of 
Guernica / O symbol blessed by God.”161 For thousands of the years, the tree has witnessed 
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Basque coronations, speeches, assembly meetings, elections, trials, and celebrations.
162
 Long 
before the Oak Tree of Guernica was recognized as the emblematic heart of Basque governance, 
ancient assemblies met beneath oak trees across Vizcaya.
163
 While the origins of the practice are 
unknown, it seems that all male landowners were represented in these gatherings.
164
  Signal fires 
and horns summoned the residents, calling the political process into action.
165
 Gradually, the 
edge of Guernica became the most prominent assembly site. Once a “powerful provincial 
parliament”166 was established at the location, the Oak Tree of Guernica was immortalized.  
The tree did not lose its relevance, despite Basqueland’s transition from an early-
Christian democracy to feudalism. During the Middle Ages, each Lord of Vizcaya pledged to 
uphold Basque liberties beneath the oak tree’s branches. Even when Basque leaders submitted to 
a centralized Spain, every Castilian king was obligated to pay homage at Guernica.  These 
Spanish monarchs swore continued acceptance of Basque freedoms at the tree for seven 
centuries,
167
 bolstering the tradition of an independent Euskal Herria. The unwritten laws, 
known as the Fueros, granted the Basque Provinces significant regional autonomy. Rights 
included habeas corpus, protection from torture, and exemption from mandatory military service. 
In addition, the Fueros accepted Navarra as a “nominal kingdom.”168 The province could review 
royal decrees, control customs, collect taxes, and manage financial affairs.
169
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The Carlist Wars  
In 1833 Spanish King Ferdinand VII died without a male heir. His death prompted a 
succession crisis between two potential monarchs, plunging Spanish society into a series of 
atrocity-ridden civil wars. Known as the Carlist Wars, the conflicts pitched Spanish and Basque 
conservatives against an increasingly-liberal monarchy. Princess Isabella II, the dead King’s 
daughter and designated heir, vied for a “reformist, progressive”170 Spain. She envisioned a 
constitutional government with an emphasis on secular republicanism, similar to the newly 
christened French Republic.
171
 Many Basque clergy, landowners, and peasants hotly contested 
Isabella’s 19th century democratic vision. Her secular ideals threatened the supremacy of the 
Catholic Church, motivating many Basques to reject Isabella’s platform as godless and immoral. 
Furthermore, the implementation of a republican structure endangered the Basque Fueros. A 
constitutional monarchy could not promote “equality” for all Spanish citizens, while 
simultaneously conserving Basque political privileges. Consequently, many Basques rallied to 
Isabella’s rival, the late King’s brother Carlos. A fervent absolute-monarchist, Carlos supported a 
powerful Church, the “home rule”172 of peripheral nations (such as Euskal Herria), the special 
interests of “brave and hardworking”173 peasants, and a return to the romanticized feudalistic 
society of the past. Carlos’s supporters, known as Carlists, included the majority of Vizcaya, 
Alava, Guipúzcoa, and Navarra.
174
  
The First Carlist War lasted from 1833 to 1839.
175
 Isabella’s royal army quickly defeated 
Carlos’s forces, but the conflict failed to produce a lasting peace. Tensions mounted between the 
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two sides again in the 1840s, when Basque Carlist veterans began carrying out violent attacks 
against Northern liberals. In retaliation, Isabella formed a national police force in 1844.
176
 
Known as the Civil Guard (Guardia Civil), the new law enforcement organization later became 
ETA’s infamous opponent. The Second Carlist War broke out in 1872,177 following the collapse 
of Isabella’s idealistic “democratic monarchy”178 and the proclamation of a formal Spanish 
Republic. Enraged at the even more “radical, anticlerical regime,”179 the Carlists rallied behind a 
second challenger, Carlos VII. Again, the Carlists failed to procure the necessary support to 
achieve military victory. But although the Basque Provinces and other Carlos-supporters suffered 
a chain of debilitating defeats, the fledgling Spanish Republic was too weak and fragmented to 
solidify victory. Sensing dissension between moderate and conservative liberals of the Spanish 
Republic, a new republican figurehead emerged. Alfonso XII, son of Isabella II, united the 
liberals behind a “restoration monarchy.”180 In 1876 a new Spanish Constitution was ratified, 
abolishing the Fueros and signifying an end to the war. The Carlist defeat marked a “triumph for 
Spanish liberalism,”181and an official end to Castilian oaths beneath the Oak Tree of Guernica.  
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A Restored Monarchy    
The tragic Carlist Wars left Spain drained and devastated. Shell-shocked by war, 
economic ruin, and political instability, the nation reverted to its pre-republic tendencies. 
Alfonso XII assumed the throne, the oligarchy returned to positions of wealth and political 
power, and liberal “reform was abandoned in return for social peace.”182 Unfortunately, 
starvation, labor exploitation, and “brutal social injustices”183 characterized Spain in the 1890s 
and early 20
th
 century. The famished Spanish proletariat rebelled in a series of violent risings, 
crop burnings, and worker strikes. Their poorly organized rebellions consistently failed, and the 
“easily defeated revolutionary outbursts began to alternate with periods of apathy.”184 Many 
Basques were equally dissatisfied with the restored monarchy. Although the Spanish Crown had 
been reinstated, the Fueros had not. In addition, government-sponsored industrialism in the 
Basque Country was upsetting the region’s demographics. As poverty spread across Spain, 
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waves of poor Spanish immigrants flooded into Euskal Herria in search for jobs in iron and steel 
foundries. The influx of starving workers brought a host of socio-economic problems to the 
Basque Country, including workplace competition, crowded slums, and higher disease rates.  
Enough with Kings: The Second Spanish Republic  
A weak monarch, discontent among privilege-seeking Spanish and Basques 
conservatives, and economic hardship brought the restoration monarchy crashing down in the 
early 20
th
 century. On September 23
rd
, 1923 conservative General Miguel Primo de Rivera seized 
power in a military coup d’état against the Spanish government. King Alfonso XIII, who ruled 
from 1902-1931, became a figurehead. His presence in the Spanish government merely 
legitimized Rivera’s rule, while the general controlled all State decisions. Years later, the 
Spanish middle classes revered Rivera’s authoritarian regime as “a golden age.”185 But at the 
time, many Spanish and Basques conservatives viewed Rivera’s emphasis on economic, 
political, and social reform as liberal and conciliatory to republicans. The dictator’s inflation-
ridden public spending, attempts to standardize merit-based military promotions, and 
introduction of labor committees to protect workers’ rights alienated industrialists, army 
members, and landowners. When Primo de Rivera lost the visible support of the Spanish army in 
1930, the general was forced to resign. Desperate to assuage the political instability, King 
Alfonso XIII appointed General Dámaso Berenguer to fill Spain’s power vacuum.  
Berenguer’s “mild dictatorship floundered,”186 as he attempted to appease both 
conservative and liberal viewpoints. In February 1931, Berenguer resigned under “mounting 
pressure for democratization and the abolition of the monarchy.”187 On April 12th, 1931 Spain 
staged municipal elections. For the first time in modern history, the citizens of Spain could 
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choose their own form of government in a referendum. To the outrage of conservatives, the 
Republicans claimed “victory in 41 or the 50 provincial capitals.”188 Authorities declared the 
Second Spanish Republic on April 14
th
, and a provisional democratic government transitioned to 
power peacefully. The announcement was “welcomed by celebrations in the streets, amid a 
holiday atmosphere that combined revolutionary hopes with a desire for reform.”189 
Disillusioned with the Spanish people’s lack of loyalty, King Alfonso XIII fled the country that 
night. His farewell note read “‘the elections held last Sunday clearly show me that I do not have 
the love of my people today.’”190 The Spanish monarchy would not regain its political power 
until 1975, nearly three and a half decades later.  
“They Shall Not Pass:” The Spanish Civil War  
 The peaceful atmosphere of the Second Spanish Republic did not last. Certain segments 
of the population, such as members of the poor and working classes, ardently supported a 
democratic Spain. But other citizens resisted the restructuring of traditional society. Not 
surprisingly, strict social hierarchies prevented the Republic from receiving the “unanimous 
support of all Spaniards.”191 Under the new republican system, Spain’s poverty-stricken masses 
appealed for higher salaries, a redistribution of aristocratic lands, legal protections for workers, 
and a public education system.
192
 These demands “signified a threat to the most privileged 
members of society and raised inordinate hopes among the most humble,”193 because they 
challenged the existing power structure. Spain’s “old order” placed the Catholic Church, the 
armed forces, and the aristocracy above the common people. With the termination of the feudal 
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system, these influential institutions could not maintain their political authority. Tensions over 
this power shift intensified into a “savage conflict over the scale of social and economic 
reform.”194  Although the social changes liberated the proletariat from the “excessive 
influence”195 of the Church and the Spanish army, the republicans suffered from a “lack of 
cohesion.”196 Lacking the necessary political organization, the Republic was doomed to fail.  
 In October 1933 a new political entity emerged. The Falange, a right-wing nationalist 
party, envisioned the rebirth of a powerful Spain under fascist rule. Led by the aristocratic José 
Primo de Rivera, the Falange inundated Spain’s conservative sectors with roman salutes, ritual 
chants, inspiring references to Spain’s Golden Age, and national pride. At Falange rallies, the 
waving flags, crowds of blue-shirted supporters, militaristic ceremonies, and unison cries of 
“¡Arriba España! (Upward Spain!)” evoked images of NAZI Germany. The far-right group 
pledged a revival of Spain’s presence on the international stage, the protection of Catholic 
“sanctity,” a reemphasis on traditional family life, the promotion of the pure Spanish raza 
(race),
197
 and a masculine culture of violence. As the Falange’s influence expanded in 1934, 
“there were growing numbers of street battles between left and right.”198 Unsuccessful at easing 
tensions through bipartisan cooperation, the Republic’s socialist elements united under the 
Frente Popular (Popular Front) coalition in February 1936. The left’s earnest attempt at 
consolidation produced disastrous consequences. Sensing a threat from the liberals, the right-
leaning Spanish military rebelled against the republican government on July 18
th
, 1936. Citing 
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“the need to maintain order and the unity of the Fatherland”199 approximately 120,000 armed 
soldiers marched on strategically-located cities across Spain. The act plunged Spain into war.  
                                   
 
As Spanish historian Julián Casanova writes, “Had it not been for the military uprising in 
July 1936, there would not have been a civil war in Spain.”200 The coup attempt, organized by 
several army generals, did not “bring about a rapid seizure of power.”201 However, it deepened 
divisions between the Spanish nationalists (those who supported the fascists) and the republicans 
(those who remained loyal to the Second Republic). The Church, the Spanish military, and the 
old aristocracy predominately sided with the nationalists. Spain’s working-classes, most 
Basques, Catalonia, and the democratic government joined the republican side. By the end of 
July 1936, the nationalists held most of Galicia, León, Old Castilla, Oviedo, Álava, and Navarra. 
The republican zone still controlled the principal cities and industrial centers of Catalonia, the 
Basque Country, and Asturias. In a matter of weeks, internal fighting had ripped Spain in half. 
The civil war would last three long years and claim thousands of lives.  
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Among the key figures of the July 18
th
, 1936 rebellion was a rising political star named 
Francisco Franco. At age 44, the charismatic major-general “had an ability to lead and inspire 
that is hard to explain.”202 Battle-hardened by severe injuries in the Moroccan wars during his 
youth, Franco was “both ruthless and heartless, using fear as his favorite weapon.”203 In addition, 
the general was ardently fascist. A firm believer in a traditionalist Spain, Franco accused 
socialists and communists of attacking “‘civilization in order to replace it with barbarism.’” 204 
Described as an “insecure little man”205 by Kurlansky, the general considered all Basque 
separatists to be aberrant traitors to Spanish unity. He romanticized 19
th
 century war tactics (such 
as bayonet charges), despised Jews, and blamed Spain’s loss of Cuba on the United States. 
Above all, Franco desired a cohesive and powerful Spain. Along with three other Spanish 
generals, he was easily attracted to the military uprising.   
In addition to possessing fervent nationalist sentiment, Franco had the resources to 
transform the 1936 fascist coup into reality. Under the Second Spanish Republic, Franco 
assumed command of Spain’s colonial Army of Africa. The outfit boasted 1,600 officers and 
40,000 men, along with several expertly-trained legions comprised of criminals, outcasts, 
fugitives, and Moroccan mercenaries.
206
 While the army’s numbers were impressive, its devotion 
to “virility and violence”207 was nauseating. Franco’s troops were notorious for committing 
atrocities in Morocco, including the rape and slaughter of women and young girls. The Army of 
Africa was equally brutal in Spain itself. When Franco was charged with repressing a 1917 
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miner’s strike in Asturias, his soldiers carried out “summary executions of leftists”208 after 
killing countless women and children in cold blood.  
But the general’s assets went beyond brute strength. A skilled flatterer, Franco managed 
to obtain beneficial alliances with Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. Drawing from a network 
of German businessmen living in Morocco, the general pitched the “right-wing and anti-
Bolshevik”209 nationalist cause to Hitler on July 25th, 1936 (just days after the rebellion began). 
The Führer answered  by dispatching “20 Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft, six Heinkel 51 
fighters, 20 anti-aircraft guns, munitions and flight and ground crew”210 to Morocco on July 29th. 
Mussolini, who received a similar petition from Franco, responded in kind. Blessed with German 
and Italian transport aircraft, high morale among his troops, and the admiration of his fellow 
nationalist rebels, Franco marched north. By August 7
th
, 1936, the cunning general held Seville. 
In the words of English historian Paul Preston, “Mussolini and Hitler thus turned a coup d’état 
going wrong into a bloody and prolonged civil war.”211  
Franco’s resourcefulness did not go unnoticed. When General José Sanjujer (the 
appointed head of the July 18
th
, 1936 military rebellion) died in a freak plane crash on July 20
th
, 
Franco’s co-conspirators selected him as the “sole political and military leader”212 of the 
nationalist cause. After Franco’s official installation as the nationalist leader on October 1st, 
1936, the ambitious general was in line to become the Caudillo (supreme chief or leader) of 
Spain. Now, all Franco needed was decisive nationalist victory.  
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 In the spring of 1937, Franco’s vicious campaign reached new heights. Under Franco’s 
orders, General Emilio Mola (one of the original conspirators) gathered 40,000 troops to wage an 
offensive against the Basque Country, a particularly tenacious republican zone. With Mola’s 
preparations came a chilling threat: “‘If submission is not immediate, I will raze all Vizcaya to 
the ground, beginning with the industries of war. I have the means to do so.’”213 Unfortunately 
for Franco, the republican Basques were dogged guerilla fighters. Accustomed to invasion, 
passionately defiant, and geographically advantaged, the Basques formed an iron defense around 
Bilbao. As Mola’s legions trekked north, the nationalist forces encountered republican booby 
traps on steep hills, rocky outcroppings, poor roads, and exposed valleys. Frustrated by his slow 
progress, Mola issued a second “warning” on April 25th, 1937. Broadcast over the republican 
radio station, Mola cried “‘Franco is about to deliver a mighty blow against which all resistance 
is useless. Basques! Surrender now and your lives will be spared.’”214 The republicans refused.  
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 On April 26
th
, 1937, fire rained down on Guernica. The Condor Legion, Franco’s 
collection of German and Italian aircraft, destroyed the city in one afternoon of sustained fire-
bombing. The date was deliberate. April 26
th
, a Monday, was an appointed market-day for the 
residents of Guernica. Franco knew peasants would gather in the city center to buy and sell 
goods, gossip, and enjoy the outdoor weather. To inflict the most civilian causalities possible, 
Franco waited until the marketplace was bustling under the afternoon sun. According to Basque 
Father Alberto Onaindia, the bombardment began at 4:40 pm and lasted until 7:45 pm. When 
recalling the horrific day, the priest stated “‘The planes descended very low, the machine-gun 
fire tearing up the woods and roads, in whose gutters , huddled together lay old men, women, 
and children…Fire enveloped the whole city. Screams of lamentation were heard everywhere, 
and the people, filled with terror, lifting their hands to heaven as if to implore divine 
protection.’”215 By nightfall the city ceased to exist. The dead and wounded lay buried beneath 
piles of rubble. Fire crackled in the blackened skeletons of former buildings. And the survivors 
were burdened with the agonizing task of laying “hundreds of mangled and decomposing corpses 
to rest.”216 
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It is unknown how many people died in the fire-bombing of Guernica. The Basque 
government estimates approximately 1,600 people perished during the three hour attack.
217
 But 
the statistic does not account for all the victims who died later, suffering from earlier wounds. 
Today, the event is immortalized in Pablo Picasso’s famous painting titled Guernica, and the 
exhibits of the Guernica Peace Museum. However, in the immediate aftermath of the attack, 
Franco and his German supporters denied their involvement. Franco eventually admitted his guilt 
in 1970, a total of 33 years after the incident. The German government did not issue an official 
apology to the Basque people until 1998. 
 The Spanish Civil War dragged on for another two years after Guernica’s bombardment. 
Franco claimed his victory on April 1
st
, 1939, to crowds of adoring nationalist supporters. 
Barcelona, famed for its republican battle cry “They Shall Not Pass!” was one of the last cities to 
fall. Exact death tolls are unknown, but Preston suggests the civil war cost Spain over half a 
million lives.
218
 Republican defeat ushered in Franco’s 36 year dictatorship, marked by 
oppression, censorship, and violence. The influence of the Caudillo’s authoritarian rule will be 
discussed in greater depth in Chapters Two and Three. Although the Basque’s civil war defenses 
failed, their defiant spirit outlasted Francisco Franco.  The nationalist atrocities of the civil war, 
especially the fire-bombing of Guernica, instilled Basque feelings of hatred and rebellion 
towards Franco’s regime.  Perhaps fittingly, the Oak Tree of Guernica survived the nationalist 
bombings of April 26
th
, 1937. According to Kurlansky, homeless survivors sought shelter and 
comfort beneath the Basque Freedom Tree in the days after the attack. By the time Basque 
students founded the ETA in 1959, the oak was still standing.    
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Chapter Two: The Family Man 
ETA-militar’s communication was short and dispassionate. The organization’s militants 
kidnapped José Maria Ryan at gun point on January 29
th
 at approximately 7:00 pm, labeling him 
a “Yankee imperialist at the service of the Spanish oligarchy.”219 Ryan’s release, the message 
read, was contingent upon the destruction of the Lemóniz Nuclear Power Plant.  The 
organization “had decided to increase the degree of its armed offensive by attacking not only the 
material goods of monopolist businesses, but also individuals who are known scientists or 
technicians in the service of the capital.”220 Brimming with unspoken threat, the ultimatum 
declared “ETA-militar would concede one week for the demolition of Lemóniz.”221 Initially 
released to Egin, a local newspaper out of San Sebastián, ETA’s demands quickly flooded the 
Spanish press. On January 31
st
, 1981, the anxious wife of José Maria Ryan issued a statement 
regarding her husband’s kidnapping. With tears in her eyes, Murua cried “I don’t understand the 
causes of my husband’s kidnapping, given that he is a simple man who never meddles in 
problems or politics.”222 The distraught mother of five pleaded for her husband’s release, 
avowing her “absolute repulsion”223 at the attack. She wasn’t alone. Countless organizations, 
including the Spanish Federation of the Electric Sector,
224
 the Basque Parliament’s Commission 
on Human Rights,
225
 The Conference on the Cooperation and Security of Europe,
226
 and 
Amnesty International
227
 condemned ETA’s action with disgust.  Thousands of citizens staged 
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pro-liberation manifestations in the streets.
228
 Pablo Ryan, the five-year-old son of Ryan, 
entreated ETA to “release my dad soon so he can spend my birthday with me.”229 But even 
Pablo’s childhood innocence did not soften ETA’s resolve. ETA assassinated José Maria Ryan 
on February 6
th, the day before his beloved son’s sixth birthday.   
                       
 
This chapter explores ETA’s motives for kidnapping and assassinating José Maria Ryan, 
as well as Spanish and Basque public reaction to the engineer’s murder. I had never heard the 
name “José Maria Ryan” at the beginning of this project. Apart from Kurlansky’s The Basque 
History of the World, most scholarly works on ETA completely disregard Ryan’s tragic death. 
And even Kurlansky only dedicates a few sentences to the subject.
230
 But Basque and Spanish 
newspaper coverage of the murder is startlingly higher. In the month following Ryan’s 
kidnapping, Madrid’s ABC and Bilbao’s La Gaceta del Norte published a combined total of 99 
articles concerning the ill-fated industrialist. The incredible frequency of Ryan-related 
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publications piqued my curiosity while scanning newspapers in Bilbao, San Sebastián, Vitoria, 
and Madrid.  
After analyzing the primary source material further, it became clear to me that Ryan’s 
murder was a pivotal event in Spain’s transition to democracy. Although Ryan was not a 
particularly unusual ETA target, Spanish and Basque public fury in response to his execution 
was remarkable. Humanization of Ryan via the press, ETA’s ultimatum for the engineer’s 
release, and pre-existing disillusionment over ETA’s high 1980 death toll turned the Spanish and 
Basque populace against the separatist group in the wake of Ryan’s assassination. Public anger 
over Ryan’s death debilitated ETA’s support base, and hardened the Spanish government’s 
resolve to fight terrorism at all costs in early 1981.  
Leftist-Leanings: ETA’s Tactics from 1968-1981  
Ryan’s kidnapping was not an anomaly. Between 1968 and 1980, ETA abducted 24 
people.
231
 Of these victims, 70.8% were industrial or business figures.
232
  Furthermore, during 
these years, 46.2% of ETA’s total victims (including killed, wounded, and kidnapped) were 
civilians. According to Robert P. Clark’s assessment of ETA’s total victims, the terrorist 
organization “divided its targets about equally”233 between perceived combatants and 
noncombatants. Although the distinction between “combatant” and “noncombatant” is often 
vague, Clark identified combatants as all military and law-enforcement personnel, including 
Civil Guard, municipal police, military, and spies. Noncombatants were equated with civilians, 
including political/government officials, industrial/business figures, objects of revenge, 
bystanders, and accidental victims. I will apply these classifications in this paper.  
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Although, as Clark’s findings show, ETA frequently kidnapped or wounded civilians, the 
majority of the organization’s killings claimed law enforcement or military personnel. Civil 
Guard, municipal police, military men and spies constituted 68% of ETA’s mortal victims from 
1968-1980.
234
 From ETA’s perspective, these “combatants” were directly responsible for the 
historical oppression of the Basque people under Franco. In addition, police and soldiers were 
actively engaged in the “military or paramilitary struggle against ETA.”235 Government 
sponsored anti-ETA activity took off in the late 1960s. ETA’s first martyr, a popular etarra 
named Extebarrieta, was killed by the Civil Guard in 1968.
236
 Later, the Spanish judicial system 
condemned nine etarras to death in the 1970 Burgos trial.237 The trajectory continued, with 
reciprocal killings accelerating into a “deadly pas de deux between the Spanish security forces 
and ETA.”238 Sadly, at least 200 Civil Guard members were killed during ETA’s 35-year 
campaign for Basque independence.
239
 According to reports from the Spanish Ministry of the 
Interior cited by Shabad and Ramo, 145 etarras were killed by law enforcement, died in jail, or 
were executed between 1968 and 1988.
240
  
Although ETA’s assassination attempts generally targeted combatants, the organization’s 
most popular kidnapping victims were Basque industrialists. These particular attacks were an 
extension of ETA’s 1960s ideological foundations. From 1960-1975, the Basque Country 
experienced a second period of intense industrialization. Immigration flourished, with the 
population of the Basque Country increasing by 44%.
241
 While the immigrant population 
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consisted of some British, German, and northern European families, the majority of workers 
hailed “from Andalusia and other poor regions of Spain.”242 The new residents lived in crowded 
slums, worked twelve hour days, and often “died young of lung disease or alcoholism.”243 
Radically altered by the influx of working-class Spaniards, the Basque Country adopted modern 
infrastructures and urbanized cities. The growth was too fast for ethnic Basques. Metropolitan 
areas threatened the “declining, but increasingly idealized, traditional Basque culture.”244 And 
waves of new workers resulted in high levels of unemployment, disproportionally among young 
Basques. By 1988, 46.5% of all 16-24 year olds living in Basque Country and 24% of all 25-34 
year olds living in Basque Country were unemployed.
245
  Ethnic Basques accused Spanish 
immigrants of stealing local jobs, polluting Euskal Herria with heavy industry, and generating an 
undesirable “underclass.”246 
Class tension quickly translated to racism. Frustrated by the economic transformation of 
the 1960s and 1970s, many ethnic Basques mentally equated “destructive” industry with 
“inferior” Spaniards.  To them, the burgeoning racial diversity was a threat to Basque identity, 
and therefore a form of Spanish imperialism. Ethnic Basques derogatorily referred to poor 
Spanish immigrants as “Chinese, Manchurians, or Koreans.”247 Others demonstrated their “racial 
superiority” by labeling the new residents as maketos, or “outsiders”.248 The linguistically pre-
Roman word “maketo” was favored by Sabino Arana, the eulogized “Father of Basque 
Nationalism,” further promoting its usage. Even worse, many Basques called foreign workers 
belarri motx or “stumpy ears.” Known for their long earlobes, ethnic Basques viewed Spanish 
                                                          
242
 Kurlansky. The Basque History of the World. 169. 
243 Kurlansky. The Basque History of the World. 169. 
244 Shabad and Ramo. "Political Violence in a Democratic State.” 417.  
245 Shabad and Ramo. "Political Violence in a Democratic State.” 417.  
246
 Kurlansky. The Basque History of the World. 169. 
247
 Kurlansky. The Basque History of the World. 169. 
248 Kurlansky. The Basque History of the World. 169. 
Armstrong 53 
 
facial structures as physically inferior. The racial slur was not original to the twentieth century. 
Belarri motx was used by Basque Carlists to snub republican Spanish soldiers during the Carlist 
Wars.
249
 The renewal of the offensive term exasperated the “us” (Basques) versus “them” 
(Spaniards) dialogue. And anti-Spanish sentiment soon extended beyond name calling.  
Equating the government-subsidized industrialism with Spanish expansionism, ETA 
leaders adopted a flare of “populist and antioligarchic rhetoric.”250 Many young etarras accused 
the central government of imperialism, economic exploitation, and the destruction of Basque 
solidarity. ETA was not alone. Other ethno-nationalist European terrorist movements of the 
1960s and 1970s were assimilating similar leftist leanings. According to Richard English, the 
IRA placed “less emphasis during the 1960s on military training, and more on a leftist definition 
of republican struggle.”251 In December 1969, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) split into two 
factions to accommodate the growing presence of Marxist members. Militants of the Provisional 
IRA were “traditional nationalists,”252 who only wanted independence from the British Crown. 
In contrast, the Official IRA “emphasized class rather than communal identity.”253 These 
individuals viewed British rule of Ireland as the corrupt imperialism of an elite class. 
Consequently, the Official IRA’s doctrine combined the desire for Irish separatism with the 
hatred of British capitalism. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) experienced a similar 
ideological split in 1967. Although the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
remained a part of the PLO, this particular faction adopted Marxist-Leninist tendencies and 
became a revolutionary-leftist organization. George Habash and Wadi Hadad, two prominent 
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founders of the PFLP, sought to drive Israel out of Palestine and “start a movement that would 
rid the Arab world of leadership by imperialist Sheiks and monarchs.”254 While the PLO served 
as an umbrella organization for Palestinian independence, the PFLP simultaneously pursued its 
own anti-oligarchic objectives.  
These Marxist and “anticolonialist”255  leanings brought ETA in contact with the Spanish 
Communist Party in 1963. After experiencing police repression at communist worker strikes, 
ETA launched a third assembly in 1964 to officially incorporate leftist sentiment into its 
ideology. The product of the meeting, ETA’s “Letter to the Intellectuals”, attempted to organize 
a leftist nationalist movement based on “action-repression-action” theory.256 The strategy aimed 
to provoke state-sponsored repression through ruthless killing. Louise Richardson argues all 
terrorist organizations aim to provoke reaction through violence. According to Richardson, 
terrorists “are action-oriented people operating in an action-oriented group…In taking action, 
therefore, they want to elicit a reaction.”257 ETA was no different. In theory, the covert group 
surmised, the government’s reckless oppression to terrorist violence would launch a “labor 
mobilization against the regime”258 and unify the Basque population behind a “broad interclassist 
national front.”259 Romantically banded together beneath the flag of Euskal Herria, the Basque 
Country would fight to reclaim its independence from Spanish “imperialism.” Editorials in Zutik, 
ETA’s underground newspaper, encouraged the attacks by assuring recruits that “Violence is 
necessary. A violence that will strike and demolish, that will turn our struggle into the good, 
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profitable violence that the Jews, the Congolese and the Algerians have created; that will place in 
our hands a substantial counterweight in the confrontation between our will for liberty against 
theirs for tyranny.”260 Eager militants answered the cry for bloodshed. Inspired by the concept of 
“anti-imperialist guerilla warfare,”261  ETA claimed its first victim in 1968. Txabi Etxebarrieta, 
an ETA executive and passionate advocate for armed struggle, murdered a Civil Guard member 
named José Pardines on June 7
th
, 1968. Shortly after the assassination, Etxebarrieta was hunted 
down and killed by Spanish law enforcement. He was hailed as ETA’s first martyr.262 Only two 
months later, vengeful etarras murdered San Sebastián police chief Melitón Manzanas outside 
his home on August 2nd.
263
 ETA’s action-repression-action strategy began with law enforcement 
targets, but it didn’t end there.  
In 1973, ETA assassinated a high-profile politician as part of its action-repression-action 
theory. Spanish Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco, despised by ETA as a “symbol of pure 
Francoism,”264 was the designated successor of the ailing Caudillo. As one anonymous etarra 
stated, “Everyone knew that the Spanish oligarchy was counting on Carrero to assure a 
convulsion-free transition to Francoism without Franco.”265 Determined to end Franco’s legacy, 
ETA commenced “Operation Ogre” (Carrero Blanco’s assassination) on December 20 th, 1973. 
ETA placed 165 pounds of dynamite in a shallow tunnel beneath the road outside Blanco’s 
church. As the Prime Minister left daily mass at 9:30 am, the militants detonated the bomb 
remotely. Blanco’s exploding car launched over a several story building, earning him the off-
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color distinction of “first Spanish astronaut.”266 Franco survived his right-hand man by two 
years, but the Spanish and Basque populations viewed Blanco’s death “as the end of 
Francoism.”267 Whether physical, symbolic, or both, the Prime Minister’s assassination had an 
impact on Spain. And the action-repression-action strategy produced results. True to ETA’s 
predictions, Franco responded with brutal arrests and executions. By September 1975, Spanish 
police and Civil Guard had killed 33 Basque insurgents. As Kurlansky puts it, “Franco was still 
alive, still in power, and still killing.”268  
Although Carrero’s assassination is an example of successful action-repression-action 
strategy, ETA could not solely target politicians. For one, politicians maintained body guards and 
enacted heightened security measures (especially after Carrero’s death). The additional 
protection made them more difficult targets. For another, there was a tangible limit of high-
profile politicians to murder. And finally, political assassinations did not necessarily provoke 
overwhelming anger among law enforcement members. Politicians are considered 
“noncombatants” in this project to maintain consistency with Clark’s statistics. However, 
political figures do not fit the definition of “combatant” or “noncombatant” cleanly. Although 
politicians do not physically fight, they make decisions which can directly impact the repression 
or arrest of individuals. Since politicians choose to involve themselves with state policies and 
counterterrorism methods, their deaths do not always impel sympathy among members of law 
enforcement. Politicians, just like members of the military or police, place themselves in 
positions of potential danger to make decisions regarding state security. In contrast, civilians do 
not. Murdering non-political civilians often provokes anger, empathy, and fear—the perfect 
combination for retaliatory violence.  
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Although it is unclear if or when ETA officially integrated civilian targeting into its 
doctrine, the covert group began murdering (non-political) noncombatants in the early 1970s. 
According to most scholarly views, noncombatants are “innocent of the violent and destructive 
action of war”269 and therefore exempt from atrocity. ETA, like other terrorist organizations, 
defied this norm. To them, civilian-directed violence became a key part of action-repression-
action strategy. The murder of noncombatants could easily incite rage in law enforcement, 
improving ETA’s chances of provoking repressive government backlash. In addition, these 
“inexplicable” attacks generated terror in Spain and the Basque Country. As fear took root, ETA 
appeared both powerful and invincible to the Spanish and Basque populations. In September 
1974, etarras detonated a bomb in a Madrid restaurant. The blast killed 13 people, and wounded 
70.
270
 Yonah Alexander, Michael Swetnam, and Herbert Levine, refer to the bombing as ETA’s 
“first act of indiscriminate terrorism.”271 Political Scientist Jacob Shapiro argues that terrorists 
fuel mass hysteria with seemingly “‘random,’ ‘indiscriminate,’ ‘arbitrary,’ and 
‘unpredictable’”272 attacks.  Because victimization appears irrational, the media elevates the 
violence to inexplicable “wild savagery.”273 Widespread overreaction places “exaggerated 
weight”274 on militant capabilities, and sows unfounded terror.    While researchers will never 
know the true motive of ETA’s restaurant bombing, it is likely the militants utilized this 
“particularly abhorrent”275 tactic to incite police brutality as part of its action-repression-action 
platform.  
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Other action-repression-action attacks appeared just as random. Alejandro Estrenian was 
assassinated by ETA in the city of Amorbieta on October 23
rd
, 1980. Estrenian was an 
unemployed clerk at the time of the attack.
276
 A twenty-four year old fisherman, named 
Florentino Lopetegui, was killed by ETA militants on March 6
th
, 1980 in Oforio.
277
 ETA 
murdered Luis Dominguez Jimenez on January 25
th
, 1980 in Vergara. He was a gravedigger by 
profession.
278
 His wife, Arrante Zurutuza, remembers her husband’s death with anguish. “I could 
not go mad with grief, fear, and helplessness, because I had to take care of my children,”279 she 
recalls dejectedly. Jose Miguel Palacios Dominguez was an executed salesman.
280
 Forty eight 
year-old Julio Rabanete Herrero was wounded in a murder attempt while working as a bus 
driver.
281
 Other ETA targets included a tennis club and beach house in Javea.
282
  
Even accidental victims could prompt both law enforcement repression and civilian fear. 
Ten-year-old Fernando Garcia fell victim to an ETA attack on March 29
th
, 1980. Fernando and 
three childhood friends were playing near a car, when they discovered an abandoned package in 
the street. Curious, one boy picked up the parcel. It exploded in his hands, showering the street in 
blood and burnt flesh. Fernando’s father rushed his son to the hospital, where doctors saved the 
boy’s life in an emergency surgery. Traumatized by horrific injuries and his friend’s sudden 
death, Fernando struggled against depression and anxiety. Later, Fernando offered a testimony of 
his story, ardently declaring “I don’t want to hear your opinion about terrorism, until you’ve 
spoken with the victims.”283 As ETA’s carnage manipulated human emotions, Basque and 
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Spanish fear ran rampant. Civilians refused to start their cars before ducking underneath to check 
for bombs.
284
 Mothers forbade their children from playing in the streets. Isabel, the widow of a 
slain husband, fearfully pointed out “our homes should be better protected.”285 Carmen Ibarlucea 
refused to give minute details of her husband’s assassination, bitterly attesting “It’s better to keep 
quiet about certain things for the good of our security.”286 When questioned about the effect of 
the violence on local communities, Ibarlucea answered “many families decided to leave Euskadi 
after a fateful day of terrorism transformed their lives.”287 Others, like Ibarlucea, decided to stay 
and pray for peace in the Basque Country.  
 
But ETA’s civilian attacks had their shortcomings. By targeting noncombatants in both 
Spain and the Basque Country, ETA ran the risk of alienating its supporters. Like all covert 
groups, ETA required a local support base for funding, recruitment, and sympathy. The etarras 
had to carefully select each victim, as “using too much violence, or hitting the wrong targets, can 
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be just as damaging to a cause as employing too little.”288 If ETA’s methods became distasteful 
to leftist-oriented Basques, a widespread class-based struggle would be impossible.  
ETA viewed successful Basque capitalists as the perfect target. After many northern 
industrialists were incorporated into Spain’s elite social class, ETA viewed the businessmen as 
symbolic traitors to “rural Basque culture.”289 Instead of conforming to the ancient Basque 
professions of agriculture and fishing, the new dominant class pursued “mining, heavy 
industry,”290 and “banking.”291 ETA’s public statements accused Basque industrialists of 
conducting business in a “repressive and coercive flow,”292 and sacrificing “whatever it takes”293 
to make money. Now ardently anti-capitalist, ETA could capitalize on its leftist support base by 
targeting wealthy manufacturers and professionals. Anti-imperialists would not object to the 
industrialists’ deaths, and Spanish authorities would seek revenge for the bloodshed. In addition, 
there were other benefits of kidnapping Basque industrialists. Not only did the attacks issue 
dramatic political messages against government-sponsored industrialism, they also gave ETA the 
“prestige of playing Robin Hood to striking workers.”294  
The kidnappings followed a fairly predictable pattern. While ETA paraded as a band of 
honorable thieves who stole from the corrupt rich, the covert group “filled its war chest” 295 with 
ransom and extortion money. Most abduction victims were released after giving ETA large sums 
in extorted payoffs. If the organization’s ransom demands were met, or the victim’s family 
arranged a suitable deal, the captive was set free. Kidnapped industrialist Felipe Huarte was 
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returned to his family unharmed in 1973 after fulfilling ETA’s monetary demands.296 In 1976, 
ETA demanded $1.6 million for the kidnapped son of a Basque industrialist named Arrasate. 
While it is unclear whether the ransom was ever paid, the young man was released unscathed.
297
  
Later, the director of the Vitoria Michelin Tire Company was kidnapped in 1979 and released in 
good health.
298
  
However, not all abductees saw home again. If ETA’s requirements went unanswered, 
the group spared no bullets. At least six kidnappings ended tragically, including those of Javier 
de Ybarra and Angel Berazadi.
299
 Ybarra, a prominent Bilbao industrialist, was kidnapped on 
May 20
th
, 1977. A group of ETA-político militar members disguised themselves as hospital 
orderlies, entered Ybarra’s home, tied and gagged his family members, and escaped in a stolen 
ambulance with the kidnapped businessman. In exchange for Ybarra’s freedom, ETA demanded 
the release of 23 imprisoned etarras and a ransom of one billion pesetas (about $14 million). 
Ybarra’s family was incapable of meeting the terrorist organization’s strict deadline, and the 
industrialist’s body was discovered on June 25th.300 Angel Berazadi, a conservative Basque 
industrialist, was kidnapped and killed by ETA-político militar on April 7
th
, 1976.
301
 Ryan’s 
1981 kidnapping and assassination is yet another example. In addition, it seems that ETA 
coerced “thousands of other Basque industrialists and professionals into paying a sizable annual 
“revolutionary tax” to the organization.”302 Although hard evidence is lacking, it appears that 
ETA captured or killed some businessmen who refused to pay.
303
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The Case of José Maria Ryan  
Unlike ETA’s typical kidnapping schemes, Ryan’s abduction was not financially 
lucrative. Instead of demanding money, the terrorist organization required the “paralysis and 
demolition of the Lemóniz Nuclear Power Plant in the span of one week.”304 At first glance, 
ETA’s obsession with Lemóniz seems peculiar. Why would etarra terrorists want Lemóniz 
destroyed? After all, the plant was located only 12 kilometers from Bilbao.
305
 Any power 
produced at Lemóniz would directly benefit the Basque Country. But upon careful examination, 
the militants’ ultimatum reflected both ETA’s anti-imperialist ideology and a larger pattern of 
global anti-nuclear movements of the 1970s and 1980s. Construction of the Lemoníz Nuclear 
Power Plant began in 1972 by the power company Iberdeuro Basque Utility. Iberdeuro intended 
to build a series of five nuclear power plants on the Basque coast, but the government-sanctioned 
project was hotly opposed by many Basque citizens. First, the project’s intended site was a 
popular local resort. The construction of Lemóniz would exploit the sandy white beaches and 
peaceful wilderness of the 15 kilometer Bay of Basardos, which stretches from Bilbao to San 
Sebastián. Second, civilians worried about “crowding existing residents near the plant”306, “as 
well as the potential “ecological and health dangers”307 of nuclear energy. Nuclear meltdown 
scares in the 1970’s, including the U.S. Three Mile incident in 1979, were fresh in public 
memory. As one Basque leader asserted “A radiation accident at Lemóniz would wipe out the 
entire Basque people.”308  
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In addition, nuclear opposition in the Basque Country had political roots. The Basque 
population resented Iberdeuro as “a classic example of right-wing business interests that 
flourished under Franco.”309 According to Basque lawyer Juan Cruz, “The company [Iberdeuro] 
is dominated by the same oligarchy that turned Bilbao into the most polluted, most contaminated 
industrial city in the world.”310 The Lemóniz venture, which began during Franco’s regime, was 
ardently supported by Spain’s central government. Although Franco’s intentions remain unclear, 
Mez, Schneider, and Thomas speculate the dictator hoped to acquire “knowledge with regard to 
the civil usage of nuclear technology also for military purposes.”311 Regardless of the regime’s 
objectives, the refusal of local political entities was “overruled by the central 
government.”312Despite a series of petitions and legal challenges, the Basque population was 
powerless to halt construction. On July 14, 1977, the Basque people flooded the streets of Bilbao 
in the “largest anti-nuclear demonstration the world had ever seen.”313 An estimated 150,000 to 
200,000 protestors gathered to condemn the authority of the central government, and demand 
Iberdeuro’s cessation of the Lemóniz project.314 By 1979, the environmental and political 
implications of the plant were “totally intertwined.”315 Jane I. Dawson refers to this 
“convergence of environmentalism and nationalism”316 as “eco-nationalism” in the context of 
anti-nuclear hysteria following the 1986 Chernobyl accident in the Soviet Union. According to 
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Dawson, anti-nuclear movements are often “transformed and incorporated”317 into sovereignty 
struggles. 
Propelled by the momentum of the anti-nuclear movement, ETA appropriated Lemóniz 
as a “powerful symbol of Spanish oppression.”318 By hijacking a popular issue, ETA projected 
heroism while simultaneously pursuing its own violent ends. Militants equated nuclear 
supporters with Basque-hating traitors by issuing polarizing slogans like “Euskadi ala Lemoiz 
(either Basque or Lemóniz).”319 According to ETA propaganda, the Lemóniz project endangered 
the very survival of Euskal Herria. This either/or scheme placed Basque industrialists in a 
compromising position. Continued support for nuclear energy meant public antagonism, and 
potential attack. But opposing the plant’s construction meant losing money, an honest job, and a 
degree of Basque oversight for the state-sponsored project.  
By the time Ryan was kidnapped on January 29
th, 1981, the “Battle against Lemóniz”320 
had claimed its share of blood. Between 1977 and 1981, etarra militants staged hundreds of 
attacks against Iberdeuro’s offices and construction sites. The first bomb, which was smuggled 
into the reactor’s core, killed two employees, caused $70 million of damage, and delayed the 
project by two years.
321
 The situation escalated. In 1979, police shot and killed one of the 5,000 
anti-Lemóniz demonstrators in Tudella. An eyewitness later recalled how “a twenty-three year 
old student from Saint-Sebastien, was dying on the bridge, from a bullet which entered her 
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mouth and exited through the top of her head.”322 ETA retaliated by killing two Madrid 
policemen the following day.
323
  
Growing Frustrations: Public Response to Ryan’s Death  
Ryan was not the first civilian to die over Lemóniz, but his death contributed to a pivotal 
decline in Basque and Spanish public acceptance of ETA’s violence. During the July 1977 
historic anti-Lemóniz manifestation, Basque flags waved high above the crowds while “chants 
against nuclear power were mixed with chants in support of the Basque separatist movement, 
ETA.”324 Opinion polls from a 1979 survey conducted by the Spanish research organization 
Fomento de Estudios Sociales y de Sociología Aplicada (FOESSA)  indicated 63% of Basque 
people favored independence.
325
  The same study found 17% of Basque respondents considered 
ETA members to be patriots, and 33% viewed etarras as idealists. Collectively, half of the 
Basque sample possessed a favorable opinion of ETA.
326
  Furthermore, Gunther, Sani, and 
Shabad’s 1979 study discovered that 50% of surveyed Basques and 29% of surveyed Spaniards 
blamed the Franco regime for Spain’s political violence problem. According to the same opinion 
poll, 43% of Basque respondents and 20% of Spanish respondents believed the central 
government should negotiate with ETA.
327
  
Despite possible limitations in sampling, it seems the Basque insurgents enjoyed 
substantial public support in Euskal Herria and central Spain during the late 1970s. But one year 
later public opinion polls told a different story. A July 1981 Centro de Investigaciones 
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Sociológicas (CIS) study reported only 12% of Basques favored independence.328 Compared to 
the 1979 FOESSA survey, pro-liberation sentiment had dropped by 51 percentage points. In 
addition, the 1981 CIS poll found that only 13% of Basque respondents favored ETA, with 2% 
viewing the militants as patriots and 11% considering them idealists. In contrast, 41% of Basques 
now equated ETA members to madmen, criminals, or manipulated personalities.
 329
  ETA faced a 
weakened support base, as positive Basque perceptions of the group decreased from 50% in 1979 
to a mere 13% in 1981.   
Two days after photos of Ryan’s grotesque body consumed the front page of Basque and 
Spanish newspapers, 200,000 anti-ETA demonstrators converged in the streets of Bilbao, San 
Sebastián, and Vitoria.
330
 The Civil Governor of Vizcaya accused ETA of committing “blood 
crimes.”331 Luis María Bandrés, the Basque Minister of Culture and executive leader of the 
Basque Nationalist Party, stated that Ryan’s execution was “The end of ETA-militar. The death 
of Ryan had no justification.”332 A group of bishops from Bilbao expressed their sorrow that 
ETA resorted to the “cruelty and insanity of killing a human being.”333 Juan José Pujana, the 
President of Basque Parliament, condemned ETA’s “savage and murderous fury.”334 The head of 
an antiterrorist delegation at a Madrid conference, Javier Rupérez, asserted “there are no good 
terrorists”335in response to ETA’s assassination. And even socialist political figure Gregorio 
Peces Barba called Ryan’s murder a “sign of bestiality, irrationality, and perversity.”336 Friends, 
coworkers, and relatives of José Maria Ryan gathered in the offices of Iberdeuro to mourn. The 
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Lemóniz plant lay quiet, engulfed in “an atmosphere of desolation.”337 Overwhelmed by the 
manifestations, the Basque Country shut down. Businesses and factories closed, schools 
cancelled classes, and public transportation ceased.
 338  To a visitor’s eye, Euskal Herria was in a 
state of mourning.  
                 
 
Even northern newspapers, which Spanish and Basque readers typically associate with 
“nationalist (separatist) sentiment,”339 highlighted the tragedy of Ryan’s assassination.  By 
February 7
th
, hundreds of anti-ETA articles inundated the Basque press. Written by journalists, 
civilians, and politicians alike, the bulletins cursed ETA militants as “terrorists”, “intimidating 
criminals”, “murderers”, and “the Number One enemy of the Basque people.”340 Bold red letters 
on the front of El Correo Español stated “For Peace in the Basque Country: The Largest 
Demonstration.”341 The cover of Bilbao’s La Gaceta del Norte read “Unanimous Clamor for 
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Peace.”342 And even more surprisingly, Egin, the local newspaper in San Sebastián, headlined 
with “Thousands of People Marched in Protest of the Death of Ryan: Serious Incidents in San 
Sebastián Produced Numerous Injuries and Contusions.”343  
Launched in 1977 and published in both Euskera and Spanish, Egin was notorious for its 
separatist inclinations. In fact, the newspaper faced judicial action numerous times for illegally 
abetting ETA militants. Mirentxu Purroy Ferrer, the director of Egin, was tried for “encouraging 
the Basque people to take up armed struggle”344 in his 1980 publications. And in 1998, the 
newspaper’s publishing company was indicted for allegedly funding etarra cells.345 Despite 
Egin’s ideological leanings, the newspaper prominently featured the widespread condemnation 
of Ryan’s death. In its February 7th edition alone, Egin printed twelve articles regarding the 
engineer’s execution. Basques who the paper interviewed accused ETA of destroying the “peace 
of a family,”346 committing acts of “unimaginable brutality,”347 causing “immense pain,”348 
“sowing terror, ”349 and “destroying the coexistence”350 of the Basque people.  
The Madrid press, normally removed from Basque matters, also fixated on Ryan’s 
murder. ABC, one of the capital city’s prominent newspapers, highlighted a picture of Bilbao’s 
La plaza de Zabálburu overwhelmed by 100,000 screaming protestors. The opening article read 
“Basque Country: The People Against ETA.”351 Later paragraphs praised the widespread 
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“indignation”352 over Ryan’s death, lauded the Basque people’s “historical and unambiguous 
rejection of ETA terrorism,”353 and expressed heartfelt condolences to Ryan’s widow.  
ABC’s news coverage of Ryan wasn’t purely altruistic. Like all media outlets, the 
publication had its own political agenda. Described as an “influential and monarchical”354 
newspaper by Spanish historian Antonio Cazorla-Sánchez, ABC is known for its pro-government 
leanings. The Luca de Tena family founded the ABC press in 1903.355 From 1939-1975 the 
newspaper conformed to Franco’s fascist propaganda. According to William Chislett, the 
privately owned newspaper “hardly ever stepped out of line under Franco.”356 When state 
censorship lifted upon Franco’s death, ABC maintained its conservative ways. In September 
1977, the newspaper expressed reservations concerning Catalonian nationalism. An autonomous 
Government of Catalonia was “convenient, and acceptable,”357 as long as it refrained from 
undermining the “unquestionable unity of Spain.”358 ABC’s opinion of Basque nationalism was 
no different. An independent Basque Country defied Franco’s personally-stated vision of a 
“unified and imperial Spain,”359 a dream which many conservative Spaniards still idealized. To 
ABC and other right-leaning newspapers, ETA was a physical deterrent to Spain’s second 
“golden age.”  
Despite the political agendas of various media outlets, it seems that both the Basque and 
Spanish populations viewed Ryan’s assassination unfavorably. As a loving husband and father, 
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Ryan’s death easily garnered sympathy. His violent passing marked the perfect opportunity to 
denounce Basque separatist movements.  Unfortunately, it is difficult to accurately gauge the 
public reaction to ETA’s violence, as there were no opinion polls conducted around the time of 
Ryan’s death. In an effort to quantify popular opinion concerning ETA in the days following 
Ryan’s assassination, I conducted a comparative analysis of Madrid’s newspaper ABC and 
Bilbao’s newspaper La Gaceta del Norte.  
To access the media coverage of each newspaper, I constructed three quantitative 
analysis schemas. I recorded the number of publications referencing ETA between January 1
st
 
and February 23
rd
 in each newspaper, excluding all articles that mentioned Ryan. I decided to 
omit Ryan in this instance to gauge how the Madrid and Bilbao press were generally responding 
to ETA activities in early 1981. I wanted to establish this “baseline” coverage to later determine 
if media coverage of Ryan’s kidnapping and assassination was unusual. Any non-Ryan article 
that mentioned “ETA,” “Basque terrorists,” “Basque terrorist organization,” “etarra,” or “ETA 
militant” counted towards the ETA category. I tallied the number of articles pertaining to Ryan’s 
kidnapping and assassination in ABC and La Gaceta del Norte. Ryan was not featured in either 
newspaper prior to his kidnapping, but any article referring to the engineer between January 29
th
 
and February 23
rd
 was included. For the sake of consistency, any article that mentioned José 
Maria Ryan’s name qualified for the tally. Finally, I compared printed nouns attributed to ETA 
militants as positive, neutral, or negative both before Ryan’s kidnapping (i.e. before January 29th) 
and in response to Ryan’s kidnapping and assassination (i.e. articles referring to Ryan beginning 
on January 29
th
). The frequencies of positive, neutral, and negative descriptions from ABC were 
contrasted with those from La Gaceta del Norte. Details of my word analysis will be provided 
with the data in a subsequent section.  
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Media coverage of ETA (excluding Ryan) reveals differences in how Madrid and Bilbao 
responded to the terrorist organization in early 1981. From January 1
st
 to February 23
rd
, ABC 
printed only 56 articles pertaining to the terrorist organization. But ETA consumed the northern 
news, with La Gaceta del Norte publishing 120 stories on the covert group (See Figure One). 
Between January and February 1981 ABC rarely covered ETA, and instead fixated on 
international terrorist movements. Ireland’s Irish Republican Army (IRA), France’s 
Organisation de l'armée secrète (OAS), Italy’s Red Brigades, Germany’s Red Army Faction 
(commonly known as the Baader-Meinhof Group), and Algeria’s National Liberation Front 
(FLN) secured much of ABC’s coverage. Articles such as “Divisions in the Italian Government 
over the Controversy of Terrorism,”360 “Moscow Accuses Washington of Enabling Western 
Terrorism,”361 “Censorship of the Italian Press against the Red Brigades,”362 “Rome: General 
Assassinated by the Red Brigades,”363 “At Least Eleven Countries Support ETA or are Utilized 
by It,”364 “Bernadette Devlin, Gravely Wounded in a Terrorist Attack: Northern Ireland,”365 and 
“The Logic of Terror”366 filled ABC’s pages. International Terrorism even claimed ABC’s front 
page on January 4
th
 with the headline “Terrorism and Information: A Debate in Italy.”367 ABC’s 
coverage of global terrorism likely served dual purposes. By focusing on terrorist movements in 
other countries, ABC deflected domestic concern over ETA. This “out of sight, out of mind” 
approach assuaged public worry and promoted trust in the Spanish government. In addition, ABC 
highlighted international political violence to remind the civilian population it wasn’t facing a 
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terrorist insurgency alone. When presented in the context of global terrorist movements, ETA 
appeared less taboo.  
 
 
Interestingly, ABC’s coverage of international terrorism seemed to drop immediately 
after Ryan’s murder. From February 7th to 11th, the four days following Ryan’s execution, ABC 
published only two articles on global terrorism.  These particular articles, titled “Washington 
Joins the Active Fight against Terrorism” and “USA Asks for Support in Proposition against 
Terrorism,” focused on U.S. counterterrorism policy making. However, each publication referred 
to ETA. In a span of days, Madrid’s terrorism dialogue shifted from international issues to the 
domestic problem.  
Newspaper coverage of Ryan’s kidnapping and murder reflects a different trend. Despite 
considerable historical animosity, Madrid and Bilbao found common ground with Ryan’s death. 
Regardless of political opinion on Basque independence, neither collective civilian population 
condoned ETA’s coldblooded murder. Not surprisingly, Madrid’s ABC included more coverage 
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of Ryan’s abduction and murder than Bilbao’s La Gaceta del Norte (see Figure Two). The pro-
government newspaper likely publicized ETA’s violence to diminish sympathy for the Basque 
insurgents. Between January 29
th
 and February 23
rd
, 1981 ABC published 57 articles regarding 
the engineer’s kidnapping and assassination.368 La Gaceta del Norte only included 42 articles.369 
Although public opinion in Madrid reflects greater preoccupation with Ryan’s tragic death, the 
difference between tallies is not substantially large. The similar results indicate both Madrid and 
Bilbao were focused on ETA’s bloodshed. This alone, is note-worthy. It would be inaccurate to 
suggest that all Bilbao civilians supported armed struggle for Basque liberty or that the entire 
Madrid population supported a centralized government, but the two cities have a long history of 
political disagreement. Bilbao and Madrid fought on opposite sides in the Carlist Wars and the 
Spanish Civil War. Later, their conflict translated into the struggle over Basque independence.  
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The third schema was a comparative analysis of ABC and La Gaceta del Norte 
descriptions of ETA, both before Ryan’s kidnapping (i.e. articles that mention ETA between 
January 1
st
 – January 28th, 1981) and in direct response to Ryan’s kidnapping and assassination 
(i.e. articles that refer to Ryan between January 29
th
 –February 23rd, 1981). Spanish words, just 
like English words, carry positive, neutral, and negative connotations. Not only does word choice 
convey meaning, it often imparts the author’s opinion. Most studies use word choice analysis as 
a qualitative methodology, given the subjectivity of language. This research combines qualitative 
and quantitative methods to explore journalists’ underlying, and perhaps unconscious, opinions 
of ETA before and in response to Ryan’s kidnapping and assassination. By comparing these 
word choices, I hoped to pinpoint a possible Basque and Spanish opinion shift regarding ETA’s 
violence in response to the engineer’s mistreatment. Words such as “abertzale (pro-Basque),” 
“youth,” “pro-liberty vigilante,” and “hero” were included in the positive classification. 
Descriptions like “group,” “organization,” “member,” and “presumed etarra” constituted neutral 
vocabulary. And “terrorist organization,” “terrorist,” “armed group,” “authors of kidnapping,” 
“drug addicts,” “illegals,” “executioners,” “murderers,” “neo-fascists,” and “criminals” were 
considered negative nouns.
 370
 Figures Three, Four, Five, and Six depict the results of the 
analysis graphically.  
When describing ETA before Ryan’s kidnapping, Madrid’s ABC used 98 negative words 
or phrases, constituting 59% of its ETA word selections. Bilbao’s La Gaceta del Norte used 84 
negative words or phrases, making up 63% of its ETA descriptions.  ABC used slightly more 
neutral phrases, with ABC utilizing 58 neutral words at 35% of all tallied descriptions, and La 
Gaceta del Norte including 36 neutral words at 27% of all tallied word choices. In contrast, La 
Gaceta del Norte printed slightly more positive descriptions than ABC. The Bilbao paper 
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included 13 positive nouns at 10% of all descriptive nouns on ETA, while the Madrid press only 
used 9 positive words at 5.0% of all ETA descriptions. The differences between positive, neutral, 
and negative descriptions are statistically small, and reveal little concerning opinion differences 
between Madrid and Bilbao. However, this data contrasts sharply with the descriptive nouns 
attributed to ETA in the context of Ryan’s kidnapping and murder.   
                      
 
In response to Ryan’s kidnapping and assassination, the word selections of both ABC and 
La Gaceta del Norte reflect an over-achingly negative opinion of ETA. Madrid’s ABC employed 
221 negative words or phrases, constituting 91% of its ETA word selections. Bilbao’s La Gaceta 
del Norte used 73 negative words or phrases, making up 90% of its ETA descriptions.  La 
Gaceta del Norte used slightly more neutral phrases, with ABC utilizing 4 neutral words at 2.0% 
of all tallied descriptions, and La Gaceta del Norte including 6 neutral words at 7.5% of all 
tallied descriptions.  ABC printed slightly more positive descriptions than La Gaceta del Norte. 
The Madrid paper included 17 positive nouns at 7.0% of all ETA descriptions, while the Bilbao 
press only used 2 positive words at 2.5% of all ETA word choices. Again, the difference between 
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each publication’s positive, neutral, and negative descriptive nouns is slight. It seems both 
Madrid and Bilbao had an overwhelmingly negative opinion of ETA.  
However, the increase in negative descriptions of ETA (in both cities) following Ryan’s 
kidnapping on January 29
th
,
 
1981 is remarkable. Prior to Ryan’s disappearance, 59% of ABC’s 
word selections regarding ETA were negative. And 63% of La Gaceta del Norte’s descriptions 
of ETA were negative. But in the newspaper articles concerning Ryan’s kidnapping and death 
(after January 29
th
), ABC’s ETA descriptions were 91% negative. And La Gaceta del Norte 
followed suit, with 90% of its ETA attributions falling into the negative category. Furthermore, 
praise for ETA and neutral terminology made up less than 10% of all published descriptions in 
both newspapers. In the context of Ryan’s kidnapping and assassination, ETA was the villain of 
both Spanish and Basque media.      
                  
 
Ryan’s death corresponded with a significant transformation in public response to ETA’s 
armed struggle. In appearances, Ryan was no different than ETA’s other victims. But unlike 
other ETA targets, the engineer was humanized before his death which encouraged a greater 
public reaction. ETA victims were typically mentioned in newspaper publications, but the 
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individuals rarely generated sustained media coverage. Leopoldo Garcia Martin, a retired second 
lieutenant of the national police, was murdered by etarras on January 17th, 1981. His death 
warranted only a small notice, titled “Retired National Police Lieutenant Killed.”371 A Basque 
business owner named Javier Egaña was kidnapped and interrogated by ETA militants on 
February 6
th, the same day as Ryan’s assassination.  La Gaceta del Norte noted the kidnapping 
briefly in an article titled “The Business Owner Egaña, Interrogated by ETA,”372 but Egaña’s 
name did not appear in print again. Even ETA’s kidnapping of three foreign dignitaries on 
February 19
th
 did not prompt special media attention. The consuls, Antonio Alfaro Fernández of 
El Salvador, Hermann Díez del Sel Korsatko or Austria, and Gabriel Biurrun Altavil of Uruguay, 
appeared in a series of articles in La Gaceta del Norte. But the publications failed to include 
descriptions or personal details on the abductees or their families.  
Instead of remaining an impersonal name, Ryan became a living, breathing man in many 
Basque and Spanish imaginations. Security scholar Bruce Schneier contends fear is strongest 
when the threat is personified in human form. He argues “people gloss over statistics of 
automobile deaths, but when the press writes page after page about the nine people trapped in a 
mine—complete with human-interest-stories about their lives and families—suddenly everyone 
starts paying attention.”373 Schneier’s example applies to Ryan’s death. By the time ETA 
executed the engineer on February 6
th
, regular civilians related to Ryan as a husband, father, and 
worker. Pepe Murua, Ryan’s wife, played a large role in giving her husband a human face. The 
black-haired beauty described her kidnapped husband as a “family man” during an interview 
with Egin on January 31st.  “He has always liked to dedicate almost all of his time to our kids—
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our marriage has five children—and to arrange and plant the small garden we have in front of the 
house”374 the woman asserted. In an article published by La Gaceta del Norte, Pepe Murua sadly 
declared her husband’s death “would destroy a happy household.”375 And a photograph in El 
Correo Español shows Pepe Murua leading a street manifestation in support of her husband’s 
release. On either side of their mother, two of Ryan’s young children grasp a banner. Behind the 
anxious family stands an array of shouting supporters, young and old, male and female.
376
 The 
public visibility of Ryan’s wife and children contributed to widespread sympathy for his 
situation.  
No one, not even a supporter of Basque independence, wanted to see Ryan’s children 
grow up without a father. Haunted by the shadow of Ryan’s fate, one 58 year-old anonymous 
widower beseeched ETA-militar to kill him in the engineer’s place. In his heartbreaking message 
to the kidnappers, published in El Correo Español, the man stated “I have watched the family 
and five small children of Mr. Ryan on television. If you want to truncate the life of this man, 
you will produce another five victims. Also innocents, who will suffer, in their own way, all the 
evil things you have done to their father.”377 The Samaritan painfully continued “I find myself 
alone in life, for my only son died in a car accident. If you eliminate me in place of Mr. Ryan, 
the pain you might have caused to other people will end with me, and the effect you seek will be 
the same.”378 Ryan’s attempted savior was not the only sympathetic soul. Colleagues at 
Iberdeuro praised the engineer’s gentle spirit. Fellow technicians described Ryan as “simple, 
plain, and always willing to do a favor for a friend.”379 And according to his friends, Ryan “was 
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always content and had kind words for everyone, even in difficult situations.”380 As a mere 
statistic, José Maria Ryan would have been forgotten. However, photos of the 39 year-old’s 
blindfolded corpse were not so easily wiped from history.  
 
In addition, ETA’s particular demands for Ryan’s release may have enraged Spanish and 
Basque civilians. Although this opinion was not explicitly stated in Spanish or Basque 
newspapers, the destruction of the Lemóniz Nuclear Power Plant seems like an unreasonable 
mandate to me. Obviously, constructing a nuclear power plant is not a trivial investment. By 
February 1981, Iberdeuro had poured millions of dollars and nearly a decade of labor into the 
Lemóniz project. There is no question the electrical company (and the Spanish government) was 
firmly dedicated to the construction of Lemóniz. As discussed earlier, Iberdeuro suffered 
countless ETA attacks against its premises during the 1970s. Several law enforcement members 
and two Lemóniz workers had already lost their lives to ETA’s anti-Lemóniz killings by the time 
militants kidnapped Ryan. It seems unlikely Iberdeuro and its government sponsors would 
discontinue the venture over the fate of a single employee. 
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 Furthermore, ETA usually demanded ransom from the families of kidnapped Basque 
industrialists. Sometimes the victims’ families could procure the necessary funds, and sometimes 
not. But at least ETA’s ultimatums followed a fairly predictable pattern, and (to some degree) the 
abductee’s fate lay with his family’s willingness to pay. ETA’s ultimatum over Ryan’s life was 
something different. Pepe Murua and her children could not merely demolish Lemóniz to save 
the engineer’s life. Ryan’s family and friends were completely powerless to halt construction. 
The only entity that could free Ryan was Iberdeuro—and by default, the Spanish government. 
Given the preexisting bloodshed over the nuclear power plant, it seemed unlikely these two 
entities would come to Ryan’s rescue.  
In hindsight, ETA’s ultimatum appears far less impractical to me. In the wake of Ryan’s 
assassination, Iberdeuro officials shut down Lemóniz on February 10
th
, 1981. While company 
officials released a statement to La Gaceta del Norte guaranteeing “the temporary closure of 
Lemóniz will be minimal,”381 Ryan’s death actually resulted in a “de facto stop of work at 
Lemóniz.”382 Iberdeuro officially discontinued the project in 1983. Clearly the terrorist 
organization’s 1981 ultimatum was not out of line, seeing that Iberdeuro formally closed the 
plant only a few years later. However, Spanish and Basque civilians could not predict the future 
in early 1981. It is quite possible the Spanish and Basque public found the terms of Ryan’s 
release excessive and unreachable. Ryan’s seemingly inevitable execution, combined with 
ETA’s trajectory of increasing violence, likely struck a nerve.  
Ryan’s death was not the sole cause of the public opinion shift, but his murder certainly 
contributed to growing disquiet over ETA’s tactics. ETA violence reached an “all-time high in 
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1980,”383 further contributing to public outrage over Ryan’s assassination in early 1981. Clark, 
who explored the distribution of ETA victims between 1968 and 1980, conducted his analysis of 
Basque violence using personal data gathered from contemporary press reports. According to 
Clark’s statistics, ETA killed 88 people, wounded 81, and kidnapped seven in 1980 alone.384 
Shabad and Ramo place ETA’s 1980 victim totals even higher, at 93 individuals killed and 10 
kidnapped.
385
 These researchers compiled their quantitative data of ETA’s attacks from Andrés 
Casinello’s “ETA y el problema vasco,” Miguel Castells’ Radiografía de un modelo represivo, 
José L. Pinuel’s El terrorismo en la transición española, and the Spanish Ministry of the 
Interior’s security reports on antiterrorist activities. Although its sources are unknown, the 
Guernica Peace Museum places ETA’s 1980 death toll highest at 94 victims.386  
The bloodshed was not erratic but mounted steadily. Beginning in 1968, ETA pursued an 
increasingly violent trajectory (see Figure Seven). Between 1968 and 1973 ETA’s annual 
number of fatal victims ranged from zero to three.
387
 In 1974 the etarras killed 11 individuals, 
wounded 58, and kidnapped zero. Besides a slight drop in murders in 1977, ETA’s killings 
continued to increase. Armed struggle reached a new level in 1979, when ETA murdered 72 
people, wounded 141, and kidnapped 8 in a single year.
388
 ETA’s annual victims peaked in 1980, 
but fell significantly in 1981. Shabad and Ramo note ETA’s 1981 mortal victims dropped to 30 
individuals, while the group’s kidnapping victims decreased to six.389 Clark does not record 
numerical data for 1981, but his analysis recognizes 1980 as the “high tide”390 of ETA’s 
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bloodshed. Furthermore, the Guernica Peace Museum exhibit records ETA’s fatal victims 
declining to 33 in 1981, followed by a trend of decreasing oscillation through 2001.
391
 The 
findings of the Guernica Peace Museum are displayed graphically in Figure Eight. ETA’s annual 
killings from 1968-2001 are illustrated by the light blue line. The small numbers above each year 
indicate the reported number of fatalities. As stated previously, the spike in the Guernica Peace 
Museum’s data occurs in 1980 with 94 recorded deaths.  
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The timing of Ryan’s assassination tipped the scales against ETA. Already drained by the 
unprecedented bloodshed of 1980, the Basque and Spanish people were tiring of ETA’s violence 
in early 1981. The militants had claimed too many innocent lives. Carmen Ortuzar, the grieving 
widow of a murdered Civil Guard, condemned ETA militants for their evil actions. “They kill 
because they want to kill…it seems so absurd, so cruel”392 she noted darkly. Ortuzar was not 
alone. Hundreds of victims and innumerable families mourned irreplaceable losses. ETA’s 
attacks were considered “particularly abhorrent”393when they directed violence at 
noncombatants. Each time ETA claimed a civilian, Spanish and Basque society cringed, 
imploring “Why this? He is neither police nor military!”394  
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ETA had no qualms with murdering innocents, but the Basque and Spanish populations 
refused to endure unrelenting violence. In October 1980, moderate political parties such as the 
Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), and the Union of 
the Democratic Center (UCD) convened a demonstration in San Sebastián to “protest against 
terrorism and for peace.”395 Universities, including the historically pro-independence University 
of Deusto, agreed to close for the occasion. Another 20,000 individuals staged anti-ETA protests 
on November 2, 1980.
396
 Etarras murdered four Civil Guard members on the day of the parade, 
and ETA claimed nine additional lives before the year ended.
397
 Clark suggests “Peace may have 
been what most Basques wanted at the end of 1980, but it was not what they seemed likely to 
get.”398 He was right. Instead of a ceasefire, the New Year brought Ryan’s tragic kidnapping and 
murder. Met with “indignation and stupefaction by all sectors”399 of the Basque and Spanish 
populace, Ryan’s assassination ushered in a surge of civilian resistance. Upon hearing of the 
engineer’s death, doctor and politician Roberto Lertxundi vowed, “They [ETA] must be 
eliminated. A society cannot permit murderers to kill for the sake of killing.”400 After twelve 
years of violence and suffering, the Basque and Spanish populations were ready for peace. 
Ryan’s assassination, publically viewed as a “criminal act,”401 represented an opportunity to 
denounce ETA and weaken the terrorist organization’s support base.  
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Chapter Three: Cause of Death: Pneumonia? 
Ryan’s fate prompted more than public opposition. By early 1981, the Basque and 
Spanish governments were also enraged. On February 4
th
, 1981, just two days before Ryan’s 
assassination, King Juan Carlos voiced warlike sentiment against ETA’s militants. “Known more 
for skiing than for politics,”402 the “tall, handsome, and silent”403 monarch was viewed as a 
harmless puppet by Franco’s regime.404 But upon the dictator’s death, the young monarch proved 
to possess political savviness and a good deal of spine. The typically mild Don Juan Carlos 
threatened ETA’s violent struggle beneath the symbolic Tree of Guernica. “I will not ignore the 
painful manifestations of violence that frequently cover this beloved Basque land in blood,”405 
the king declared. He went on to condemn “those who practice intolerance, despise coexistence, 
and do not respect the institutions or elementary rules of orderly freedom of expression.”406 
Angered by the “rancor of violence and sectarianism”407 in the Basque Country, the forty-three 
year old royal vowed to end ETA’s killing spree. In response to Ryan’s assassination on 
February 6
th
, Basque politician Enrique Múgica Herzog released a statement to Egin’s February 
8
th 
edition. The political figure denounced all ETA militants, but also extended his condemnation 
to all “‘accomplices of ETA, political groups and media channels that defend their [ETA’s] 
thesis, protect them, support their actions or excuse them.’”408  
It seems the anti-ETA sentiment extended beyond words. On February 13
th
, 1981, an 
etarra named José Ignacio Arregui Izaguirre was discovered dead in a Madrid prison hospital.409 
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The thirty-year-old militant had been intercepted by Spanish law enforcement near Madrid’s 
Prado Museum on February 4
th
. Izaguirre and three fellow ETA-militar members were 
discovered in a stolen car, with numerous weapons and munitions in their possession.
410
 There is 
no evidence to suggest the etarras’ arrest resulted from Ryan’s abduction, although it is possible 
Madrid authorities were on high-alert following the engineer’s kidnapping on January 29th. The 
insurgents were incarcerated in Madrid’s Carabanchel Penitentiary to await judicial action. Built 
in 1944 under Franco’s regime, Carabanchel was constructed in a Madrid suburb to remove 
political prisoners from the city center.
411
 According to the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones 
Científicas (CRIC), the penitentiary’s wheel-and-spoke design, tall glass windows, and never-
ending hallways gave prisoners the sense “of being watched constantly.”412 Constructed by the 
forced labor of inmates, the prison carried a connotation of state repression and malignant 
happenings from the 1940s through the 1990s. Due to its notorious reputation, the Spanish state 
abandoned Carabanchel in 1998 before destroying the building in 2008.
413
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According to Spain’s Minister of the Interior, Izaguirre “was put to judicial resolution on 
February 10
th
 within the penitentiary.”414 But on February 12th, the suspected terrorist suffered 
severe dizziness while being reviewed by the División del Gabinete de Archivo e Identificación 
Personal (Spain’s judicial investigation services, equivalent to the U.S. FBI). Although the 
prison doctor noted Izaguirre’s “good state of consciousness,”415 the etarra was suffering from 
respiratory acidosis (a medical emergency characterized by decreased ventilation), a discolored 
tongue, tongue-bites, crackling death rattles, swollen lower legs, and a high blood pressure of 
170/90. Realizing the gravity of the situation, the doctor ordered Izaguirre’s “urgent transfer to 
an appropriate hospital facility.”416 Within 16 hours the prisoner was moved to the penitentiary’s 
hospital. Initial medical reports listed Izaguirre’s symptoms to include “conjunctivitis, a bruised 
right shoulder, internal swelling of both arms and legs, second degree burns on the bottom of 
each foot, a stupor-like state, intense shortness of breath, and prolonged abdominal pain.”417 But 
on the morning of February 13th, Izaguirre’s condition had worsened. The doctor’s notes read 
“insufficient respiration due to double bronchopneumonia. Pneumonic condensation developed 
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in the middle lobe of right lung within last few hours. Serious prognosis.”418 At 9:00 am a 
hospital nurse reported the feverish Izaguirre murmured “‘Nik uste diat hiltzekotan nagoela (I 
think I am dying).’”419 By early evening the etarra was dead.420 
                                            
 
Madrid officials skirted suggestions of torture. But it seemed clear to Spanish and Basque 
civilians that José Ignacio Arregui Izaguirre was tortured to death. On February 14th, Minister of 
the Interior Juan José Rosón Pérez ordered an “exhaustive investigation”421 concerning 
Izaguirre’s illness. Instead of proposing an explanation, Pérez affirmed “I cannot operate on 
assumptions, but on realities. The reality lies with the medical examination that will be 
conducted by forensic scientists tomorrow.”422 The judge assigned to the Izaguirre case, José 
Antonio de la Campa, was equally tight-lipped. Although De la Campa publically affirmed 
Izaguirre suffered bronchial pneumonia, a pulmonary edema, and a pleural effusion,
423
 the judge 
refused to entertain allegations of torture. De la Campa ambiguously stated “the fact that ill-
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treatment was the direct cause of the alleged ETA member’s death is not clear, and could be 
ruled out.”424 Ironically, the ABC article that published De la Campa’s interview, was titled “Five 
Police Officers to Face Justice.”425 The same government officials who evaded the word 
“torture,” were already prosecuting law enforcement personnel for committing that very crime.  
Statements from Izaguirre’s next-of-kin, including three brothers and two cousins, further 
confirmed the dead militant’s mistreatment at the hands of the government. Immediately after 
Izaguirre’s death, his family members assured ABC journalists the suspected etarra “had not 
lived at home for two years,”426 preemptively discounting any implicated connections to their 
dead relative. Later they expressed outrage at learning of Izaguirre’s death through the press. 
Izaguirre’s family members never received an official notification of the etarra’s death, and they 
were not permitted to view his body until February 15
th—only two hours before Izaguirre’s 
corpse was transferred from Madrid’s Institute of Anatomical Forensics to his hometown for 
burial. It seems reasonable Madrid authorities did not allow anyone to view the etarra’s body 
before the autopsy, given that Izaguirre was part of a criminal investigation. But the 
government’s failure to notify the dead prisoner’s family reveals an odd break of standard 
bureaucratic procedure. According to the European Prison Observatory, the Spanish Penitentiary 
Law of 1979 details “in the event of a prisoner’s death, serious illness, serious injury, or the 
transfer to a hospital, the authorities shall, unless that prisoner expressly requested them not to do 
so, immediately inform the spouse or partner of the prisoner, or, if the prisoner is single, the 
nearest relative.”427 Furthermore, the family’s disbelief at Izaguirre’s official cause of death 
suggested foul play. The militant’s brothers “affirmed he [Izaguirre] had a strong physical 
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constitution and had never been sickly.”428 It seemed unlikely the healthy thirty year-old simply 
dropped dead of pneumonia. And Izaguirre’s next-of-kin confirmed “the gruesome wounds on 
his corpse”429 ominously signaled abuse.  
Many political entities voiced their suspicions publicly. Carolos Garaicoechea, the 
lendakari (or president) of the Basque government, commented on the day after his death that 
Izaguirre’s death had a “sinister appearance”430 and asserted the “Basque parliament would 
demand responsibilities.”431 Political parties, including the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) and 
the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) issued a formal inquiry to the Spanish government regarding 
Izaguirre’s death.432 The leader of the PNV, Xabier Arzalluz, subtly implicated foul play, saying 
“There is great suspicion that this man died in very strange conditions, and there is both an 
official and unofficial version.”433 José María Benegas, the Secretary General of the Spanish 
Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), abandoned all political delicacy. He released an official 
communication conveying the PSOE’s revulsion at Madrid’s violation of human rights. Benegas 
blatantly stated: Izaguirre’s death “was the consequence of torture suffered during his detention. 
[PSOE] wants to publically manifest its absolute repulsion and condemn this act, which should 
be considered a flagrant transgression of elementary human rights, intolerable in a 
democracy.”434 The Municipal Council of San Sebastián even suspended its session when 
hearing of Izaguirre’s death. Before dismissing, the assembly dedicated its pre-established two 
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minutes of silence for José Maria Ryan, followed by an improvised minute of silence for 
Izaguirre.
435
  
Just one week after anti-ETA sentiment erupted in protest of Ryan’s assassination, 
Spain’s political voices were horror-struck by the nature of a terrorist’s untimely death.   On 
February 15
th
, the disturbing rumors of torture were confirmed. Published autopsy reports 
revealed Izaguirre suffered “physical violence,”436 which causally contributed to the prisoner’s 
pulmonary crisis. Once again the Spanish government avoided using the word “torture.” During 
the span of their torture-related research from 1975-1994, Basque psychologists Lurdes Moraza 
and Mertxe Basterra claim the Spanish government insisted “torture does not exist in the Spanish 
democracy.”437 When media outlets or human rights advocates suggested otherwise, State 
authorities would deny the suspected abuses met the official definition of “torture.” According to 
Moraza and Basterra, whose study analyzed thousands of media communications from 1978-
1994, the Spanish press would simply replace the term “torture” with a substitute word.  
Such was the case with Izaguirre. After conceding Izaguirre’s burns were likely the result 
of “mistreatment”, Judge De la Campa then stated “‘I don’t want to give any definitive and exact 
information, without having the final report.’”438  Although De la Campa’s vague response could 
be interpreted as an attempted cover-up, it is more likely the judge was exercising caution against 
premature media hype. After all, publically revealing case details before a trial can compromise 
the justice process. In either case, the unspoken truth lingered on public minds. An opinion 
column in La Gaceta del Norte read “The Shadow of Torture.”439 Another opinion piece in ABC 
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was titled “Torture Exists in Spain,”440 and one of Egin’s articles argued “The Autopsy of Arregi 
Izaguirre Confirmed Signs of Torture.”441 Common sense guided the media’s reaction. The 
etarra had been imprisoned for eight days before displaying respiratory illness. Had Izaguirre 
entered Carabanchel with severe physical injuries he would have succumbed to pneumonia 
sooner. The physical abuse must have occurred behind prison walls.  
It would be tempting to argue Izaguirre’s fatal torture was retaliation for Ryan’s 
assassination, but there is no concrete evidence to support the theory. The timing of Izaguirre’s 
alleged torture certainly corresponded with Ryan’s death. Ryan was already an ETA hostage 
when government forces imprisoned Izaguirre on February 4
th
. Kurlansky speculates Izaguirre’s 
extensive wounds “testified to the ten days of torture that had killed him.”442 In addition, 
extensive indignation over Ryan’s death (illustrated in Chapter Two) supports the notion 
Izaguirre suffered revengeful violence. Ryan’s assassination, chronologically very close, may 
have provided a rationalization for Izaguirre’s abusive interrogators. However, there are many 
motivations for torture. It is possible the five policemen utilized torture to acquire intelligence 
information from the etarra. Or perhaps torturing ETA militants was a standard operating 
procedure in Spanish prisons at the time. Even if Ryan’s murder did not specifically provoke 
Izaguirre’s mistreatment, the chronological proximity of the two events is relevant. In some way, 
either directly or indirectly, Ryan’s death affected Izaguirre’s imprisonment. Maybe the 
engineer’s kidnapping placed law enforcement members on high-alert, causing Izaguirre’s 
February 4
th
 arrest. Maybe prison policemen tortured the etarra out of vengeance for Ryan’s 
fate. Or maybe Ryan’s death made the Basque and Spanish populations extra sensitive to 
injustice, generating additional fury over Izaguirre’s death.  Regardless of the exact connection 
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between Ryan and Izaguirre, the etarra’s prison death provides this research with a case study on 
how Madrid authorities were responding to ETA violence in early 1981.  
Many Basque and Spanish civilians immediately implicated the Spanish government with 
Izaguirre’s death. Although it is possible the etarra’s abusive interrogators operated at their own 
volition, press reports implied the police officers acted under official orders. Monseñor Setién, a 
Bishop of Bilbao, accused the Spanish government of “robbing the consciousness and forcing the 
ethical convictions”443 of law enforcement officials. Setién’s colleagues, Moseñores Larrea and 
Uriate, fervently claimed Izaguirre’s torture and death “was not an accidental or singular 
occurrence,”444 but rather a standard governmental procedure. An anonymous opinion writer in 
Madrid identified Izaguirre’s murder as “a grave error…of our democracy,”445 associating the 
etarra’s death with a systemic State defect.  A La Gaceta del Norte journalist conformed to this 
view, deeming Izaguirre’s death an “institutional example”446 of State corruption. An Egin 
opinion column signed “family member of torture victim” asserted “the police, the torturers, are 
nothing but executors of a repressive policy directed by the highest levels of power against the 
[Basque] revolutionaries and people.”447 Supporters of this opinion deemed Madrid prison 
guards and police officers an extension of government power. To them, Carabanchel’s ruthless 
prison guards acted in the interests and practices of Spain’s administration.  
Psychologist Philip Zimbardo contends torture is often the product of institutional 
perversion. Zimbardo argues governments typically label deviant policemen and soldiers “a few 
bad apples” to deflect blame from themselves. But power elites actually “create mechanisms that 
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translate ideology—say, the causes of evil—into operating procedures.”448 When government 
executives condone atrocity or dehumanize certain populations, the state adopts a culture of 
impunity. In the Spanish case, press reports implicated two of the highest-ranking government 
officials with Izaguirre’s torture. Publications in El Correo Español asserted “The murky 
circumstances surrounding the suspected etarra José Arregui Izaguirre’s death directly involve 
two ministers.”449 The article dubbed Minister of the Interior Juan José Rosón and Minister of 
Justice Francisco Fernández Ordónez as “most responsible”450 for the terrorist’s death. Although 
the ministers could be considered “rouge” individual actors, they did not personally torture 
Izaguirre. Instead these power elites likely created or maintained the institutional hierarchy 
which permitted the etarra’s torture. Interestingly, El Correo Español journalists blamed these 
“guardians of the system”451 for Izaguirre’s death above the interrogators who abused the 
imprisoned terrorist. The distinction suggests the Basque media held Spain’s institutional 
authorities accountable for Izaguirre’s death, not a few evil policemen.  
Furthermore, the Spanish government carried a harsh reputation for torture under the 
Francoist regime. Franco’s Law of the Spanish People (Fuero de los Españoles) did not protect 
civilians from torture. The document granted the Spanish people the right to judicial security, but 
stated “All the [judicial] organs of the State shall act in accordance with a hierarchic order with 
pre-established norms.”452 In effect, the Caudillo legally solidified his authority to use execution 
and torture. As discussed later in this chapter, Spanish justice from 1939-1975 was characterized 
by secret arrests, vicious torture tactics, and mysterious disappearances of political dissenters. 
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This legacy of brutality likely bred Spanish and Basque distrust in the central government, and 
substantiated civilian suspicions that Izaguirre was tortured to death by the Spanish state. One 
Egin journalist overtly connected Izaguirre’s torture to memories of Francoist atrocity. He wrote 
the etarra’s interrogators “used the same [torture] methods—only even more brutal—as the 
torture in the time of the Dictator [Franco].”453 And Basque opinion writer Ardotxi passionately 
declared “For all those people detained, incarcerated, tortured, and killed in the time of Francoist 
power, José Arregui has raised a flag against the pseudo-democracy of today.”454 
Basques civilians quickly voiced their anger over Izaguirre’s fate. Small manifestations 
broke out around 7:00 pm on February 15
th
. The impromptu marches attracted an approximate 
total of 7,000 Basques to the streets of Bilbao, San Sebastián, Vitoria, and Pamplona.  Most 
participants criticized torture tactics, while a smaller minority “uttered shrieks against the police 
and in favor of ETA.”455 As the anti-government protests gained momentum, the Basque 
Country halted industry, services, and eventually all civilian activities.
456
  Egin reported the 
complete closure of public transportation, centers of learning, companies, industries, and even 
bars.
457
 Public response to the etarra’s mistreatment eerily resembled the pro-Ryan 
demonstrations, which occurred only a week before. And it would be reasonable to suggest 
public outrage over Izaguirre’s death was extraordinary. Although I cannot provide hard 
evidence to this effect, I did not encounter any other instances of civilian outcry over an ETA 
terrorist’s death in my research. 
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The protests only escalated. On February 16
th, 10,000 Basques attended Izaguirre’s 
funeral in Zizurkil, a town located 20 km south of San Sebastián.
458
 The attendees prayed over 
Izaguirre’s displayed body, bore his coffin through the streets, and paid their respects to the 
suspected etarra’s family.459 The same day, approximately 108,000 civilians gathered in the 
streets of the Basque Country to protest the Spanish government’s brutal mistreatment.460 Cries 
of “Amnesty Yes, Torture No,”461 “Police Kill,”462 “Against Terrorism of the State”463 
reverberated through the streets. Egin journalists described the protest as a “great show of 
solidarity, the most important one of recent years in Euskadi.”464  
Izaguirre’s fatal torture, which deepened the “us” [Basque] vs. “them” [Spanish 
government] mentality, also provided Basque separatists with the opportunity to denounce 
Madrid authorities. Herri Batasuna (“Popular Unity” in English), an influential Basque 
nationalist political party, pressed its political advantage by declaring the demonstrations a “great 
triumph”465 for the Basque people. Party representatives praised the Basque people for 
strengthening the nationalist coalition, and publically criticized government cruelty. ETA also 
took advantage of the etarra’s death. Eager to thwart public sympathy for the violent group, one 
ABC opinion writer stated “to convert the members of ETA into heroes, in this way, would be a 
manipulation of this death.”466 But the writer’s admonitions went unheeded. ETA, sensing an 
opportunity to garner public support, painted Izaguirre as a tragic martyr for Basque liberty. The 
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militants hailed Izaguirre as a “Homeric”467 hero, who stood “ready to die”468 for the cause. ABC 
reported “ETA Capitalized on the Manifestations”469 by appearing at various demonstrations to 
mourn its fallen comrade. Militants and supporters interjected shouts of “Hail ETA Militar”470 in 
crowd chants, and one anti-government march even carried a “banner signed by the terrorist 
organization ETA.”471 Despite the ethno-nationalist exploitation of Izaguirre’s murder, many 
outraged Basques had no political motivations. The front page of Egin estimated about 77,000 
demonstrators identified with leftist Basque political parties, while another 31,000 protestors 
were centrist civilians. Although it would be nearly impossible to accurately count a crowd of 
110,000 people, the Basque political parties organized themselves into separate blocks. Political 
delegates from each block tallied their own crowds, allowing Egin reporters to estimate the 
larger crowd demographics. The presence of centrist civilians is especially notable. Only a week 
previously, these same individuals had publically denounced Ryan’s assassination with equal 
fervor.
472
 The Basque Country, still emotionally raw from Ryan’s death, was in uproar again. But 
this time, the Spanish government was the enemy.  
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This chapter examines the circumstances and consequences of José Ignacio Arregui 
Izaguirre’s brutal death at the hands of Madrid law enforcement officials. Like “José Maria 
Ryan,” I was unfamiliar with the name “José Ignacio Arregui Izaguirre” at the start of this 
project. Although the suspected etarra is absent from most academic texts on ETA, the 
circumstances of his death captivated the Spanish and Basque press in early 1981. Within a 
period of four weeks, Madrid’s ABC and Bilbao’s La Gaceta del Norte published a combined 
total of 74 articles regarding the imprisoned terrorist. As this chapter will argue, Izaguirre’s death 
demarcates another key moment in Spain’s post-Franco democratization process. Frustrated by 
ETA’s violence, Madrid authorities likely tortured Izaguirre to extract intelligence information or 
to retaliate for Ryan’s tragic assassination. “Instead of capitalizing on a tragic public relations 
victory”473 from Ryan’s death, the Spanish government fought ETA’s violence with similar 
cruelty. This vengeful counter-terrorism policy undermined democratic principles outlined in the 
Spanish Constitution of 1978, and prompted Spanish and Basque civilian backlash. As the next 
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chapter will discuss, the political instability stemming from Ryan and Izaguirre’s deaths 
contributed to a near-failure of Spanish democracy on February 23
rd
, 1981.  
Franco’s Brutality: Torture and Murder of Basques from 1939-1975 
Izaguirre’s death, while incarcerated, was not unprecedented. According to the Basque 
Nationalist Party (PNV) cited by Kurlansky, Franco’s regime executed a total of 21,780 Basques 
between 1939 and 1945 alone.
474
 While the chilling statistic has never been verified, it is clear a 
substantial number of Basques perished in the Caudillo’s post-Civil War purges. Clark remarks 
“hundreds of innocent civilians were rounded up on the street by day, and in their homes at 
night, driven to remote country areas, or to deserted graveyards, and executed summarily, 
without even the benefit of having a priest hear their confession.”475 Basque veterans who 
opposed Franco’s rule endured unimaginable misery in Spanish prisons. Inmates of the Dueso 
prison were forced into crowded cells with no running water or toilets. Death came by starvation, 
disease, firing squad, or the medieval garrote.476 And sadly, frequent “beatings, torture, and 
forced confessions”477 augmented execution rates. Martin, a Basque nationalist who fought for 
the Republican side during the Civil War, bitterly recalls his imprisonment from 1937 to 1942. 
When asked if incarceration was better than a hazardous battlefield, the former soldier succinctly 
responded “To be a prisoner is the worst thing.”478 A woman named Josefa, the wife of a 
nationalist soldier, remembers encountering a former Basque republican in her hometown after 
the Civil War. Franco’s forces, who saw Josefa meet the young man’s eyes, questioned whether 
the two were acquaintances. ‘“No,’” she lied. Years later Josefa confessed the Basque had eaten 
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breakfast at her house that morning. ‘“They took him to the cemetery and there they gave him 
the last shot. I will never forget that,”479 she remarked painfully.  
 When ETA entered the political stage in 1959, Franco continued his cruel policies under 
the guise of counter-terrorism tactics. The dictator’s forces conducted massive anti-ETA sweeps, 
“arresting, torturing, and imprisoning”480 hundreds of Basques without judicial process. 
Kurlansky estimates Franco arrested 4,356 Basques without trial between 1963 and 1973.
481
 The 
statistic may be low. Given the Caudillo’s use of death squads, it is likely additional presumed 
etarras disappeared unreported. The precursor to ETA’s violent action-repression-action strategy 
was an attempted train derailment on July 18
th, 1961. After ETA’s attack, which did not (and did 
not intend to) physically harm anyone, “more than 100 [militants] were arrested and tortured; 
about 30 of these were taken to the infamous Carabanchel prison in Madrid for more 
interrogation and torture.”482 And when ETA assassinated chief police inspector Melitón 
Manzanas in 1968, “Madrid imposed martial law, and hundreds of suspects were imprisoned 
amid rumors of police brutality.”483  
Although the Fuero de los Españoles or Statute Law of the Spanish People (detailed in 
the The Spanish Constitution of 1972) guaranteed the “dignity, integrity and the liberty of the 
human person,”484 and “the right to judicial security”485 for every Spaniard, Franco’s absolute 
power could easily halt these fundamental human rights. Known as a “state of exemption,” 486 
this suspension allowed police and Civil Guard members to disregard civil liberties such as 
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“freedom of expression, privacy of the mail, assembly and association, habeas corpus, freedom 
of movement and residence, and freedom from arbitrary house arrest.”487 According to Clark, a 
state of exemption was declared six times in the Basque Provinces between 1960 and 1977. ETA 
scholar José María Portel estimates 8,500 Basques were affected by the states of exemption, 
“either through arrest, imprisonment and torture, or by fleeing into exile to avoid the police or 
vigilante groups.”488 Amnesty International, which conducted investigations of Spanish police 
brutality in 1975, found conclusive evidence that “massive detentions took place in Vizcaya and 
Guipúzcoa provinces at levels far higher than the official statistics claimed.”489 The resulting 
publication, titled Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Spain, contended the Spanish 
government detained more than 2,000 Basques during its six states of exemption. Madrid 
authorities documented only 189 arrests.
490
   
Torture was common. Eva Forest, a Catalan mother of three, was arrested and tortured in 
1974 for interviewing ETA commandos for a solidarity organization.
491
 In her testimonies, Eva 
recalls hearing “carnival-like laughter” in the midst of horrific beatings. She goes on to describe 
the unspeakable experience of watching a “blindfolded woman lying nude on a table whom the 
torturers told they had advanced technology to sterilize her through some type of ray.” 492 The 
woman, who endured electric shock on her abdomen, was “particularly broken”493 after the 
incident. Tragically, Eva was imprisoned, interrogated, and tortured without trial until her release 
in 1977.
494
 Her case was not unusual. Amnesty International’s 1975 report asserted “torture was 
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systematically used against a minimum of 250 Basque detainees”495 from 1960 to 1975. But 
investigators suggested the phenomenon was far more frequent than hard evidence could prove. 
Victims who died while incarcerated vanished from prison records and many abused detainees 
likely avoided human rights interviews, fearing police retaliation. Each victim interviewed by the 
human rights organization “had been tortured at least once a day during his period of 
imprisonment.”496 Some inmates had suffered up to five torture sessions in one day. And 
sickeningly, the abuse lasted anywhere between “half an hour to six hours.”497 To quote Amnesty 
International’s assessment, Madrid’s torture methods consisted of:  
“Severe and systematic beatings with a variety of contusive weapons, 
falanga (beating on the soles of the feet), burning with cigarettes, near 
drownings by being submerged in water while suspended upside-down, 
enforced sleeplessness, and forms of psychological stress, including mock 
executions, sexual threats, threats to relatives and the technique known as 
el cerrojo (the frequent fastening and unfastening of bolts on the cell doors 
in order to keep prisoners in perpetual fear that the torturers have 
returned).”498 
According to Amnesty International, all three major police forces of the Basque 
Provinces, including the Policia Armada, the Guardia Civil, and the Brigada Político-Social, 
participated in the beatings. Given the consistent nature of the violence and its usage across law 
enforcement agencies, Amnesty International’s report argues prison torture was a “systematic 
technique to punish and suppress Basque nationalists and was not a series of isolated and 
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irregular violations of law by a few police.”499 This assessment suggests the frequent violence 
against alleged etarras was a state-sanctioned activity for two specific reasons. First, torture 
could potentially obtain intelligence information or confessions from terrorists. Second, the 
beatings could “intimidate the Basque population into submission, and to frighten them into 
abandoning support for the Basque nationalist cause.”500 While only the victim suffered physical 
violence, the entire community of Basque separatists endured the collective punishment of fear. 
If Basque nationalists grew too terrified to support ETA militants, the covert group could not 
fulfill recruitment goals, acquire necessary funds, honor “martyrs,” or evade arrest.  
“Things Have Not Changed:” Basque Torture under Democracy   
Counter-terrorism torture tactics continued after the imposition of democracy. Although 
Section 15 of Spain’s new Fundamental Rights and Public Liberties (outlined in The Spanish 
Constitution of 1978) guaranteed “Everyone has the right to life and to physical and moral 
integrity, and under no circumstances may be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
punishment or treatment,” 501 law enforcement officials paid no heed. The fascist tendencies of 
Franco’s authoritarian regime pervaded Spain’s early democratic institutions. According to 
Clark, “the worst elements of Franco’s police state survived the transition to democracy in 
Spain.”502 These “elements” were both physical and cultural. Countless individuals, including 
Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez himself, served under Franco. Those who promoted or 
participated in torture from 1939-1975 likely supported the continuation of the tactic. In addition, 
Franco’s tenure generated a culture of impunity. The dictator’s post-Civil War purges permitted 
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nationalist soldiers to humiliate, rape, pillage, and kill dissenters with no repercussions.
503
 Sadly, 
this mindset outlived the Caudillo himself.    
  In October 1979, Amnesty International conducted another mission concerning Spain’s 
mistreatment of political prisoners. The publication, which analyzed torture incidents between 
September 1978 and June 1979, reported maltreatment occurred in Madrid, Barcelona, and 
Bilbao police stations against Basque prisoners.
504
 Abuse included threats of death or mutilation, 
sleep deprivation, beatings of the “head, body, genitals, soles of the feet, and fingers,” 505 
suspension by hand-cuffed wrists, electric shock, sexual threats, and la bañera or “having one’s 
head forced into a bathtub filled with a mixture of water, blood, vomit, excrement, and food 
remnants and kept there until near-suffocation.”506 One detained ETA militant, Mikel Amilibia, 
claimed he was tortured by Civil Guard members for six days in October 1979. When the etarra 
was released on October 20
th
, he displayed burn marks on his inner thighs from electrodes. 
Doctors confirmed the thirty-two year old had endured severe electric shock while in captivity.
507
  
Izaguirre’s 1981 death is yet another example of law enforcement torture under Spanish 
democracy. In their research, Zulaika and Douglass cite Moraza and Basterra’s La Columna 
Infame, a book on Spanish torture. Moraza and Basterra’s analysis of Spanish media 
communications from 1978 to 1994 reveals 14,000 Basques have been arrested since 1978 for 
political reasons, and “85 percent of those arrested are subjected to torture and maltreatment of 
all kinds.”508 Clearly, Izaguirre was neither the first nor the last victim of brutal treatment in 
prison.  And four days after Izaguirre’s death on February 13 th, imprisoned ETA militant Isidro 
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Extabe Urestrilla was admitted to the Carabanchel prison hospital for a bullet wound in his left 
shoulder.
509
 The etarra, who was captured with Izaguirre on February 4th, was experiencing 
severe pain and permanent dizziness. While ABC proposes Urestrilla may have been injured 
during a shoot-out with law enforcement on February 4
th
, the article offers no evidence for the 
suggestion. It is possible the militant was shot in prison. And even if Urestrilla suffered the 
gunshot wound on February 4
th
 (and not in Carabanchel), Spanish prison authorities neglected to 
provide him with sufficient medical treatment in a timely manner. Forcing a person to live with a 
bullet lodged in their shoulder for 13 days could certainly be considered torture.  
Spain Was Not Alone: The International Aspect    
Spain’s high torture rates were not unusual. Many democratic European nations utilized 
physical abuse from the 1960s-1980s to combat separatist insurgencies. During the 1970s and 
1980s, the British government was notorious for the brutal interrogation and torture of suspected 
IRA militants. In July 1976, IRA prisoners in Belfast’s Crumlin Road Jail issued a statement 
protesting the “continuous barrage of abuse, both verbal and physical, from the prison 
wardens.”510 Jim Auld, a twenty-year old Irish Catholic, was mistakenly arrested by British 
security forces in 1971 as a presumed IRA member. In his testimony, the youth recalled “They 
[police] beat me with batons, they kicked me all around the place. They were aiming towards my 
privates and my head and they were making me keep my hands at my sides. I went unconscious 
a couple of times and they woke me up.”511 During the 1970s Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) 
officers at the Castlereagh Interrogation Center participated in abuse. Former members recall 
“both IRA suspects and loyalists were beaten, burned with cigarettes or lighters, forced to 
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assume stressful positions for long periods, stripped and humiliated, and sometimes threatened 
with murder.”512 In an interview with The Guardian, one senior RUC detective avowed the 
“beatings were an integral part of the policing process.”513  
The democratic French government was equally ruthless during Algeria’s war for 
independence in the 1950s and early 1960s. Henri Alleg, a French journalist who supported 
Algerian independence, was arrested by French paratroopers during the Battle of Algiers in June 
1957. His memoir, The Question, reveals appalling acts of torture committed by the French 
military. In one horrific memory, Alleg recounts enduring his first round of electric shock: “I 
leapt in my bonds and shouted with all my might…A flash of lightning exploded next to my ear 
and I felt my heart racing in my breast. I struggled, screaming, and stiffened myself until the 
straps cut into my flesh.”514 Later Alleg remembers choking as paratroopers forced his rag-
wrapped head underwater. “I had the impression of drowning, and a terrible agony, that of death 
itself, took possession of me. In spite of myself, all the muscles of my body struggled uselessly 
to save myself from suffocation.”515 Alleg was one of many victims. Martin Evans, author of 
Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, argues torture was a fundamental aspect of the Battle of 
Algiers. He writes, “Although there was no written order sanctioning torture, the army was 
verbally encouraged to use it”516 by high-ranking military officers. French History teacher and 
Communist Party member Robert Bonnaud recorded his eyewitness account of the inhuman 
brutality committed by the French military in Algeria. He explained the horrific torture methods, 
stating “‘the electrodes are fixed to the temple, to the underside of the tongue, to the genitals as 
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well as to any other sensitive part of the body…Such torture leaves hardly any marks.’”517 
French General Jacques Pȃris de la Bollardière, who assumed his command in eastern Algeria in 
July 1956, was equally shocked by the French military’s routine use of torture. Enraged by the 
barbaric practice, Bollardière published an open letter against the French government in the 
newspaper L’Express. He was dismissed from the French army, served sixty days in solitary 
confinement, and was exiled to an obscure African territory. 
  Bollardière’s outrage was only the beginning. When news of torture in Algeria flooded 
the European press in March 1957, eye-witnesses and civilians alike fervently pledged a 
“humanist rejection of torture.”518 Destabilized by public outrage, the French government denied 
the collective use of torture and censured press articles. Determined to continue fighting for 
Algeria, the French military threatened a military coup d’ètat in May 1958. From May 24-29th 
the French people waited anxiously, fearing French paratroopers would drop into Paris and 
overthrow the government. On May 29
th
, 1958 the Fourth French Republic fell, destabilized by 
controversy over torture and the burden of a war-induced financial crisis. The coup came in the 
form of General Charles de Gaulle. Already a prominent political figure, the World War II 
veteran announced he would found a new Republican government to “ensure national unity.”519 
De Gaulle’s Fifth Republic featured a strong presidency with a weak parliament, and an 
emphasis on the de-escalation of violence in Algeria. By Izaguirre’s fatal torture in February 
1981, France’s 1958 crisis was still a fresh memory. Many Spanish and Basque civilians 
personally witnessed the near collapse of French society as a result of state-sanctioned torture in 
the Algerian War. Furthermore, even in late 20
th
 century Europe, democracy was still a fragile 
concept. Spanish and Basque civilians, like French citizens before them, likely recognized 
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government torture as a direct threat to democratic consolidation. And just like 1958 France, 
Spain experienced citizen backlash for torturing insurgents under a democratic regime.  
Definitions and Laws: The Case against Torture     
Many contemporary democracies use torture, so the tactic cannot be accurately deemed 
“undemocratic.” However, the concept of torture contradicts the basic civil liberties sought by 
most democracies. According to Merriam Webster’s, the most basic definition of democracy is 
“a government by the people.”520 Torture rejects this representative justice process. Perpetrators 
disregard the “will of the people,” and consume themselves with the necessity of gaining 
information, sowing fear, or instilling pain. In doing so, the physical abuse “corrupts the moral 
standards of the nation practicing it.”521 In addition, the dictionary also considers democracy “an 
organization or situation in which everyone is treated equally and has equal rights.”522 Again, 
torture defies this designation. Victims of physical abuse are treated horrendously in comparison 
to their fellow citizens. Furthermore, American Social Psychologist Clark McCauley argues 
torture fundamentally violates the democratic principles of individual rights and individual 
punishments. Torture victims suffer abuse, often before guilt is ascertained, because they belong 
to an “enemy group.”523 Instead of facing punishment for their own individual crimes, victims 
pay for the misdeeds of their entire community. In the case of Spain, Izaguirre suffered for the 
collective crimes of all ETA militants before his own offenses were even determined.  
A democracy that pledges equality but engages in torture, contradicts its moral 
foundations. This behavior, while potentially beneficial in the short-term, can actually inspire 
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armed insurgencies. Mohammad Sidique Khan, one of the terrorists responsible for the July 7
th
, 
2005 London train bombings, defends his atrocities by saying “Your democratically elected 
governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world…I am 
directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters.”524 Algerian 
War scholar Martin Evans argues there is no doubt torture strengthened support for Algerian 
separatists, namely the National Liberation Front (FLN). And Warner G.K. Stritzke points out, 
terrorists can use the “moral double standards of democratic nations”525 as justification for 
civilian targeting.  
More concretely, torture in 1981 Spain threatened to break the legal framework of the 
newly democratic state. Izaguirre’s death in the hands of Madrid prison authorities violated the 
fundamental laws of the state. The Spanish Constitution of 1978 blatantly outlawed torture and 
the “degrading punishment or treatment”526 of Spaniards. Given Izaguirre’s injuries, he likely 
suffered both excruciating pain and personal humiliation in Carabanchel. Furthermore, the 
document asserted “A habeas corpus procedure shall be provided by law”527 for all prisoners. 
Although the Minister of the Interior assured the Spanish press that Izaguirre enjoyed fair 
“judicial resolution”528 within the penitentiary, this secretive hearing may or may not have 
happened. In addition, the General Prisons Act of 1979 decreed: “The prison administration shall 
ensure the life, integrity and health of inmates.”529 Izaguirre’s interrogators did the opposite. The 
etarra, who was lawfully protected by the State, “had a premature, violent, and terrible death”530 
from police-inflicted wounds. Clearly, Madrid did not meet its own legal stipulations in February 
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1981. And, as detailed in the following paragraphs, both Spanish and Basque civilians 
condemned the central government’s failure to uphold its new democratic principles.  
“Who Cared?”  
Izaguirre was a suspected terrorist and murderer “whom the police accused of several 
assassinations.”531 Among other crimes, he was accused of “blowing up two Civil Guard in 
Logroño which resulted in two deaths and at least thirty injuries, and placing a bomb in a central 
street of Logroño which killed two, a deputy of police and an industrialist.”532 But the etarra’s 
fatal torture prompted an intense Spanish and Basque public reaction, among civilians and 
politicians alike. As illustrated above, thousands of demonstrators congregated in the streets to 
denounce the prisoner’s fatal torture. And approximately 10,000 individuals mourned the 
suspected terrorist at his funeral.   
Countless newspaper articles and opinion pieces from both Spain and the Basque Country 
labeled Izaguirre’s death a hypocritical deviation from Spain’s democratic laws. A bishop 
interviewed by ABC exclaimed “Not a single reason provided by the State can justify the 
violence”533 against Izaguirre. In El Correo Español, PNV President Xabier Arzallus stated “The 
torture [of Izaguirre] is an attack against a fundamental human right protected by the 
Constitution and all of its laws…You cannot justify one murder and condemn another.”534 An 
article drafted by Europa Press featured in Egin agreed with this assessment. The column 
denounced Izaguirre’s death, reading “The Constitution sets forth, that in no case, may people be 
subjected to torture, nor inhuman or degrading treatment.”535 Charo Zarzalejos, a journalist for 
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La Gaceta de Norte, argued the newly-crafted Spanish government had not “upheld democratic 
laws, free elections, or a Constitution accepted by all”536 since its inception. The Basque 
Parliament issued a statement on the cover of El Correo Español’s February 14th edition, stating 
“The Basque Country condemns this death [of Izaguirre] with the same force it has condemned 
all murders.”537 And Egin journalists cited Julen Guimón, a representative of the Union of the 
Demoncratic Center Party (UCD), in their February 15
th
 edition. When questioned about the 
“criminal’s” death, the politician defended Izaguirre, arguing “‘I do not believe anyone has the 
right to call someone a criminal until a judge has delivered a definitive sentence.’”538 Clearly, 
many Spaniards and Basques rejected Izaguirre’s death as blatant injustice.  
To further access the Spanish and Basque response to the etarra’s death, I constructed 
two analysis schemas similar to those in Chapter Two. First, I tallied the number of articles 
pertaining to Izaguirre’s imprisonment and death in ABC and La Gaceta del Norte. Izaguirre did 
not appear in publications prior to his death on February 13
th
, but I included any article 
mentioning the presumed ETA militant between February 13
th
 and February 23
rd
. For the sake of 
consistency, any article that mentioned José Ignacio Arregui Izaguirre by name qualified for the 
tally. Unfortunately, I could not compare “baseline” Spanish and Basque media response to the 
deaths of ETA militants (i.e. excluding Izaguirre) with Spanish and Basque media reaction to the 
death of Izaguirre (i.e. only Izaguirre). This particular analysis schema was possible in the case 
of Ryan, given that ETA staged many attacks in the month preceding the engineer’s death. But 
Izaguirre’s death was unusual. In the newspapers collected from January 1st – February 23rd, I 
found no mention of another etarra’s death. Due to this limitation, I was particularly interested 
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in gauging any differences between Madrid and Bilbao media reactions to the presumed 
terrorist’s death.  
Second, I compared the positive, neutral, or negative descriptive nouns attributed to 
etarras in articles referring to Ryan’s kidnapping and murder, with those word choices used in 
articles referencing Izaguirre’s torture and death. The frequencies of positive, neutral, and 
negative descriptions from ABC were contrasted with those from La Gaceta del Norte. I wanted 
to access whether the high frequency of negative words attributed to ETA following Ryan’s 
death changed after Izaguirre’s death. In addition, I was interested in noting any variance 
between ETA descriptions in Bilbao and Madrid in response to Izaguirre’s fatal torture. Details 
of my word analysis will be provided with the data in a subsequent section.  
Newspaper coverage analysis of Izaguirre’s torture and death reflects an equal level of 
preoccupation over the etarra’s mistreatment in Madrid and Bilbao. Despite the contrasting 
political leanings of the cities (detailed in Chapter Two), both ABC and La Gaceta del Norte 
published exactly 37 articles regarding Izaguirre between February 13
th
 and February 23
rd
. In this 
10 day span, both newspapers published approximately 4 articles about Izaguirre per day. The 
results indicate both Madrid and Bilbao were focused on the death of an imprisoned terrorist. 
This is astounding by itself. The fatal torture of Izaguirre, a man who likely murdered two Civil 
Guard officers, a police deputy, and a civilian, captivated Basque and Spanish media coverage 
for weeks. Even more surprising, the publications generally rejected Izaguirre’s fate (as 
demonstrated in previous paragraphs). Furthermore, ABC and La Gaceta del Norte wrote exactly 
the same number of articles concerning the presumed ETA militant’s untimely death. Given the 
historical anti-ETA sentiment in Madrid, this research anticipated very little reaction to the 
etarra’s death in ABC’s publications. And recognizing the generally friendlier view of ETA in 
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the North, this project expected a greater response to Izaguirre’s death in Bilbao. Instead, the 
statistics illustrate a shared sense of injustice across Spain and the Basque Country. Regardless 
of opinion on Basque nationalism or ETA, both the Basque and Spanish media considered 
Izaguirre’s fatal torture a morally repugnant and hypocritical rejection of Spain’s new democratic 
foundation.  
         
 
The second analysis method compared ABC and La Gaceta del Norte descriptions of 
ETA in articles pertaining to Ryan’s kidnapping and murder, and articles pertaining to 
Izaguirre’s torture and death. Again, this research combines qualitative and quantitative methods 
to explore journalists’ underlying opinions of ETA in response to Ryan’s kidnapping and 
assassination, and Izaguirre’s fatal torutre. By comparing these word choices, I hoped to identify 
a possible Basque and Spanish opinion shift regarding ETA in response to the imprisoned 
etarra’s mistreatment. The same linguistic analysis from Chapter Two applies to this section. 
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Words such as “abertzale (pro-Basque),” “youth,” “pro-liberty vigilante,” and “hero” were 
included in the positive classification. Descriptions like “group,” “organization,” “member,” and 
“presumed etarra” constituted neutral vocabulary. And “terrorist organization,” “terrorist,” 
“armed group,” “authors of kidnapping,” “drug addicts,” “illegals,” “executioners,” “murderers,” 
“neo-fascists,” and “criminals” were considered negative nouns. 539 Figures Two, Three, Four, 
and Five depict the results of the analysis graphically.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the word selections of both ABC and La Gaceta del 
Norte reflect an over-achingly negative opinion of ETA in response to Ryan’s death. Madrid’s 
ABC employed 221 negative words or phrases, constituting 91% of its ETA word selections. 
Bilbao’s La Gaceta del Norte used 73 negative words or phrases, making up 90% of its ETA 
descriptions.  La Gaceta del Norte used slightly more neutral phrases, with ABC utilizing 4 
neutral words at 2.0% of all tallied descriptions, and La Gaceta del Norte including 6 neutral 
words at 7.5% of all tallied descriptions.  ABC printed slightly more positive descriptions than La 
Gaceta del Norte. The Madrid paper included 17 positive nouns at 7.0% of all ETA descriptions, 
while the Bilbao press only used 2 positive words at 2.5% of all ETA word choices. The 
difference between each publication’s positive, neutral, and negative descriptive nouns is slight. 
In articles referring to Ryan’s kidnapping and assassination, both Madrid and Bilbao expressed a 
tremendously negative opinion of ETA.  
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However, the positive, neutral, and negative nouns used to describe ETA in the aftermath 
of Izaguirre’s torture and death differ strongly from those word selections used in response to 
Ryan’s kidnapping and murder. In articles referring to Izaguirre’s brutal fate, both Madrid and 
Bilbao attributed far less negative nouns to ETA. Madrid’s ABC employed 155 negative words 
or phrases, constituting 62.5% of its ETA descriptions. Bilbao’s La Gaceta del Norte used even 
fewer negative nouns. The Northern newspaper included 29 negative word choices, making up 
34.5% of its ETA word selections. La Gaceta del Norte used more neutral phrases, with ABC 
utilizing 51 neutral words at 20.5% of all tallied descriptions, and La Gaceta del Norte including 
43 neutral words at 51.2% of all tallied descriptions. And both newspapers used approximately 
the name number of positive words or phrases. ABC utilized 42 positive descriptive nouns at 
17% of its ETA word choices, and La Gaceta del Norte used 12 positive words at 14.3% of its 
ETA descriptions.  
The sharp decrease in negative ETA descriptions following Izaguirre’s torture and death 
is stunning. In articles referring to Ryan’s kidnapping and murder (only a week prior to 
Izaguirre’s death), 91% of ABC’s ETA references were negative. And 90% of La Gaceta del 
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Norte’s ETA word choices were negative. But when Izaguirre’s fatal torture consumed Spanish 
and Basque media on February 14
th
, only 62.5% of ABC’s and 34.5% of La Gaceta del Norte’s 
ETA descriptions were negative. Furthermore, the frequency of neutral and positive nouns 
reflects a substantial increase between articles referencing Ryan and publications concerning 
Izaguirre. In the context of Ryan’s mistreatment, 2.0% of ABC’s ETA descriptions were neutral 
and 7.0% were positive. La Gaceta del Norte’s neutral and positive nouns were equally low. In 
response to Ryan’s kidnapping and death, 7.5% of the Bilbao newspaper’s ETA word selections 
were neutral and 2.5% were positive. But in articles referencing Izaguire, 20.5% of ABC’s ETA 
descriptions were neutral and 17% were positive. And 51.2% (the majority of ETA descriptions) 
in La Gaceta del Norte were neutral, while 14.3% were positive. The large increase in neutral 
noun choices in both Madrid and Bilbao is particularly fascinating. It suggests the public 
possessed a less polarized stance on ETA following Izaguirre’s death than it did after Ryan’s 
kidnapping and murder. Instead of portraying ETA militants as evil incarnate or heroic patriots, 
the Spanish and Basque press took a more neutral stance. Izaguirre was a presumed terrorist, but 
he was also a victim. As this realization dawned on both the Spanish and Basque populace, 
public opinion mellowed from two emotionally-driven extremes.  
The difference between negative shift in Madrid and Bilbao is also noteworthy. Although 
both ABC and La Gaceta del Norte attributed substantially less negative descriptive nouns to 
ETA following Izaguirre’s death, ABC was far more derogatory than its Northern counterpart. 
While 34.5% of La Gaceta del Norte’s ETA descriptions were negative, ABC’s negative nouns 
reached 62.5% of all words assigned to ETA. The conflicting political sympathies of Madrid and 
Bilbao likely contributed to the disparity. Madrid, the city in which Izaguirre suffered brutal 
torture, was more inclined to denounce etarras as dangerous criminals. Negative descriptions of 
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Izaguirre, and his fellow ETA militants, provided a superficial justification for the prisoner’s 
death. In contrast, Bilbao was historically sympathetic to ETA’s cause. La Gaceta del Norte 
journalists were more likely to avoid negative condemnation of Izaguirre and other etarras. 
Instead the Bilbao paper utilized positive or neutral terminology regarding ETA to bolster 
support for Basque independence movements.  
      
 
Despite Izaguirre’s criminal history, the etarra’s savage torture increased favorable 
public sentiment towards the Basque terrorists. His prison death, which Basque and Spanish 
civilians deemed an example of governmental disregard for Spain’s new democratic system, 
enraged both populations. A representative of the Socialist Party of the Basque Country 
(Euskadiko Ezkerra) speculated to El Correo Español, “This fact [Izaguirre’s death] 
demonstrates that there is a government strategy to divide the country [around terrorism] and 
cause another civil war.”540 And the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (PSOE) issued a statement 
asserting “the death of José Arregui Izaguirre, brought on by nine days of interrogation, threatens 
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the new coexistence and freedom of all Spanish citizens.”541 Evidently, the central government 
was not meeting Basque and Spanish expectations of democracy.  Inspired by the promise of 
peace under democracy, the public would no longer tolerate injustice from either ETA or the 
Spanish government.  
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Chapter Four: The Aftermath  
 Colonel Antonio Tejero wore a “bushy moustache,”542 a three-cornered hat, a crisp 
uniform, and a self-righteous attitude. The forty-nine year old Civil Guard officer ardently 
believed that “Spain, since the death of Generalissimo Francisco Franco in 1975, had gone to the 
dogs.”543 Determined to reinstate the fascist old order, Tejero launched a military coup d’état 
against Spanish democracy on February 23
rd
, 1981 (the event is known as El Tejerazo). At 
approximately 6:30 pm that evening, Tejero and a small group of paramilitary Civil Guard 
members stormed Spanish parliament in full session. Astonished diplomats ducked under seats 
as Tejero’s rebels fired “intimidating rounds that ripped into the ceiling and visitors’ gallery.” 544 
Deputy Prime Minister Manuel Gutierrez Mellado bravely stood in protest, before the intruders 
“ignominiously man-handled”545 the former general back to his seat. After several minutes, and 
minimal struggle, Tejero held the entire Spanish parliament at gunpoint.  
When news of the coup reached the press, Spain froze in apprehensive silence. Spanish 
and Basque civilians crowded around radios and TVs. Many individuals hurried home to gather 
family members and possessions. Leftist politicians and union leaders fled the country, fearing 
the reinstatement of a fascist government. And Basque nationalists poured across the border into 
France, uneager to endure another 36 years of social and political oppression. According to 
Graham, “over 25,000 cars left Spain that night, cleaning out the petrol stations of their supplies 
and exhausting all the bank cashpoints in the border area.”546 For many, Tejero’s coup signaled 
high prospects for another civil war. If Tejero’s forces could consolidate power behind a military 
junta, Spain would have a new “Franco.” If not, the country could descend into another 
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gruesome war between fascists and democracy-supporting republicans. Meanwhile, Tejero 
settled down to wait. The Colonel, who felt confident in the armed forces’ dissatisfaction with 
Spain’s new democracy, expected a smooth transition to military dictatorship. Luckily for 
Spain’s five-year-old democratic government, Tejero gambled incorrectly.  
 Many scholars credit King Juan Carlos with saving the day. When parliament was seized, 
the King was dressed in a leisurely track-suit and tennis shoes. Despite being caught off guard, 
the young monarch quickly sprang into action. Juan Carlos donned the ceremonial uniform of 
Captain General of the armed forces, and “began an urgent series of calls to check on the loyalty 
of his soldiers. His lonely vigil lasted nearly until dawn.”547 Several phone calls in, it became 
apparent that Tejero had powerful friends. General Jaime Milans del Bosch, a highly decorated 
and fascist-leaning officer of Valencia, had 3,500 men under his command. In addition to his 
personal standing army, the General enjoyed considerable “prestige and friendship”548 among 
Spain’s eight other regional military commanders. Furthermore, another one of Tejero’s co-
conspirators was godson to Alfonso XII, the King’s grandfather. Given his royal connections, the 
aristocratic General Alfonso Armada believed he could easily persuade Juan Carlos to abandon 
democracy and support Tejero.  
 But the King refused to yield. Juan Carlos, who “set democratic reforms in motion”549 
after Franco’s death in 1975, was personally invested in Spain’s new government. After the 
Caudillo’s death, the young king understood the Spanish monarchy was weak and illegitimate. 
His own grandfather died in miserable exile after the imposition of the Second Spanish Republic, 
and Juan Carlos’s early reign consisted of trailing behind Franco in a “forced public role.” 550 
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While civilians associated the Crown with nationalist support of Franco’s dictatorship, 
democracy “coincided with the national mood which both favored and expected [political] 
change.”551 After instituting a parliamentary monarchy, democratic elections, and an approved 
constitution, Juan Carlos was firmly committed to democracy.  According to Spanish historian E. 
Ramón Arango, the King “showed himself to be a modern, progressive, intelligent man with a 
modern, progressive, intelligent wife, devoted to democracy and willing to make the ultimate 
sacrifice to bring it about: the relinquishment of his own power.”552 Don Juan would not 
jeopardize Spain’s democratic system for anyone, including the military.  
 Juan Carlos demanded Tejero’s men either stand down or start a war. Although a few 
military generals vacillated in their support of the King, only Milans del Bosch remained loyal to 
the rebels. No one wanted to relive the Spanish Civil War, possibly the bloodiest three years in 
the nation’s history. Even Armada, despite his original bravado, “tried to conceal his 
involvement in the coup.”553 Tejero, recognizing his support base had disintegrated, negotiated 
the release of the hostages. He left parliament without handcuffs, declaring ‘“I’ll get thirty years 
for this.’”554 The disgraced Colonel was released from military prison in 1996, after serving a 15 
year sentence.  
Years later a palace observer recalled Juan Carlos sending for his thirteen year-old son at 
3:00 am after the crisis began to wind down. The King, with Queen Sofia at his side, explained 
the events of El Tejerazo to Prince Felipe. Juan Carlos told his son “while the first duty of a king 
was to serve the people, a king’s ultimate duty was to be the people’s last defense.”555 The young 
monarch’s courage was not forgotten. Spanish and Basque republicans thanked their King, 
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realizing Juan Carlos “had proved the ultimate guarantor not only of democracy but also of their 
lives.” As historian Robert Graham points out, no other Spanish monarch had ever defied a 
military coup attempt prior to February 23
rd, 1981. Juan Carlos’s decision-making, while 
certainly a “remarkable personal achievement,” was also a first-time display of royal fortitude. 
Democracy survived the night, but the coup attempt prompted structural changes in both ETA 
and the Spanish government.   
         
 
This chapter, rather than focusing on singular incidents like the previous two, addresses 
the implications of Ryan and Izaguirre’s murders on both ETA and Spanish democracy in the 
1980s. The chapter begins by explaining Tejero’s motivations for the February 23rd coup 
attempt, and their connection to Izaguirre’s murder.  The chapter continues by outlining the 
political aftermath of democracy’s near-failure. February 23rd ushered in a host of changes to 
Spain’s political climate, including ETA-político militar’s decision to disband, ETA-militar’s 
lower levels of violence and the formation of a secret government anti-terrorist police force 
called GAL (Anti-Terrorist Liberation Groups). These changes, either direct or indirect results of 
Tejero’s coup attempt, defined Spain’s relationship with terrorism through the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
 
El Tejerazo, Madrid: ABC, February 24th, 1981 
 
El Tejerazo, Madrid: ABC, February 24th, 1981 
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Politics and Power Vacuums: The Causes of El Tejerazo 
 Basque terrorism was inevitably linked to Spanish politics during the 1975-1982 
democratic transition. ETA militants had threatened Spain’s domestic security for over a decade, 
and the institution of democracy had only heightened the group’s dependence on armed struggle. 
With ever-rising levels of bloodshed, “ETA’s abandonment of political violence”556 became a 
primary objective of King Juan Carlos. On July 30
th
, 1976 the young king granted amnesty to all 
political prisoners, except those sentenced for terrorist attacks. Juan Carlos refused to pardon 
individuals who “‘caused death or endangered the life of any person.’”557 His dedication to 
counterterrorism was insightful.  Political Scientist Michael T. Klare writes that a successful 
government “assumes an obligation to protect its constituent population from random and 
unauthorized violence. When a state can no longer provide such protection, its authority withers 
and failure is likely.”558 If the fledgling democracy failed to disarm ETA, the Spanish 
government would not achieve the political legitimacy it needed. By 1981, the cessation of 
Basque violence was paramount.  
Unfortunately, Spain’s democratic leadership had mixed strategies on addressing the 
“Basque problem.”  After Carrero Blanco’s assassination in 1973, Carlos Arias Navarro assumed 
the position of Spanish Prime Minister. The “dithering administrator”559 originally served as 
director-general of security under Franco, and carried the “additional stigma of a grim repressive 
record on the nationalist side in Malaga during the Civil War.”560 Although Arias was an 
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“uninspired choice,”561 King Juan Carlos asked the Prime Minister to retain his current role 
under democracy. Known for maintaining tight control over Spain’s intelligence community, 
Arias “was at least au fait”562 with the abuse of suspected etarras in prison. When anti-ETA 
vigilantes shot and killed two Basque nationalists at right-wing rallies in May 1976, Civil Guard 
members did nothing to stop the attacks or arrest the perpetrators.
563
 Arias, who controlled 
Spain’s law enforcement forces, likely ordered the passivity.  Woodworth claims the Prime 
Minister resigned a few weeks later, confirming his guilt in the matter. Graham takes it  a step 
further. He suggests the “King was forced to sack Arias”564 for damaging Spain’s international 
image and refusing to adhere to democratic measures. In any event, Arias “was not the best man 
to encourage a mood of national reconciliation”565 after Franco. 
In contrast, the new Prime Minister was the perfect man to advance democratic reform. 
After carefully considering his options, King Juan Carlos replaced Arias with the forty-five year-
old Adolfo Suárez. Deemed the “new face of democracy,” Suárez had “clean, youthful looks,”566 
middle-class ideals, a pretty wife, happy children, and no connections to the aristocracy. 
Ironically, Suárez “had spent all his life inside the Francoist administration.”567 But the young 
politician was a skilled adaptor. Suárez, who appeared politically neutral, achieved his successful 
reputation through “wits, charm, and cold ambition.”568 Luckily for Juan Carlos, the newly 
appointed Prime Minister had the brains to match his face. Suárez was “groomed in the 
intricacies of the Francoist power structure,”569 so he knew exactly how to enable its destruction. 
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He legalized political parties and trade unions, presided over the first democratic elections since 
1936 (in which he became the first democratically-elected Prime Minister in post-Franco Spain), 
and passed the 1976 Law of Political Reform that established a Spanish Parliament and Senate 
through universal suffrage.
570
  
Unlike Arias, Suárez understood the importance of adhering to counterterrorism policies 
that (at least) appeared to follow constitutional precedents. Realizing the mistakes of his 
predecessor, Suárez “insisted that the intelligence services kept their dirty warriors on a tight 
leash.”571 Spanish police could easily incite public unrest or increased ETA violence “through 
brutal and unpredictable behavior.”572 The Prime Minister did not end the mistreatment of 
suspected etarras, but he attempted to combat terrorism through legal channels. Determined to 
counter ETA’s rising death toll, the Suárez government passed strict new anti-terrorist laws in 
1978. The new acts gave police additional powers to arrest and detain presumed terrorists. 
Spanish authorities could hold suspects for 72 hours without charges, if the courts were 
notified.
573
 Unfortunately, the new laws gave the police legal opportunity to abuse its power. 
While judges could halt detentions, Clark argues “this check was almost never applied.”574  
Suárez did not stop with legislation. In 1978, the Prime Minister attempted to open 
negotiations with ETA. According to a close observer, Suárez “saw himself as the person chosen 
by circumstances to resolve the ETA problem, and he took a very close personal interest in the 
progress of the talks.” His reconciliatory attitude, while more in line with the democratic 
principles of The Spanish Constitution of 1978, alienated right-wing law enforcement and 
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military officials bent on destroying ETA. In 1980 Spanish parliament debated a censure motion 
against the Suárez government for pursuing “negotiations with ‘terrorists and assassins.’”575 As 
Suárez watched his own political party (the UCD) fragment over the issue, he reneged. 
Challenging the censure motion, the Prime Minister stated “‘I must say that I have never been in 
agreement with any negotiation of the government with ETA. At no time.’”576 
Suárez certainly felt caught between two counterterrorism approaches. Hardline tactics 
enraged Basque nationalists and undermined the new democratic constitution, as later witnessed 
by protests to Izaguirre’s death. But a lack of governmental pro-state violence against ETA 
infuriated fascist-leaning law enforcement and military members. Suárez was powerless to 
appease both sides and simultaneously eliminate ETA-inflicted bloodshed. The Prime Minister 
resigned on January 29
th
, 1981, the same day José Maria Ryan was kidnapped by ETA-militar.  
At 7:47 pm the Prime Minister interrupted all radio and television broadcasting to announce his 
resignation. The message lasted exactly twelve minutes.
577
 Ryan was kidnapped at 
approximately 7:00 pm, 47 minutes prior to Suárez’s speech. However, the engineer’s 
kidnapping could not have triggered the Prime Minister’s decision. Suárez’s announcement, via 
television and radio, likely took days or weeks to coordinate—far longer than 47 minutes. It was 
not a rash action. But turmoil within the Spanish government regarding ETA’s violence likely 
encouraged the Prime Minister to step-down.  
Although Suárez failed to disclose concrete reasons for his departure from public office, 
it is possible the Prime Minister experienced a crisis of conscious over the “Basque Problem.” In 
a segment of his resignation speech, released by ABC, the former Prime Minister assured the 
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public “‘My departure is more beneficial to Spain than my continuation as President.’”578  
Another statement published in La Gaceta del Norte read “I will remain dedicated in body and 
soul to the defense and promotion of the ethical commitment and moral rearmament that Spanish 
society needs.’”579 And El Correo Español, which published Suárez’s entire announcement, 
quoted the Prime Minister enigmatically affirming “‘My decision is an act of strict loyalty, of 
loyalty to Spain which is free to form an indispensable foundation and overcome a history full of 
traumas and frustrations; of loyalty to the idea of a political center that is structured around an 
inter-classist, reformist, and progressive system committed to eradicating injustice.’”580  
 In his farewell address as the highest-elected official in Spain, Suárez expressed 
alienation from the existing political system. Spain had not yet achieved his vision of democracy. 
The Prime Minister believed the nation was lacking a moral and political center. Interestingly, 
Suárez considered his resignation a greater act of “loyalty” to the State than his continued service 
in government. Perhaps internal government divisions over counterterrorism methods brought 
the Prime Minister to his breaking point. As discussed in Chapter Three, Franco’s hardline 
counterterrorism tactics continued after the implementation of democracy in 1975. Although 
there is no hard evidence, it is possible Suárez felt he could no longer support, condone, or order 
the mistreatment of etarras. Izaguirre’s torture, which occurred several days after Suárez’s 
resignation, suggests law enforcement members and government officials still considered torture 
a viable counterterrorism approach.  
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The fall of Suárez opened a power vacuum. Graham suggests what Suárez “judged a 
responsible action was an irresponsible betrayal of the voters who had placed their confidence in 
him.”581 His replacement, the indecisive Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, was no match for the political 
intricacies of Spain’s democratic transition. With a “natural distaste for bashing heads 
together,”582 the newest Prime Minister was hesitant to disagree with ultra-conservatives in the 
Spanish government, law enforcement, and military. Only several days into his term, Sotelo 
faced overwhelming Spanish and Basque public outcry over Ryan’s assassination. And one week 
later, Izaguirre’s fatal torture prompted a second civilian backlash. It is unknown whether Sotelo 
personally ordered or condoned Izaguirre’s mistreatment, but the floundering Prime Minister 
quickly directed blame at the etarra’s interrogators. After news of Izaguirre’s death flooded 
Spanish and Basque media, Sotelo suspended five policemen and turned them over to the justice 
process.  
Unfortunately, tensions over two different counterterrorism approaches continued 
unchanged after Suárez’s resignation. Sotelo’s firm arrests in the wake of Izaguirre’s death 
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backfired. “Within twenty-four hours of the suspensions, the three most senior officers 
concerned with combatting terrorism had handed in their resignations in protest.”583 Many 
Spanish law enforcement and military members viewed Sotelo’s action as a harsh betrayal. After 
all, these particular individuals had sacrificed countless man-hours and many lives to prevent 
ETA attacks. Clark estimates ETA killed 91 Civil Guard members, 68 policemen, and 20 
military men between 1968 and 1980.
584
 These victims constituted nearly 70% of all ETA’s 
murders. In addition, it is possible the five condemned policemen were acting under higher 
governmental orders. If so, the interrogators were facing judicial action for obeying their 
superiors. A supporter of Izaguirre’s interrogators justified the torture, saying “A basic difference 
separated the two deaths…José Maria Ryan was a worker and innocent man, and José Arregui 
was a member of ETA-militar and a presumed terrorist.”585 Another opinion writer in ABC 
argued that Spain’s security forces were constantly “persecuted in recent years by the murderous 
terrorists of ETA.”586 Regardless of their crimes, the writer insisted, imprisonment was a poor 
way to repay the policemen’s public service records. For a few right-wing extremists, “arresting 
defenders of Spain’s honor”587 crossed a line.  
After careful planning, Tejero and his gang of supporters launched the 25th military coup 
attempt in Spanish history since 1814.
588
 Tejero’s February 23rd, 1981 seizure of parliament 
failed, but it affected the course of Spanish democratization. Immortalized as El Tejerazo, the 
coup d’état plot had major consequences on the Spanish government and ETA. Neither group 
supported a return to authoritarian rule. ETA wanted Basque independence, not the 
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reestablishment of dictatorial oppression. And the Spanish government had been moving towards 
democracy since 1975. Realizing the fragility of the regime, both the central government and 
ETA adjusted their respective strategies in the aftermath of El Tejerazo.  
A Group Disbands: ETA-político militar 
In response to democracy’s near-collapse on February 23rd, 1981, ETA-politico militar 
(ETA-pm, the politically-oriented majority faction of ETA) began to disintegrate and disband. 
Following the coup attempt, ETA-pm “negotiated an amnesty agreement with the Spanish 
government for its imprisoned and exiled members.”589 Shabad and Ramo state “In 1981, shortly 
after the attempted coup d’état by a segment of the military, ETA-pm was dissolved, and those 
members who wished to continue the armed struggle joined ETA-m.”590 Other members of ETA-
pm committed themselves to Basque independence through strictly political methods. Jennifer 
Holmes, author of Terrorism and Democratic Stability, writes ETA-pm “which disbanded in 
1981, transformed itself into the Euskadiko Eskerra (EE),”591 a Basque socialist party. By 1982, 
the collective entity of ETA was less than half its original size. 
February 23
rd, 1981 was a catalyst for the group’s expiration. In the aftermath of El 
Tejerazo, many members of ETA-pm  felt Basque violence was undermining ETA’s core goal of 
independence from Spain.
 592
 One former ETA-pm member described the ideological currents 
sweeping through the organization following Tejero’s seizure of parliament:  
“‘Even though we had already made the decision to declare a truce [after 
Tejero staged his coup], we didn’t announce it until February 24. And this 
is when we really went all out. Not only did we call a truce, but within the 
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organization itself, you now were seeing this tendency totally in favor of 
calling off armed struggle, and taking advantage of the political avenues 
that had opened up through the Parliament, etc., to be able to take part in 
this process and above all, to do something to consolidate democracy, 
which was still under threat, as was clear from the February 23 coup 
attempt (Interview no. 1).’”593 
When asked why he chose to leave ETA, one anonymous ETA-pm militant explained: 
“‘It was that February 23 [1981] business, that happened when I was in 
jail, and I think that from that point…or maybe already by that point…you 
had the government, the Basque regional authority, other regions were on 
the way to self-government charters, and the public administrations were 
being formed...So you might say that I just stopped…it just didn’t make 
sense anymore...back in 1976, who would have thought that we were ever 
going to have a democratic king, that we would have a Basque 
government in which all segments of the political spectrum were 
represented? In other words, that the objective conditions had changed 
(Interview no. 50).’”594 
Other ETA-pm militants were just as wary of further destabilizing democracy through continued 
violence. One interviewed deserter argued: 
“‘The thing was that we reached this point where we had the Autonomy 
Statute, elections held, and you say to yourself: okay, what comes next? 
We got what we wanted, so what sense is there in going on shooting 
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people, and planting bombs?...Anyway, no matter how you look at it, 
independence is not something that was ever going to be achieved by a 
handful of kill-happy morons, and believe me, because I got to know them 
well, you’re not going to get very far at all, not far at all, down that path 
(Interview no. 3).’”595  
Another etarra agreed, pointing out: 
“‘I had this feeling that things had really changed…that the situation was 
objectively different than when I first became a militant. You had this 
feeling a new era was dawning for Euskadi and for the Spanish state. 
Fascism had come to an end with Franco, and there was this pervading 
feeling of things finally opening up…Everything that had led me to 
become a member was at least starting to change (Interview no. 6).’”596  
And a fifth ETA member recognized the detrimental effects of terrorist violence on democratic 
consolidation: 
“‘So I’m starting to realize…that if politically, some type of understanding 
is going to be reached. If the will for it exists, then it can happen…There 
are other issues, sure, different matters of emphasis, different viewpoints, 
you’re on the right and I’m on the left, but one can accommodate them in 
order to achieve a common purpose. Only the real problem that is keeping 
them divided is the violence (Interview no. 33).’”597 
The de-radicalized etarras had a point. Although the Basque Country did not have full 
independence from Spain in early 1981, the institution of democracy had expanded Basque 
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liberties significantly. The democratic Spanish Constitution of 1978 stated “Political parties are 
the expression of political pluralism, they contribute to the formation and expression of the will 
of the people and are an essential instrument for political participation.”598 And it also 
guaranteed “the right to freely express and spread thoughts, ideas and opinions.”599 Furthermore, 
the Statute of the Autonomy of the Basque Country (ratified by referendum on October 25
th
, 
1979), granted the Basque Country the “organization, regime and functioning of its institution of 
self-governance”600 and a political voice in Spanish parliament. For the first time since the 
implementation of Franco’s regime in 1936, Euskal Herria enjoyed a sense of autonomy from 
Madrid. A return to fascism would effectively erase the Basque Country’s newfound freedoms. 
ETA’s actions did not necessarily provoke El Tejerazo but both murders contributed to 
the February 23
rd
 democratic crisis. National discourse over counterterrorism tactics (amongst 
civilians, politicians, and military members) certainly played a role in prompting the February 
23
rd
 coup attempt. Massive civilian outrage over ETA-m’s brutal assassination of Ryan (which 
occurred a few days before Izaguirre’s death) likely encouraged the Spanish interrogators to use 
violent counterterrorism tactics. And remarkable public outcry over Izaguirre’s fatal torture 
angered and alienated Spanish law enforcement members to the point of rebellion.  
The linkages between events were not lost on ETA-pm. Democracy provided new 
avenues of political change, whereas violent terrorist cycles reinvigorated right-wing support for 
fascism. As Spanish Social Scientist Fernando Reinares contends, “It was not therefore a surprise 
that many of them [ETA-pm] decided to give up their clandestine militancy after acknowledging 
these structural transformations.”601 And Clark agrees, arguing “It was clear from the events of 
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February 23 that neither ETA nor the Basque people in general would be able to defend 
themselves against a military takeover of the Spanish government; and so (p-m) would pull back 
from the brink to avoid what might be a fatal provocation of the armed forces.”602  
A Group Survives: ETA-militar Continues Armed Struggle 
 The effects of February 23
rd
, 1981 on ETA-militar are less discernable. However, the 
faction did display several structural changes after Tejero’s military coup attempt. Unlike the 
politically-oriented ETA-pm, ETA-m refused to disband. The covert group was ardently 
dedicated to achieving full independence for the Basque Country, no matter the costs. Well 
before the events of 1981, ETA-m had issued a statement in March 1978 to the Basque press 
justifying its continuation of violent tactics despite the shift to democratic political structures. 
The communiqué read: 
“Many people are wondering today, why is ETA still active after Franco’s 
death and with the process of democratization of the Spanish state under 
way? ETA has not changed. What has changed is the awareness of a sector 
of people toward our organization and what it represents and defends. 
These people thought that we were simply anti-Francoist patriots, and they 
never stopped to think about the definition that goes along with our 
initials: a Basque socialist revolutionary organization for national 
liberation…ETA will try to exist and to struggle in the most appropriate 
way for the creation of a Basque socialist state, independent, reunified, 
and Basque-speaking.”603 
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A publication issued by PNV leaders in 1978 reiterated these sentiments: “As long as the 
Spanish state does not take effective and clear steps designed toward reversing discrimination 
against Basque culture, it will be very difficult for us to explain to ETA why they should lay 
down their guns.”604 
ETA-m retained this all-or-nothing mentality in the aftermath of El Tejerazo. Although 
the terrorist organization’s kidnapping and assassination of José Maria Ryan partially instigated 
the Civil Guard’s February 23rd, 1981 coup attempt, ETA-m had no concern for the stability of 
the Spanish government. In fact, the covert group expressed disinterest in Madrid’s political 
troubles. One etarra summed up his political opinions, saying: “‘As far as I’m concerned, I don’t 
care who is running the government in Madrid, but what matters is: are they going or are they 
not going to grant us independence? (Interview no. 35).’”605 And one anonymous Basque 
woman, a friend and supporter of ETA militants, voiced her approval of ETA-m continuation of 
armed struggle after February 23
rd
, 1981. She felt ETA-pm sacrificed the ideals of Basque 
nationalism by disarming. When referring to ETA-pm disbanding, the woman remarked: “‘they 
[ETA-pm members] are better politicians, if you wish, but the ETA military are more truthful, 
more efficient.’”606  
Although ETA-m remained devoted to its dream of an independent Euskal Herria, the 
group did alter its strategy after the events of El Tejerazo. First and foremost, ETA-m committed 
significantly less violent acts through the remainder of 1981. As illustrated by Figures Seven and 
Eight in Chapter Two, ETA violence levels dropped dramatically between 1980 and 1981. There 
are several possible reasons. The first was explored in Chapter Two. Up until Basque and 
Spanish civilian protests to Ryan’s assassination in February 1981, ETA-m had never 
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experienced overwhelming public criticism. Like all terrorist groups, ETA-m depended on a 
level of citizen support to recruit new militants, collect arms, evade arrest, and raise funds for 
new attacks. Without this sympathy base, the terrorist organization could not fulfill armed 
operations. And without a presence in the media, ETA-m could not pursue its action-repression-
action strategy.  
Therefore, the military-oriented sector of ETA likely limited its violent attacks to regain 
support within the Basque population. A press conference held by de-radicalized ETA-pm 
members on February 22
nd
, 1982, confirmed this idea. According to former ETA-pm members, 
ETA-m could not sustain its high levels of violence after Ryan’s death. The representatives 
stated: “The acceptance of armed struggle by the Basque people…has declined substantially due 
to the participation of the masses in the political game and the social fatigue produced by the 
period of mobilization and agitation of the past decade.”607 
Furthermore, it is possible elements of ETA-pm’s ideological disillusionment extended to 
ETA-m in the aftermath of February 23
rd
, 1981. Although ETA-m did not experience the same 
level of de-radicalization as ETA-pm after the coup attempt, some etarras agreed with the 
politically-minded sector. This dissatisfaction with armed struggle may have reduced ETA-m’s 
reliance on violent attacks. As one former ETA-m militant explained his reasons for leaving: 
“‘I came to the conclusion that we were losing sight of our goals. There 
were two fundamental reasons for this. Because the struggle never really 
got all the popular support it should have. And because it should have 
come to an end in 1980, or 1982 at the very latest. Because it [armed 
struggle] was a short-term process, designed to achieve its objectives over 
a short-period of time…Secondly, you begin to sense that the process is 
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being redirected towards objectives that are not the same as the ones you 
began fighting for back in 1977 (Interview no. 34).’”608 
 Finally, internal disagreement and mistrust likely restricted ETA-m’s ability to coordinate 
terrorist attacks. Like all bureaucratic organizations, ETA-m suffered from conflicting opinions 
and loyalties. Shapiro contends “terrorist groups face an organizational dilemma whenever 
leaders and their operatives have different induced preferences.”609 Without the clear objectives, 
full unwavering dedication, and strong leadership, terrorist organizations cannot retain followers. 
Such was the case with ETA-m after February 23
rd
, 1981. One former etarra identified the 
contradictions in ETA-m’s leadership after the coup attempt: 
“‘Here we were going around all over the place talking about freedom for 
everyone, freedom here and freedom there, and they come to me telling 
me to cool it, that I should shut up and do what I was told (Interview no. 
32).’”610     
Another ETA-m militant who joined in 1978 began sensing doubts about the organization’s 
leadership in the early 1980s.  
“‘Of course, if you go around getting your hands bloody day after day, 
you’re going to end up being totally isolated…That’s not to say I have a 
problem with the idea of armed struggle. As long as it stays clear that it 
has to be real armed struggle and…that you play by the rules, if you get 
my drift. None of this indiscriminate stuff or anything of that sort 
(Interview no. 36).’”611 
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 Reduced violence levels were not the only change in ETA-m’s behavior after El 
Tejerazo. In February 1982, ETA-m expressed interest in negotiating with the Spanish 
government. Before carrying out a series of violent attacks between February and May, the 
organization issued a set of conditions to Madrid. Similar to the mid-1970s KAS Alternative, the 
demands included the withdrawal of Spanish police from the Basque Country, the transfer of law 
enforcement authority to the Basque government, and the relocation of all Basque prisoners to 
Basque prisons. The Spanish government refused to respond, and ETA-m commenced with 
further violence. However, on April 18
th
, 1982 a headline in the Spanish newspaper Deia read 
“ETA Wants to Negotiate.”612 And an ETA-m communication to Egin published in mid-April 
stated: “This political practice [referring to the recent armed attacks], has become the only 
alternative offered to us from Madrid to resolve the so-called Basque problem…Notwithstanding 
these indications [of Madrid’s intransigence], in politics, in principle, there is nothing 
immovable…it cannot be discounted that in the near future a series of events—will bring about 
the qualitative change in the process and exchange those warrior songs for the sounds of political 
accords.”613 The statement indicated ETA was ready to forego violence, if the Spanish 
government agreed to compromise. Whether Madrid was willing to negotiate was another matter 
entirely. Although various political parties (including Herria Batasuna and the PSOE) attempted 
to launch negotiations in the 1980s, hopes of peace were continually dashed by central 
government authorities.  
 Because ETA-m was a violent covert organization, it is difficult to concretely link ETA-
m’s 1981-1982 structural changes to the February 23rd, 1981 coup attempt. However, the 
democratic crisis (and its contributing factors) likely affected ETA-m’s organizational decisions. 
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Ryan’s assassination, Izaguirre’s death, and El Tejerazo, which transpired in a time span of less 
than one month, existed in extremely close chronological proximity to one another. It is unlikely 
historians will ever identify all the interwoven implications of these three occurrences, but it 
would be reasonable to assume each event impacted the others. Furthermore, ETA-m’s reduction 
of violence and attempt to negotiate with Madrid happened in quick succession with the events 
of January-February 1981. At one level or another, the chain of violence and political instability 
in early 1981 affected the organizational evolution of ETA-m.  
Fighting Fire with Fire: The Spanish Government and GAL  
What was the GAL Conspiracy?  
Like both factions of ETA, the Spanish government underwent structural changes after 
the political turmoil of February 23
rd
, 1981. In 1983, rather than using its own police forces, the 
Spanish government began hiring mercenaries to kill ETA militants. The secret group, known as 
GAL (Anti-terrorist Liberation Groups) consisted of right-wing French military veterans from 
the Algerian war, Italian fascists, Portuguese immigrants, and hitmen from Europe’s organized 
crime circles.
614
 Similar to other pro-state terrorist groups, the government conspiracy aimed to 
handle Spain’s “dirty work” without jeopardizing Spain’s constitutional image or implicating 
official law enforcement institutions. Between 1983 and 1987, GAL killed 27 Basques and 
injured many more—including women and children. The organization existed to destroy ETA, 
by whatever means necessary.  
It would be too strong to suggest GAL was a direct result of El Tejerazo. Unlike the 
impact of Tejro’s rebellion on ETA-pm (or even ETA-m), the linkage between the coup attempt 
and Madrid’s GAL scheme is less concrete. In terms of chronology, GAL did not begin violent 
attacks until 1983, two years after Tejero’s rebellion. And since the Spanish government 
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endeavored to keep the mercenary organization secret, much of GAL’s gory details are still 
unknown. However, the coup attempt likely affected Spain’s decision to engage in pro-state 
terrorism. February 23
rd
, 1981 represents a watershed moment for the nation. Dissatisfied 
members of the Spanish Civil Guard nearly toppled a six-year-old democracy over parliament’s 
new emphasis on legal counterterrorism actions. Only two years later the Spanish state hired 
foreign assassins to engage in illegal counterterrorism tactics. It is highly unlikely El Tejerazo 
had no impact on this decision. Furthermore, the origins of GAL can be traced back to political 
decisions made in the aftermath of Tejero’s coup attempt.  
Who Created GAL and Why?    
After democracy’s near-collapse on February 23rd, 1981, the Spanish government rushed 
to appease the Civil Guard and the military. Sotelo’s government understood that giving Tejero’s 
rebels harsh punishments would only heighten tensions between Spain’s democratically-minded 
parliament and supporters of the conservative extremists. Increased animosity between the two 
groups could provoke another civil war. Liberal political leaders “suddenly responded 
sympathetically”615 to the fascist viewpoints of Spanish law enforcement members. Tejero and 
Milans del Bosch received thirty-year sentences, a third leader got six years, and the eleven 
others were sentenced to less than three years.
616
  The verdicts were mild considering Tejero’s 
posse committed high-treason against the Spanish government. Furthermore, the five policemen 
accused of torturing Izaguirre were released from custody with impunity.
617
  Clearly, the 
democratic Spanish government was tip-toeing on eggshells. Rather than risk another coup (or 
another civil war) by delivering severe justice to Tejero’s men, the democratic order chose to 
diffuse hostilities with mercy.  
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The Spanish government did not stop there. Instead of merely appeasing the right-wing 
Civil Guard members, the democratic government chose to take a harsher stance against ETA-m. 
The newly-elected Prime Minister, Felipe González Márquez (served from1982-1996), quickly 
“adopted a tough new policy toward ETA which seemed to offer little hope of a negotiated 
settlement.”618 As discussed earlier in the chapter, the González government refused to enter 
talks with ETA between February and May 1982. Twelve individuals lost their lives in the 
resulting terrorist attacks. At a September 1982 press conference, González ardently asserted 
“‘we [government officials] say ‘No’ to negotiation [with ETA].’” His remarks reiterated the 
austere sentiments expressed by Interior Minister Juan José Rosón at an April 22
nd
, 1982 Spanish 
Congress of Deputies debate. At the meeting Rosón declared “‘with ETA there is not nor will 
there be, neither now nor in the future, any possibility of negotiation. One does not negotiate 
with life or with freedom. The unity of the country is not for sale, and neither the government nor 
the people are ready to turn over or break up Spain.’” Clearly, González’s government was not in 
a reconciliatory mood.  
After the turbulence of El Tejerazo, González was likely hesitant to alienate Spanish 
police, Civil Guard, and military members by acting weak and conciliatory towards ETA 
terrorists. At a press conference December 1
st
, 1982, the Prime Minister fervently denounced 
ETA-m. González stated “‘if what ETA pretends is to threaten and coerce the government of the 
nation, I must say that we are going to remain firm. In the face of this challenge, I call on the 
citizenry to react against this threat and contribute to peace in the Basque Country and all 
Spain.’” His fiery proclamation appeared to excuse violent or even vigilante counterterrorism 
tactics against ETA. Like his predecessor, who chose to pursue minimal sentences against 
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Tejero’s rebels, González was likely attempting to mollify the far-right elements of Spanish law 
enforcement.  
However, the Prime Minister could not permit hardline counterterrorism tactics without 
undermining the central government’s democratic legitimacy. Incredible public fury over 
Izaguirre’s fatal torture in February 1981 was still fresh in González’s mind, and Spain’s 
collective memory. Realizing the fine line between justice and retaliation, González issued a 
clarification to his earlier statement on December 13
th
, 1982. In an El País interview, the Prime 
Minister explained “‘I do not want to be misunderstood, and if people believe that I am offering 
a dialogue to those who act violently, I am being misunderstood. As far as I am concerned there 
can be only one kind of dialogue—the kind laid down by the limits of the constitution.’”619 This 
time, González appeased Spain’s democratic center by defending the non-violent justice process 
described in the Spanish Constitution of 1978. Like Suárez in January 1981, González was 
vacillating between two opposite counterterrorism approaches in an effort to please both sides.  
In 1983, González and his fellow government officials discovered the answer to their 
counterterrorism dilemma. The Spanish government could placate right-wing law enforcement 
and military members, and simultaneously maintain an “untarnished” democratic image. Madrid 
authorities decided to hire subcontractors to resolve the “Basque Problem” through illegal 
means. Spanish police and Civil Guard would continue to pursue terrorists, through legal 
channels, while GAL would take care of the unconstitutional methods. The public would not 
question the government’s commitment to democratic justice, and Spanish law enforcement 
would rest easy knowing ETA-m would get “what it deserved.” Beginning in 1983, the Spanish 
government ordered Spanish police forces to recruit and pay GAL assassins.  
GAL Violence  
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During its four-year “dirty war,”620 GAL utilized kidnapping, torture, and murder to 
debilitate and intimidate the Basque terrorists. Although GAL mercenaries carried out attacks in 
Spain, much of the organization’s violence occurred in France. Spanish authorities likely ordered 
GAL operations in France to pressure the French government into adopting a harsher stance 
towards ETA fugitives. The covert group’s first victims were two young etarras named Joxean 
Lasa and Joxi Zabala, who went missing in 1983. When their teenage bodies were discovered in 
the Alicante countryside in 1991, forensic evidence revealed the young men had been shot, 
physically tortured, and forcefully subjected to the influence of psychoactive drugs. During court 
trials in the 1990s, GAL member Daniel Fernández Aceña confessed to the gruesome crime. The 
former mercenary admitted the torture of Lasa and Zabula “had got out of hand.” He confessed 
the young etarras were eventually “killed, burned with car tyres and buried in quicklime.”  
Other GAL attacks were just as grisly. On December 19
th
, 1983, GAL assassinated 
Ramón Oñederra (nom de guerre Kattu). The twenty-three year old etarra worked at a bar, 
played football, and had a steady girlfriend. Described by others in ETA as “not a very 
significant” member, Oñederra was an easy target. GAL members opened fire on the 
unsuspecting youth while he played solo chess in an empty bar. When the bar’s owner ran in the 
room, he found Oñederra’s body riddled with ten bullets. Nine days later GAL gunmen murdered 
twenty-seven year old etarra Mikel Goikoetxea Elorriaga in front of his wife and small daughter. 
The bullets were “so powerful they went on to penetrate a steel shutter and a door.” GAL 
claimed responsibility for Elorriaga’s shooting the next day, writing “no activist, collaborator, or 
sympathizer with ETA will be able to escape our vengeance.” At the “Massacre at the Monbar” 
on September 25
th
 1985, GAL members killed four suspected ETA militants at a café-bar in the 
Monbar Hotel. GAL assassins walked into the hotel, opened fire, and walked out. An eye witness 
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recounts watching one victim crawling “with his body half inside and half outside the bar…the 
old guy [GAL member] was shooting him, finishing him off.”621  
Tragically, many of GAL’s victims had no affiliation with ETA. Some individuals were 
targeted due to mistaken identities, others were suspected of harboring sympathies for ETA’s 
cause, and a few were unlucky bystanders. On Christmas Eve, 1985, GAL gunman shot Robert 
Caplanne at close range in Biarritz. The thirty-seven year old electrician had no connections to 
ETA. He died of bullet wounds to the chest, stomach, and neck on January 6
th
. A local 
newspaper called Caplanne’s murder “an incomprehensible act.” GAL gunmen shot newly 
widowed Karmele Martínez and her three year old daughter while they ate dinner in a Petit 
Bayonne bar on February 8
th, 1985. According to eye witnesses, “men outside were pumping 
bullets into the bar, with 9 mm automatic weapons.” Martínez recalls frantically reaching for her 
daughter after being shot herself. “‘She was not unconscious, I could see she was still alive. She 
had blood on her backside…and her windcheater was turning pink.’” Both mother and child 
survived, but they suffered severe physical and mental trauma from the incident.  
Other innocent victims were less fortunate than Martínez. Sixty-year-old Christophe 
Matxikotte and sixteen year old Catherine Brion were driving in the French Basque town of 
Bidarray when GAL ambushed their car in 1986. After sustaining a burst of automatic fire, the 
car pitched into an embankment. Matxikotte died before help arrived, and Brion died in the 
ambulance. The girl’s heart-wrenching last words were “‘Maman, je vais mourir’” (Mother, I am 
going to die). And Basque refugee Juan Carlos García Goena died in a car bomb at 5:20 am on 
July 24
th, 1987. Laura Martín, Goena’s wife, remembers “‘I couldn’t see the car, and I saw him 
lacerated with glass. He did not scream but he moaned, he moaned…’” The blast tore off 
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Goena’s leg and part of his face. Laura Martín sprinted out of the house, but her husband was 
already dead. 
The Truth Comes Out  
After etarras began disappearing in 1983, Spanish and Basque political entities and 
civilians began to assume foul play. Many suspected the shadowy death squads were a “full-
scale clandestine offensive”622 organized by the democratic Spanish government. Xabier 
Arzalluz, the leader of the PNV, announced “‘I am personally persuaded, although I cannot 
prove it, that the GAL and that ‘dirty war’ have ties to government measures in Madrid.’”623 At a 
press conference, Herri Batasuna argued there was “connivance between the GAL and the 
apparatus of the [Spanish] state.”624 El País also voiced its suspicions publically: 
“Who recruits, organizes, arms, supplies, and pays the mercenaries of the 
GAL? Who gives the green light for their murders, points out their 
victims, and gives the order to fire? Who protects their strategic 
withdrawal towards the Spanish frontier? If silence is the only answer to 
these questions, it should not be forgotten that there are occasions when 
silence is the most eloquent of attitudes.”625  
Today, it is clear the conspiracy was state-sponsored. But GAL’s organizational details 
remained shrouded in mystery until the 1990s, when court investigations uncovered the truth. In 
1997 a captured GAL mercenary named Ismael Miquel Gutiérrez, vowed before the Spanish 
courts that he had killed under orders “‘from authorities in the Interior Ministry at that time.’” 626 
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BBC Europe confirmed “GAL was financed by secret funds from the Interior Ministry.”627 And 
at a high-profile trial over GAL’s “Massacre at the Monbar,” GAL gunmen confirmed Spanish 
police forces “paid 50,000 francs for a wounded [ETA] victim, and 200,000 francs for a dead 
one.”628 By the 2000s, the highest ranking officials of Spain’s democratic government, including 
the Prime Minister, Interior Minister, and Director of Security Forces, were either suspected or 
convicted of aiding GAL. 
Although Paddy Woodworth argues “the strings that moved the GAL have not been 
traced to their ultimate puppet master,”629 the 1990s trials verified high level members of the 
Spanish government were responsible for the mercenaries. The Civil Governor of Vizcaya from 
1982 to 1984, Julián Sancristóbal, confessed to organizing and funding GAL’s first kidnapping. 
The fiery politician had a nefarious reputation for “fighting fire with fire.” And according to a 
1995 publication from the Spanish newspaper El Mundo, Sancristóbal frequently told his 
advisers “‘I would sort [ETA] out in four days, practicing ‘two for one.’’”630 The Civil Governor 
meant to kill two etarras for every one of ETA’s victims. In 1996, José Barrionuevo, the Interior 
Minister of Spain from 1982 to1988, was convicted of authorizing GAL activities during his 
tenure. His Director of Security, Rafael Vera, was also found guilty by the Supreme Court of 
Spain due to an “avalanche of data and evidence”631 against him. In response to the verdict, Vera 
angrily responded “‘I have no faith whatsoever [in our justice system].’”632 Both men received 
ten-year sentences, and Barrionuevo was later tried for misuse of public funds in 2001.  
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Prime Minister González himself narrowly evaded Supreme Court prosecution for 
involvement with GAL. In 1996 Spanish Judge Baltazar Garzón “built an impressive case 
alleging that Felipe González was the director of GAL.”633 Spain’s Supreme Court rejected the 
prosecution appeal on November 5
th
, 1996, on a narrow six-four margin. The right-wing Prime 
Minister publically denied any participation, but he commented “People do not want to 
understand that we inherited a State apparatus, in its entirety, from the dictatorship.”634 Instead of 
denouncing GAL or praising the success of Spanish democracy, González chose to associate the 
current State structure with Franco’s authoritarian regime. The cryptic statement appeared 
apologetic, as though González were begging Spanish civilians to excuse his government for 
unconstitutional actions. Furthermore, González subtly defended GAL. He contended: “Incidents 
like those which have taken place in Spain [GAL attacks] have happened in all countries where 
terrorism has attacked democracy…but the whole world applauds Clinton and Bush, when there 
is a terrorist attack, people say ‘Let’s go after them wherever they are hiding.’ Applause all 
around.”635 González trailed off, leaving the conclusion of his argument unstated. However, his 
marked silence accused the Spanish people of hypocritically demanding safety, but rejecting 
hardline counterterrorism tactics. Regardless of his true involvement with GAL, González is 
“best remembered for either tolerating or masterminding a network of death squads.” 636 
International Precedence for Pro-State Terrorism  
 The presence of pro-state terrorism in Spain was not unusual—in this González was right. 
In fact, many other nations employed or permitted paramilitary organizations to combat terrorist 
insurrections from the 1950s through the 1980s. There are countless examples of pro-state 
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terrorism in the late-twentieth century, including right-wing death squads in South and Central 
America funded by the United States. For comparative purposes, this section will discuss two 
European pro-state terrorist groups operating in chronological proximity to the GAL. Like Spain, 
Great Britain and French Algeria maintained legitimate police forces to fight terrorism, while 
allowing pro-state extremists or mercenaries to commit hardline anti-terrorism tactics.  
There are several explanations for the prevalence of late-twentieth century European 
paramilitaries. In the Spanish case, GAL partially existed to pacify right-wing law enforcement 
officials who had been using torture, secret arrest, and assassination against ETA for decades. 
For these police, military, and Civil Guard members, hardline counterterrorism methods were the 
norm. Non-violent tactics didn’t necessarily fail in Spain, but law enforcement authorities often 
didn’t attempt them. Franco’s culture of impunity pervaded the State apparatus long after the 
imposition of democracy.    
More generally, Spain, Great Britain, and France (and other nations) likely realized 
hardline actions sometimes work. According to American lawyer Alan Dershowitz, “‘the tragic 
reality is that torture sometimes works, much though many people wish it did not.’”637 Torture, 
along with assassination and secret arrest, can yield the same “benefits” as terrorism. These 
hardline tactics can instill fear in a collective population, diminish terrorist recruitment levels, 
intimidate the opponent group into political submission, or acquire intelligence information. In 
addition, pro-state terrorism can channel negative civilian or military energy into productive 
action.  
During the IRA’s 40 year fight for an independent Northern Ireland, British security 
forces were notorious for colluding with pro-state terrorist groups. In 1966 and 1971 
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respectively, Irish Protestants founded the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defense 
Association (UDA) to combat the IRA’s Catholic separatist violence. These vigilante groups 
were not directly connected to the British government, but they enjoyed the “blind eye” of 
London authorities for decades. Although the UVF went through periods of government 
prohibition for its violent acts, the UDA remained legal until 1992.
638
 Between 1972 and 1978, a 
particularly violent period in the UDA’s history, the loyalist paramilitary killed 120 people. 
Many civilian victims, including farmers, shopkeepers, women, and children, had no connection 
to the IRA.  
The UVF and UDA were not state-sponsored like the GAL, but their violent actions were 
condoned by the British government. London authorities viewed the loyalist paramilitaries as 
unpredictable, but potentially useful, tools. On October 23
rd
, 1972 the UVF staged a massive raid 
on the British Army’s base at Lurgen to collect weaponry. The loyalist gunmen stole “Eighty-
five SLRs [self-loading rifle], twenty-one SMGs [submachine gun], 1,300 rounds of 
ammunition, flares and flak jackets.” When a British soldier woke up during the theft, a UVF 
gunman murmured “‘Don’t worry. We won’t harm you. All we want are the weapons which 
we’ll put to better use than you before December.’”639 The British government never investigated 
or convicted the perpetrators. London had no interest in punishing loyalist thieves, as long as the 
UVF continued killing IRA militants. British “ignorance” was not atypical. In 1973, Belfast 
soldiers stopped three armed UDA men. Instead of arresting the loyalists, the British military 
forces handed them over to the UVF—which in turn let the UDA militants walk free.640 And 
some Northern Irish believed the Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR), a formal British infantry 
regiment, was in league with the loyalists. When the British government deployed UDR troops to 
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South Armagh in 1978, a security spokesman from the area protested London’s transfer orders. 
He argued “‘local people will look at the UDR presence as blatant harassment and intimidation 
carried out to placate extreme loyalist politicians.’”641 Whether or not British soldiers were 
actually colluding with loyalist paramilitaries was irrelevant. IRA supporters viewed the two 
groups as co-conspirators.  
Some British security forces even participated in Ireland’s pro-state terrorism. In August 
1973, British parliament commissioned a study regarding the existence of British military 
members in the UDA. The report concluded “that some soldiers are undoubtedly leading double 
lives.”642 It stated between 5 and 15% of all soldiers in the UDR were involved with the UDA. 
Furthermore, the document claimed “the UDR is the single best source of loyalist weapons and 
their only significant source of modern weapons.”643 Not surprisingly, joint membership in the 
UDA and UDR was encouraged by the British military. In July 1972, the “Civil Advisor” to the 
General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the British Army in Northern Ireland wrote: “One 
important (but unspoken) function of the UDR is to channel into a constructive and disciplined 
direction Protestant energies which might otherwise become disruptive.”644 In short, the military 
official charged UDR soldiers with aiding the UDA’s violent attacks. Sociologist Steve Bruce 
contends the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the UDR, and other factions of the British Army 
shared counterterrorism intelligence with the loyalist paramilitaries. According to Bruce, when 
British security forces collected an IRA militant’s “habits of movement, the interior layout of his 
house, his appearance, his car number and type, and so on,”645they would pass the information to 
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UDA hitmen. And in 1975 a UVF representative asserted the loyalist organization often received 
“British army photographs of IRA suspects.”646 
The French military and the pro-state Organisation d l’armée secrete (OAS) were equally 
intertwined during the Algerian War, which lasted from 1954-1962. Similar to Spain’s GAL, the 
OAS was a far-right paramilitary organization created to combat Algerian separatism. Between 
1961 and 1962, OAS militants kidnapped, tortured, and killed hundreds of National Liberation 
Front (FLN) terrorists. Sadly, the loyalist organization also claimed the lives of many innocent 
women, children, and Muslims. Unlike Spain’s GAL mercenaries, or even the UDA/UVA 
militants of Northern Ireland, OAS members were predominantly French soldiers. When several 
ex-lieutenants devised the pro-state paramilitary organization in January 1961, French General   
Raoul Albin Louis Salan voiced his apathetic support. The high-level official remarked, “‘if it 
[the OAS] amuses them [the French military] and helps them pass the time waiting for better 
things, then let them get on with it.’”647 Benyoucef Benkhedda, an Algerian politician and leader 
of the FLN, confirmed the popular support of the OAS among French Foreign Legionaries and 
army troops. In 1962 Benkhedda stated “‘the union between the O.A.S. and dissident French 
army units was creating so much provocation…Had they succeeded there would have been an 
appalling massacre.’” 648 
In addition to remarkable support among the French military in Algeria, the OAS enjoyed 
a level of respect in France. French politician Jacques Soustelle denounced the “barbarous 
methods”649 of the OAS, but declared the pro-state terrorist organization was now “the real third 
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force in Algeria.”650 Another political figure, Léon Delbecque, announced “‘the only effective 
power in Algeria is the O.A.S’” at a Paris conference in November 1961. And the right-leaning 
deputy Jean Dides passionately declared “‘Glory to General Salan, who will restore France’s 
grandeur!’”651 While the OAS didn’t receive unanimous support from Paris authorities, members 
of the French government certainly condoned (and even celebrated) the group’s violent actions.  
By 1983, there was considerable precedence for pro-state terrorism in Europe. High-
profile attacks in Northern Ireland and French Algeria placed loyalist paramilitaries in 
international news circuits. It is highly unlikely Spanish Prime Minister González and other 
Madrid authorities were not aware of these “examples.” Furthermore, González faced a 
fundamental counterterrorism dilemma. If he ordered hardline anti-terrorism tactics, the Spanish 
and Basque public would rebel. But if he relied on legal counterterrorism methods alone, the 
Spanish military and law enforcement might stage another coup attempt. These factors, 
combined with the prevalence of pro-state terrorist movements world-wide, likely encouraged 
the creation of the GAL.  
Did It Work?   
Unfortunately for the Spanish government, GAL was largely unsuccessful in countering 
ETA-m’s violence. In fact, it may have incited higher death tolls. Although the evidence is 
circumstantial, ETA-m’s violence did increase during GAL’s active period. According to Shabad 
and Ramo’s statistics ETA killed 31 people in 1982. But by 1987 the number of murders 
increased to 49. GAL’s last assassination occurred in July 1987, and in 1988 ETA killings 
dropped to 19 people.
652
 Historian Rauúl López Romo contends, “Unlike Northern Ireland, the 
Basque Country did not have two terrorist groups confronting one another and enjoying similar 
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levels of social support.”653 ETA and its sympathizers, who were ruthlessly hunted by GAL 
assassins, could play the oppressed victim. GAL, on the other hand, became the villain. Enrique 
Gimbernat Ordeig, a criminal law professor at Complutense University in Madrid, asserted 
GAL’s actions were unconstitutional and intolerable. He ironically stated, “‘all citizens have the 
right to life…except those who are victims of State terrorism.’”654 The Spanish newspaper El 
País denounced GAL, publishing “No State which really believes in the rule of law can, for 
whatever reason, leave [such crimes] uninvestigated and unpunished.”655 Laura Martín, a Basque 
woman widowed by GAL, bitterly questioned “‘Is there no one, not one of them, who suffers 
remorse which does not let them live? For me these people [GAL members] are not 
normal…these people, who have committed barbarities, feel nothing.’”656 And a Basque 
nationalist group confirmed Laura Martíns opinion, stating “These mercenaries [GAL] are in fact 
paid, above all, to spread terror.”657 Spanish and Basque civilians alike condemned GAL’s 
actions.  
GAL’s violence against ETA only strengthened the Basque survivors’ commitment to 
armed struggle. Edurne Brouard lost her father to GAL mercenaries in 1984. Santiago Brouard, a 
doctor and ETA militant, was shot six times while he attended to an infant patient in his medical 
clinic.
658
 After his death, Edurne remembers her mother screaming “‘they [GAL] will have to 
pay for this.’”659 When Woodworth interviewed Edurne in 1997, the young woman passionately 
argued “‘I don’t believe that the wife of a guardia civil suffers less than I do.’”660 GAL 
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assassinated Karmen Galdeano’s father in 1985 outside his family home. The young woman 
remembers kneeling by her father’s body in the street, pledging her allegiance to ETA. She 
sobbed “‘Aita [Daddy], I’m going to do it, I’m going to finish the course, I’m going to carry 
on.’”661 Later Karmen honored her promise by becoming a defense attorney for etarras.662 
Izaskun Ugarte, the young widow of a murdered etarra, viewed her husband’s assassination by 
GAL as confirmation of the necessity of ETA violence. At her husband’s funeral, Izaskun raised 
the symbol of ETA crying “‘the finest homage one can pay to Txaplela [her husband’s nom de 
guerre] is to continue the armed struggle.’”663 The black-haired beauty continued her fiery 
rhetoric by stating “‘Txaplela’s sword was liberty, and thousands of swords will take his 
place.’”664 Her passionate spectacle transformed Elorriaga (Txaplela) into a Basque martyr. As 
Woodworth argues, “The GAL had turned him [Elorriaga] into an even more dangerous member 
of ETA in death than he was in life.”665 ETA-militar would continue to fight.  
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Chapter Five: Final Thoughts 
Conclusions  
This research explores a remarkable period in Spanish history. In less than one month, 
three distinct events consumed Spanish and Basque society—including media, politics, and daily 
life. While each occurrence arose from unique circumstances, all three have a common factor. 
ETA terrorism (or efforts to mitigate ETA terrorism) spawned Ryan’s assassination, Izaguirre’s 
fatal torture, and the February 23
rd
, 1981 military coup attempt. Combined, the three events 
produced long-term results within ETA’s organizational structure and the Spanish government’s 
counterterrorism strategy. Although the linkages between El Tejerazo and ETA-pm, ETA-m, and 
GAL have varying degrees of strength, the coup attempt undoubtedly affected the ways in which 
ETA and the Spanish government approached their respective objectives in the 1980s. This 
incredible chain of events, beginning with José Maria Ryan and ending with GAL mercenaries, 
reshaped the trajectory of Spain’s democratic transition.  
Like terrorism, democracy played a vital role in this story. Spanish and Basque hopes for 
political liberty, King Juan Carlos’s devotion to the new democratic system, and Spanish law 
enforcement’s qualms with transparent justice affected innumerable political decisions in the 
1980s. To me, democracy represents the will of the people. While the intricacies of El Tejerazo 
and GAL are fascinating (and crucial) parts of this research, my original contributions focus on 
the Basque and Spanish people. The deaths of José Maria Ryan and José Ignacio Arregui 
Izaguirre generated a new sense of unity between Basques and Spaniards. Many Basques who 
supported independence found Ryan’s assassination appalling. And many Spaniards who 
despised ETA’s violence condemned Izaguirre’s mistreatment. Disregarding civil-war loyalties, 
regional sympathies, political opinions on Euskal Herria, and longings for vengeance, Basques 
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and Spaniards banded together against injustice. Furthermore, both Basque and Spanish civilians 
acted on their convictions. It is one thing to criticize a wrongdoing. It is another thing entirely to 
denounce one’s friends (or defend one’s enemies) in street demonstrations or media publications. 
This courage, displayed by Basques and Spaniards alike, is an extraordinary example of 
compassion and resolve. The thousands of individuals who chose to overlook a bloody past for 
the hope of a non-violent future, inspired later generations to work for a free and fair Spain. 
Thanks to their legacy, the Basque Country eventually found peace.  
            
 
Future Research 
 In the future, I aim to extend my research of Spanish counterterrorism tactics beyond 
ETA. Spain weathered ETA’s 52 year terrorist insurrection, but the political, cultural, and 
economic implications of the violent conflict continue to dictate the nation’s domestic and 
international security policies. The Madrid Train Bombings of March 2004 shifted international 
terrorism to the forefront of Spanish public policy. Today, Spain endeavors to mitigate jihadist 
radicalization and networking within its borders. Recent tragedies in Western Europe, including 
Sunset in San Sebastián, Personal Photo: August 2014   
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the January 2015 Paris attacks, lend new relevance to the study of how and why regional 
sympathies enable asylum seeking terrorists. Many terrorist ideologies, including separatism, 
ethno-nationalism, and jihadism have shaped the political landscape of Spanish history. I hope to 
identify the various factors that make Spain an attractive operational headquarters, residence, or 
target for terrorists. 
 Additionally, this research may be incorporated into a comparative review of ETA and 
the IRA in the future. The separatist terrorists of Northern Ireland exhibit remarkable similarities 
with their Basque counterparts. The two organizations were active at the same time, both 
incorporated ethno-nationalist and leftist sentiment into their ideologies, and both groups 
operated under parliamentary democracies. Furthermore, ETA and the IRA eventually chose to 
disarm. If pursued, this research would compare quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
newspapers from London and Belfast with the newspaper trends revealed in this project. This 
joint-review would explore the similarities and differences in media perceptions of terrorism 
(and counterterrorism) in both Spain and Ireland. The results may lend further insight into the 
influence of popular press on ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations.  
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